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OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

VOLUME III
EVOLUTION OF CIA'S
ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,
1959-JANUARY 1961
(pages 1-203)

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DCI-8

December 1979

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

DCI-8

Volume III

EVOLUTION OF CIA'S
ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,
1959-JANUARY 1961

December 1979

Jack B. Pfeiffer

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Foreword

This is the third volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the problems of establishing a policy for the United States Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts came to power in Cuba.* The policy decided on by the US Government in March 1960 called for the displacement of Fidel Castro, and it was by no means a unilateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency -- although it is demonstrable that the Agency was far more perceptive than the policy making bodies in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro's communist affiliation. Because the policy makers feared censure by the United Nations and/or the Organization of American States, the myth of "plausible deniability" was the caveat that determined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination,

* The preceding volumes were:

- I - Air Operations
- II - Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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"deniability" would be the albatross around the necks of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, (i.e., 15 April 1961) it became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs.

This volume describes the Agency's organization designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it records the interaction between the Agency and other government components (State and the military in particular), between the Agency and the White House, and among various CIA components as the program evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the roles played by both President Eisenhower who authorized the anti-Castro program and Vice President Nixon who has been charged time and again -- unjustifiably as the record reveals -- with being the mastermind behind the operation.

Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change in the concept of the operation between the spring and fall of 1960. From April's plans for the infiltration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained specialists in communications, sabotage, and paramilitary operations to provide training and guidance

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to anti-Castro dissidents, November's plans called for an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a provisional government (approved ^{by State} and ^{controlled} sponsored by CIA) could issue its clarion calls for US, UN, or OAS intervention.

Encompassed in this volume are the records of the policy level meetings which considered such items as funding the operation, possible use of US personnel in combat roles, the use of US bases for training or for operations, types of direct action programs (e.g., propaganda drops vs sabotage), and the host of other problems related to Castro's overthrow. It also makes clear that various US corporate interests played an active (sometimes overactive) role in support of the anti-Castro efforts of the Government.

This volume also examines official records in light of the allegations of the Senate Select Committee's investigations that the assassination plans being developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the official US Government program to overthrow Fidel Castro. There is no basis in fact for this ~~change~~ ^{change}.

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Finally, the reader of this volume should gain some insights to the character of various of the principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency -- who were involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro policy during the period from its inception through the close of the Eisenhower administration. Not all of these impressions are flattering; but the author, who was in no way associated with the operation of the Directorate of Plans (now Operations), hopes that the presentation of the evidence has been as free from bias as possible.

Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions of the other two members of the CIA History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hammond and Mrs. Sharon Bond, to the completion of this volume. Without their unfailing willingness to perform either the substantive research or the grimly mechanical tasks required in preparing a volume such as this, the task could have been interminable.

For any errors of fact or questionable interpretations, the author alone is responsible.

Volume III

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THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

Volume III Evolution of CIA's
Anti-Castro Policies,
1950 - January 1961

Part I

Background

A. Watching from the Sidelines

Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young, 'student leaders' in Cuba, who manages to get himself involved in many things that do not concern him." 1/ Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the United States Government (USG). By early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action program designed to remove the Castro government from control of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de Cochinos from 17-19 April 1961.

- Beginning in 1948 and continuing even after the United States had formulated its official policy of

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removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban Government, the principal questions faced by CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, by the Department of State, and by other concerned principals in the United States were: What is Fidel Castro? By whom is he controlled? What does he represent? Is he, or is he not, a Communist? The nature of the Agency's interest in answers to these questions is reflected in various of the records for the period beginning in the mid-1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended in considerable part on the reporting from the American Embassy offices in Havana.

Commenting on a report entitled "Antidemocratic Antecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro" prepared by President Batista's Military Intelligence Service (SIM) -- apparently in response to a request from the Buró de Represión a las Actividades Comunistas (BRAC)* -- to the Counselor of the American Embassy (Amembassy) in Havana, Lincoln Vinton Chapin, told the CIA representative among other things, that:

*_ Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities.

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The SIM report is nothing more than a summary of allegations and accusations made against Fidel Castro during the period 1948-1950. This summary has apparently been slanted in an effort to make Castro a "Rojo," but the result is a rather poor one. 2/

The Department of State reporter refuted, on a paragraph by paragraph basis, all of the allegations which indicated that Castro had been tied in with Communists, or Communist sympathizers, ever since his university days; and in forwarding the report to Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana indicated that he was furnishing the information because of renewed interest by the State Department in Fidel Castro. 3/

The tenor of State reporting continued in a similar vein well into 1957. Charges that Castro was a Communist could not be substantiated, but State did note that in his student days, he "was involved in gangster-type activities." 4/ Havana Embassy reporting also reflected another of the problems of continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community -- would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista, and were his basic feelings toward the US friendly. 5/

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In the mid-1950's, Havana Station ran seven approved FI projects, most of which were aimed at the Cuban Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular). Agency funds also were used to support the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged principally in propaganda activities. 6/

Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General, apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and his party to a meeting with President Fulgencio Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles, in praise of the meeting.* 7/ In fact, Agency support for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a democratically elected successor and amnesty for Castro and his followers, as well as other anti-Batista dissidents, was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector General in November 1957. 8/

* David R. McLean, a former member of the IG's Inspection Staff, attached a cryptic note to the copy of Dulles' letter of response to Batista, which he, (McLean) included in the file of miscellaneous documents on the Bay of Pigs, which were inherited by the present author. McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not confirmed this story.

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In view of subsequent developments, one interesting suggestion made by the Inspector General in November 1957 was the following:

On the island of Cuba, probably only a US citizen, in some way known to be connected with the US Government and "assumed" to be backed by Washington, would have the ability to act as intermediary between the various opposition groups in the Batista Government and work out a possible "cease fire." This would have to be done covertly, and any results achieved either not ever publicly announced or certainly not advertised until after the election. Any public attempt to bring peace would be foredoomed to failure by each side probably indicating exorbitant demands and then being unable to withdraw from its announced position.* 9/

Although it may have had no relation to the Kirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957, less than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum, William Wieland of the Department of State notified Adolf Rerle, one of the country's leading experts on Latin American Affairs and a former member of the

* It is interesting to speculate whether at this time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Pawley, former US Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an American businessman who operated significant enterprises in Cuba, to negotiate with Batista. Within a year's time, Pawley, who also stood high in the ranks of the Republic Party contributors, was designated to undertake such a mission to Cuba.

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State Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, according to Berle, "to see whether anything can be done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an orderly conclusion." 10/

Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted:

It is rough going, anti-intervention is all right up to a point. But we are responsible for keeping order in the hemisphere quite aside from the proprieties, and a rather bolder policy in that regard seems indicated. 11/

By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of Castro's government, and particularly the pro-Castro proclivities of his two principal deputies, Ernesto Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel's brother, that penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a priority concern of the field. At least two agents were successfully placed in PSP ranks, and in March 1958, one Agency officer managed to join the Castro forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and to observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958, Robert D. Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself "captured" by Raul Castro's forces in order to be able to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US

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businessmen who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro. In both instances, the Agency representatives returned unharmed; and both reported on the "radical" and anti-American nature of the Castro movement. According to one source, Wiecha found "definite communist overtones" among the Raul Castro forces.* 12/

Additional documentation of the pro-communist nature of the Castro organization was reported with great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's contingent was communist oriented or not, others such as Adolf Berle and his friends (both in and out of State Department), continued to reflect their concern about the possible ways to combat the growing strength of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13/ Berle was most hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied by cooperation among Latin American liberals working in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans who had broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos and Pepín Bosch) with additional support from the OAS

* The historian for WH Division provided the figures on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates 19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured.

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-- and only minor participation from the US Department of State. 14/

At a time when the Agency's fears about the Castro movement were increasing, a rather different proposal was put forward by the Chief of the Paramilitary Division, Political and Psychological Staff, of the Clandestine Service. Rather than trying to whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro. It was apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's hostile attitude toward the United States because of our efforts to prop up Batista. To accomplish this, Cox suggested that:

A practical way to protect United States interests in this matter would be to make secret contact with Castro, assure him of the United States sympathy with some of his objectives, and to offer him support. The individual chosen to make the contact should be of such background that it is clear that he speaks with the authority of the United States Government.

Obviously, the support must be given covertly so as not to endanger United States relations with Batista. The most effective means of help to Castro would be arms and ammunition. Air dropping of

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this equipment might be dangerous from the security aspect. Allowing a ship-load of equipment manned by a Cuban crew to evade our Coast Guard would probably be a better method. The most secure means of help would be giving the money to Castro, who could then purchase his own arms. A combination of arms and money would probably be best.* 15/

By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under, the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less gracefully and to have the government of the country taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had been elected in the rigged election, but by a junta pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When

* Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was biased against Castro. One report in the fall of 1958 indicated that Castro definitely was not a Communist, citing as a reason for this: "Ninety-five percent of his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic priests have joined Fidel Castro and his forces in the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains, while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single chaplain. (Source comment: The United States should not be taken in by President Fulgencio Batista's attempt to label the revolutionary movement as Communist inspired, dominated, or influenced.)" 16/

The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as one might surmise, a Catholic priest.

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traveling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William D. Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out gracefully. Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been running the Cubana Airline.

In return for Batista's support for a friendly military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his ouster -- the representatives of the Department of State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be provided safety for himself, his friends, and his close cronies, particularly those whose lives would be endangered should there ever be a truly violent overthrow of the government. Batista also was to be provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba. Various individuals were identified as possible candidates for the junta, and, according to King, the objective was that various of these members would have

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sufficient political strength to weaken Castro's support.

Following the meeting in Miami, Pawley did undertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba. Arriving on 8 December in Havana he had a series of preliminary meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister, who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley indicated that he was going to make. Unfortunately, however, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was unlikely that Batista would accept the proposals. The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took place on 11 December 1958 when, according to the report from Havana station:

Pawley met with Batista for two hours this evening. Laid his plan before Batista without pulling any punches. B[atista] took it calmly. He agreed with much of Pawley's analysis of situation, but said he could not take the junta way out. 17/

Batista made no promises, and went through the reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office -- for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that there would be a blood bath; and that he had both moral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana

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noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows:

Batista will not accept plan, and will make every effort turn government over to Rivera Aguero [the Batista candidate who had been named Presidential successor in a rigged election]. However, unfavorable developments may produce change of attitude on part of B[atista]. 18/

Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. A representative of the Archbishop of Havana, Father Bez Chebebe, approached the American Consul in Santiago to float some proposals for resolving the differences between the two countries. The priest emphasized that although a Castro take over was inevitable:

Both Fidel Castro and US interests had important stake in sugar crop and both undoubtedly wish resolve problems caused by present situation. Also said that there were matters now mostly minor on both sides which have been sources mutual irritation and misunderstanding and that these should be eliminated soonest, so that they would not grow to affect future relations, which Father considers inevitable. 19/

In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of Havana indicated to the Amconsul that:

He though[t] US Government could profitably send person of confidence,

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not necessarily an official, to discuss mutual problems as discreetly as possible with Fidel. Implied that such would be well received. 20/

Despite the fact that the communist proclivities of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated by Agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COS Havana cabled Headquarters strongly supporting the position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative had proposed to the American Consulate, saying:

Havana Station feels proposal merits serious State/CIA consideration. Operation this nature could pay big future dividends if fully qualified person could be found for job and dispatched quickly. Regardless how we may feel about Castro and his movement, both will be important political forces for a long time to come. Perhaps candidate could be found through National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21/

At about the same time this proposal was being put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary Division (PMD) to establish a small contingency task force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two representatives of PMD, [3] and [3] were sent to Havana -- [3] to locate and survey possible drop zones and [3] to get himself into position to see if he could locate dissidents who

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were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. What WH hoped to accomplish, presumably, was that they could organize these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro from taking over the government if Batista should suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. 22/

On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington; a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and the Office of Logistics would have an arms load rigged for a drop by 2 January 1959. 23/

It was not until the last week of December 1958 that President Eisenhower became actively involved in discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward Cuba. His interest was precipitated by a 23 December 1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 December. The President apparently indicated that he had not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA

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regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject for discussion.

Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the President's Board of Consultants (later the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to the discussions, but Dulles rather strongly suggested that there was a significant difference between the discussions which were intended for the Special Group 5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities for general problems related to foreign intelligence. Dulles made the specific point that if the Board of Consultants was going to get involved in the details of planned covert operations, they were then in a position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discussion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress to attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly, noting that such action by Congress would be an infringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief. 24/

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At 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958, there was another high level meeting attended by Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke, the CNO; General Cabell, DDCI; and Gordon Gray at which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing to flee Cuba; and possible US action, including direct intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that were discussed. There also was some suggestion that the US take the responsibility for naming members to a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban Government. 25/

With some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower recalled this period in the following manner:

During the rush of these last events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United States. (Earlier reports which I had received of Castro's possible Communism were suspect because they originated with people who favored Batista.)

"Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement," Allen Dulles said. "If Castro

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takes over, they will probably participate in the government." When I heard this estimate, I was provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier.

At another point, the ex-President wrote:

Though our intelligence experts backed and filled for a number of months, events were gradually driving them to the conclusion that with the coming of Castro, Communism had penetrated this hemisphere. 26/

B. Castro Takes Over

During the first few weeks of 1959 following Castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the changes in government. The Station seemed assured that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements, especially on the developing military capabilities. In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station provide support for the Army's covert collection of military intelligence under commercial cover in Havana, COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing the Station's own capabilities in this area. COS was overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell assured the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army that while he was aware that Havana had

objected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonetheless had been "instructed" to cooperate.* 27/

In these early weeks of 1959, US representatives in Havana were predicting that Castro would have a difficult time holding his government together, and among other things, one report emphasized the probability that Castro would soon find that he would have to get along with the United States. 29/ The most likely threat to relations with the United States was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, but neither CIA nor State Department representatives saw any threat to this installation, and this belief was supported in early March 1959 by a Special National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro "sooner or later [is] likely to ask for major increases

* An interesting side note to the discussions at this time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned to use a negro Lt. Col. who was on TDY in Havana to do a study of the new Castro Army. In a memorandum to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, and to the Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief, Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using the term "black" -- that General Erskine (Army Special Forces) believed that a "color bar" did exist in the Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col. Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could be made. 28/

in the nominal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base, revision of employment practices which appeared to discriminate against Cuban workers, and perhaps other changes." 30/

In the early spring of 1959, as Castro made known that he was planning to visit the United States, COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the importance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters information that:

Washington visit can make or break Castro. Unless he gets a strong helping hand from the United States, many serious observers feel his regime will collapse within a matter of months. 31/

Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the new Cuban Government, COS Havana indicated that Castro's popularity was very low among the middle and upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that Castro was "the idol of the masses." 32/ COS Havana did an excellent job of predicting how Castro would act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting that Castro would probably make his pitch, not to the heads of the State Department and to the press, but that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the

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students, and the masses in America to support his revolution. COS emphasized that Headquarters should make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not openly avowed Communist, was heavily infiltrated with Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to Communist positions, and, moreover, there was little question about who would eventually control the Cuban Government. COS did suggest that Headquarters give serious consideration to planting embarrassing questions with reporters to stick to Castro while he was in the US. 33/ Both the Department of State and COS Havana were in general agreement about the results of the Castro visit. COS Havana summarized one of his dispatches as follows:

It would be unwise to assume from the minor indications to date that Fidel has undergone a serious change of heart as a result of his visit to the United States. 34/

In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted that:

Despite Castro's apparent simplicity, sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the United States public, there is little

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probability that Castro had altered the essentially radical course of his revolution. From his experience here, he has gained a valuable knowledge of American public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his return to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this man. With all his appearance of naiveté, unsophistication, and ignorance on many matters, he is clearly a strong personality and a born leader of great personal courage and conviction. While we certainly know him better than before, Castro remains an enigma; and we should await his decisions on specific matters before assuming a more optimistic view than heretofore about the possibility of developing a constructive relationship with him and his government. 35/

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in this period shortly following Castro's visit to the United States the COS Havana may have misjudged a significant development which surfaced almost immediately after Castro's return to Cuba. Remarking on an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appearing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that:

These demonstrations obviously welcome, but possibly most significant aspect is demonstration once again, enormous power Castro, who with few words made anti-Communism popular position. By same token he could reverse trend at any time, and skeptics speculating that current stand is so intended to make it more difficult for U.S. interests to protest effectively against stringent agrarian reform law. 36/

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A follow-up dispatch within two days of that cited above provided a more accurate insight as to the depth of the struggle which was, in fact, being waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti-Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) with reference to the confusion among party members regarding statements that Castro had made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante laid it on the line that there was a struggle between the left and the right; and he emphasized that the conservative element was trying to take advantage of remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in the United States. According to the source reporting on Escalante's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the Communists, the United States would cut off economic aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so serious that he made some unwise statements. The source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the 26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario (the DR), were in control of the revolution, and that the

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duty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome the counterrevolutionaries. 37/

In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on *The Situation in the Caribbean through 1959*, the intelligence community again indicated that the internal situation in Cuba had not been decided. The SNIE commented:

The Communists probably do not now control Castro, but they are in a position to exert influence in his regime, and to carry on further organizational work. 38/

Through the summer and into the early fall of 1959, the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism continued to be a major subject of discussion within the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting that was begun by COS Havana in early June, this topic continually occurred. In August 1959, when the Deputy Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Rudolph Gomez, assisted Leo Churn in the preparation of an "Urgent Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist association was prominently featured. At this time, and reflecting the views of both Western Hemisphere Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not

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considered to be a Communist. His brother Raul Castro, however, was clearly identified as a hard-core Communist.* 39/

The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante had referred in mid-summer came to a head in mid-October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military leader in Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number of leadership positions which were being turned over to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than to members of the 26 July Movement. Matos resigned as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and was arrested on 20 October. During the months prior to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a

* In view of the trend of recent years, it is interesting to note that the Churn report found reason to be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security Committee (Sen. Eastland's Committee) for getting involved in matters which were principally of concern to the intelligence community. In this case, the Senate Committee was criticized specifically for taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who had defected, and questioning him before turning him over to the intelligence agencies for initial interrogation.

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number of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos also broke with Castro. Among these were Faustino Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired Property; Rufo López-Fresquet, Minister of Finance; Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro and replaced by Che Guevera, whose expertise was in revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has said, this was the second civil war for Castro. 40/

Coincidental to the internal squabble that led to Matos's resignation, the Deputy Chief of WH Division, Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promoting an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the PSP. In the course of this tour, the qualifications of the best of the agents who might conduct this penetration were reviewed with COS Havana and Station personnel. Gomez also pointed out that the anti-Communist efforts in Havana should not be limited to those who were FI or PP designees, but everyone in the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities to push into the Partido Socialista Popular. In reporting on his visit with COS Havana, Gomez noted that

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the Ambassador and other members of the American Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in the program being advanced; and, in fact, asked Gomez if CIA could "send a qualified Communist expert to Havana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officers on Communist doctrines, particularly on their modus operandi and how Communists working under cover could be recognized." Upon his return Gomez received J. C. King's approval to comply with this request.* 41/

Even as Gomez was promising State's representatives in Havana assistance in understanding Communist activities, J. C. King, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, was going forward to the Director of Central Intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the Department of State's failure to provide CIA with a policy action paper on Cuba -- a paper which, according to King, had been promised as early as May 1959, yet had not been received by the end of October. Nor was there any indication when such paper might be

* It would appear from this request that both the DDP and State were remiss in the training of their overseas personnel. That the Station had to request Headquarters for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine.

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expected, despite numerous meetings with Department representatives. King also was particularly critical of the fact that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance had he called on the Agency for consultation -- this despite the fact that there had been indications from the Department that such consultations were to be held. 42/

The ambivalence regarding Castro's relation to the Communist Party was illustrated by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959 in testifying at the hearings of the Judiciary Subcommittee which was investigating the "Communist Threat to the US through the Caribbean." In response to the question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C. P. Cabell stated:

Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member or even a pro-Communist. On the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his government, which was allowed the Communists opportunity -- free opportunity -- to organize, to propagandize, and to infiltrate. We know the Communists consider Castro a representative of the bourgeoisie ... Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist, however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. 43/

In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on

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6 November 1959 and "would remain in effect until further notice." The RMD stated in part as follows:

For the moment, CIA operations should be carried out on the assumption that the revolutionary government is basically non-Communist, with legitimate reform goals that deserve US respect and support. Covert operations should support overt efforts to arrive at a rapprochement with the present government and to eliminate the conditions described above without resorting to forceful means.

If it should be established that the Cuban government is Communist-led or Communist-dominated, or if that government cannot be swayed from adopting measures which intentionally or unintentionally accomplish Communist objectives, the question of direct attacks against Castro will be re-examined. In planning for such a contingency, each existing or new asset should be evaluated in terms of possible future utility from a paramilitary point of view, nor will the development or recruitment of assets be precluded merely because they lack a paramilitary capability. Under no circumstances would any asset be apprised of this contingency planning. In fact any disposition to undertake violent action should be promptly and emphatically discouraged pending a change in policy at the policy-making level. 44/

Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the field, another and more significant program was being evolved in Headquarters. On 11 December 1959, J. C. King, Chief, WH Division prepared a memorandum for the

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Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as its specific objective "The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections 6 months after assumption of office." To achieve this objective, Chief, WH/D put forward a program, to include among other items the following:

1. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba, from liberal Caribbean countries.
2. Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.
3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba.

Colonel King then went on to suggest that:

Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevarra [*sic*], have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government.* 45/

* The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see page 296) which reproduces the original 11 December 1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI. In light of subsequent investigations, hearings, and publicity regarding the Agency's complicity in assassination (footnote continued on following page)

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As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National Intelligence Estimate, "The Situation in the Caribbean through 1960," indicated that Castro was in to stay, despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no serious threat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed out that if there was direct US intervention, "Most Cubans including the military, would react violently." 46/

As 1960 began, General Cabell, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, held a joint briefing

plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3 of Appendix A show two significant corrections in Allen Dulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col. King. In paragraph 3d, the phrase "thorough consideration be given to the *elimination* of Fidel Castro" carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the text read "removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination."

At a later point in the same paragraph the original text said "many informed people believe that the *disappearance* of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles has substituted the word "removal" for the word "disappearance." These significant changes in the text on the original copy of King's memorandum -- which the author has recovered -- support the contention that the author has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the component (WH/4) officially charged with the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program was neither charged with nor responsible for programs designed to assassinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. Colonel King's memorandum of 11 December 1959, with the pencilled corrections noted above, was concurred in by Richard M. Bissell and approved by Allen W. Dulles on 12 December 1959.

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(8 January 1960) on Cuba for the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the increasing hold that the Communist ideology and those affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting the Castro government. At this time, the DDCI also discussed the need for increased covert and semi-covert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological warfare, political action, economic action, and paramilitary action, all of which had been conducted in some degree during the past year. 47/ This 8 January 1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of the serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelligence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs.

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Part II

Castro Must Go

A. Organizing for Covert Action (January-March 1960)

The first mention of a formal Agency structure to deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by Colonel L. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support, in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January 1960. White's diary noted:

There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba, and the Director requested Dick Bissell to organize a special task force to insure that we were attacking this situation from all possible angles. 1/

The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 January 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban Operations. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and 2 at Santiago Base. 2/

Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned [27] [16-17], and formerly one of the principals

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in Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resulted in the overthrow of the Communist-dominated government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Esterline was the choice of J. C. King, Chief, WH Division; and to the best of Esterline's recollection, toward the end of his two year tour in [11] he had been queried by King about remaining in [11] or coming back to Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It was shortly after his return to the States in January of 1960 that Esterline became Chief, WH/4. 3/

In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan episode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience in World War II with the OSS, Esterline thinks that he got the job because J. C. King "had pretty much confidence in my judgment."* 4/ The relationship between Esterline and J. C. King, Chief, WH Division and the relationship between King and Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) during the course of

* The author had heard that Esterline had been directly selected by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of WH/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is contrary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline.

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the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of considerable speculation ever since the close out of the invasion. It seems appropriate that some attention should be devoted to this subject before going further into detail about the evolution of the covert plans to oust Castro. One source close to the DDP at the time of the anti-Castro activity stated flatly:

A task force was formed under Bissell, excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from having in fact any control whatsoever over the activity. 5/

The WH/D history states:

There was an informal but understood short cut in the chain of command; basic decisions were made at the DDP, DCI, or Presidential level. Although some of the key personnel were detailed from WH Division, the Cuban Headquarter's unit was in another building; and no one pretended that J. C. King was running the show. Jacob D. Esterline ... was the Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the build-up and invasion attempt and took his orders from the DDP. 6/

Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep King on the outer edges of the anti-Castro activity; but according to Elder, Col. King always knew what was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of

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Pigs activity from its inception until its conclusion.* 7/

Esterline himself declined to comment for the record on this particular speculation, but indicated that he was not sure what J. C. King was up to at all times. It is clear, however, that Esterline was in very close contact with Col. King throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.**

Additional insights concerning J. C. King's role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by Richard D. Drain, who was Chief of Operations for WH/4, and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drain has stated:

J. C. King never was told, I think for understandable reasons, to what extent he

* Elder suggested to the author that "they" wanted King out of the operation because of his strong Republican affiliations. "They" were never identified, but King was well acquainted with highly placed figures and contributors to the Republican Party.

** This will become most apparent in the subsequent discussion of the relationships between WH/4 and William D. Pawley. During the author's initial conversation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline did state, in a manner similar to Elder, that J. C. King was out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro effort, because he had known Republican Party affiliations. 8/ There was no elaboration indicating the impact of such affiliations on King's role, and there is nothing in the record to support this allegation.

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was in it, to what extent he was not in it. Therefore, from time to time, he would protrude ... sometimes, saying that he was sorry to protrude; and then he would retract; and then he would be in; and then he would be out ... that's as a person. Then again, his Deputy, Ray Herbert, would call and say "I just don't understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala today. Would you come over and explain to me what that's all about;" and I would step out of the maelstrom of JMATE ... they were just working flat out ... and go over. There would be the old WH types doing their thing in the old WH way. Maybe two cables a week from the stations, and quite leisurely ... I think what had happened to J. C. King was that he had stayed overlong in the same job; and he was "Mr. WH," by Gawd. With the exception of first Guatemala and then Cuba, there was very little that ever happened in Latin America which got to be, given our other worldwide responsibilities in the DDP, a very front priority matter; and consequently, at Staff meetings, for example, they would go around and talk about the Soviet Union and China and Europe and even Africa. Then, if there was any time left, J. C. King would have his time at bat and report some relatively minor thing. Except in the case of Guatemala there was, as everybody knows now, a very substantial paramilitary operation which was run by Richard M. Bissell in his capacity as Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination.

I think that one of the many reasons ... and I never was able to get much in the way of history on Guatemala as an aid to the study of the Cuban operation ... while the latter was in process ... was

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that this had never set very well with J. C. King. He was divested of the Guatemalan experience, and particularly when it turned out to be a success ... PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb luck more than anything else. J. C. ... couldn't take any of the bows for it. All right, that rankled, I am sure. Now this one comes along, and rather than expand WH/4, or whatever the hell it was, and leave this JMATE Project within that Branch, and build up that Branch -- oh, no. Once again the same man, Dick Bissell -- now, however, DDP instead of SAPC -- becomes the case officer for the thing; and his assistant, Tracy Barnes, is all over him. One of J. C. King's few very good men, Jacob D. Esterline, is pulled aside and made Chief of the project ... The old man had a great deal of *amour propre*, J. C. King did. He was very vain. He had all of the area expertise that one would like to see in a Division Chief, but he had been at it an awful long time. It was a very incestuous Division. In terms of the rotation, it was solely within WH. There were very few people in WH who had served outside of the Western Hemisphere, except in Washington. They were a tight-knit little group, and here now, for the second time running, one of their big chances to shine -- there was a lot of money and all that kind of stuff -- again had been taken away ... and it was ... it was tough. 9/

Where Drain implied that J. C. King was cut completely out of WH/4 activities and operations, Mr. Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat different. In the course of an oral interview, the

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former DDP responded to questions concerning J. C.

King in the following manner:

Question: I would like to clarify at this point J. C. King's relationship to the Bay of Pigs project. I have heard it on both sides -- that he was involved and that he was deliberately end-run.

Mr. Bissell: There is no doubt in my mind that that was the case. I was going to say that both of the things that you have heard have an element of truth in them. There was a deliberate decision fairly early in the game -- I doubt if it was as early as March [1960. In fact,] I am pretty sure that it wasn't, [but] I am reasonably sure that the decision I speak of was made by some such date as June [1960] -- [that] Esterline would take charge of this Project and Esterline would have direct access to me. He would not be under the usual requirement of all the cases going through J. C. King. Now, as the scope of the scale of this operation increased, and with the passage of time, Esterline's direct channel to me came to be more exercised; and there was frequent interchange between Esterline and myself that didn't go through J. C. King in the sense of a command channel. On the other hand, J. C. was brought into all the consultations and was fully informed from the very beginning about this operation. His advice was sought and given, and I usually found it very good and followed it. I remember no specific case where either J. C. King's specific advice or general attitude toward the operation was inconsistent with, or in conflict with my own.

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Question: Why did you make this decision with regard to Jake, coming directly to you and not going through King? Was it just a matter of great efficiency, or what precipitated that?

Mr. Bissell: I think it was in part on the model of the Guatemalan operation, and in part, I think, a feeling, probably on my own part -- in some degree perhaps on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J. C. was not effective enough to handle this kind of very fast moving, quite large scale, quite complex, paramilitary operation.

Question: Do you recall any instances where there was a serious conflict between what Jake wanted to do and what J. C. King thought should be done?

Mr. Bissell: I don't remember many, if any, and I believe that the relationships between Jake and J. C. were pretty good throughout. 10/

Certainly the written record bears out Bissell's contention that King was fully informed and that the relationship between King and Esterline was, if not love, at least mutually respectful.*

* The only point of contention between King and Esterline that surfaced in the records concerned the degree to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs related to the organization of the Cuban exiles. At one point, Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact with Pawley be cut off, but in sending Esterline's memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact with WH/4. In fact, Pawley was in continuous contact -- even though in disagreement -- with both Jake and King until the close out of the operation.

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Another of the questions which must be addressed in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is the failure of Richard Helms -- at that time Chief of Operations (COPS) for the DDP -- to become more than marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral interviews again provided the best explanations, and, consequently, are entered into this record in rather full detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the following comments:

Helms was COPS [Chief of Operations]. Either on his own volition, which I suspect or on order -- which I doubt -- Dick Helms completely divorced himself from this thing. I mean absolutely! The one time that I heard from Helms during this entire project was ... I am sitting down there in my chair, as COPS of the project, on a Monday, having spent the entire goddamned weekend working with

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] trying to get an airplane and some Cubans out of Montego Bay before the Brits in Jamaica came back from their long weekend ... I am sitting there congratulating myself that the plane is out, and the Cubans are out, and the British are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and I get a telephone call from Dick Helms's long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would like to speak to you." Well, fine ... well, the whole thing on his part was so ... to me ... incredibly apologetic ... three times he said to me in different parts of the conversation ... "As you know, I have nothing to do with this project." What he did have to do with, ever since

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the Francis Gary Powers thing, he had been a member of an inter-Agency committee that met with periodic regularity to discuss air matters of any sensitivity. I guess he'd had enough to do with this project so that somebody [who] had [been] reading the cable traffic told him ... "Well, those nuts down in Quarters Eye seem to have lost an airplane this weekend." He was going to the regular committee meeting that afternoon, so he had to ask me the details ... very apologetically. The third time that he said, "You know I have nothing to do with this project," I said, "Well Mr. Helms, I don't want to be fatuous about this, but I wish to Christ that you did have because we could use your expertise." He said, "Hahaha ... yes, well thank you very much," and that was the end of that. He avoided the thing like the plague. One of the reasons may have been that, of course, life went on; and if Bissell was getting increasingly immersed in this one thing, somebody had to watch the whole worldwide store ... which of course Helms was damned good at. A less attractive suggestion is that Helms figured that there was a high likelihood that this thing would screw up, and he didn't want to have the tar baby around him. I don't know. ll/

Bissell, in responding to the question about Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, commented as follows:

I think that he [Helms] saw most all of the cable traffic and I think he was pretty well informed as to what was going on, very well informed; but he was really out of the line of command on this operation. There was something of a tacit agreement between us, that he would be devoting himself to a lot of the other on

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going business of the DDP office, because this was taking a great deal of my time.

Question: This was a tacit agreement, this wasn't a session in which you and Helms ...

Bissell: Let me say this was probably not that explicit. I would make an observation here, and I don't want you to infer anything really beyond what it says, it was not particularly easy -- I did not find it particularly easy -- to discuss things clearly and derive a clear understanding with Dick [Helms] about the division of labor between us when he was my Deputy. I don't imply by this any sense of conflict or rivalry, but he would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters, and I would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters. We saw one another, of course, all the time. Quite often I would consult him about something that I was handling. I think rather less often he would consult me. I don't mean to imply however in that any kind of concealment from me -- I never had that feeling at all -- but it really was our habit during the whole time that we were in those positions that the division of labor between us was more tacit than explicit. 12/

Simultaneously with the decision to create a separate Branch in WH Division to handle the anti-Castro activity discussions were begun by both the Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the many questions raised early in the game was whether

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the US program should be overt or covert, with the overt implications being the ultimate application of US military force to oust Castro. DCI Dulles emphasized that contingency planning should be undertaken by the Special Group, without necessarily involving either the President or the National Security Council.

The Department of State was concerned that if Fidel Castro were deposed, perhaps his successors, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, would be even worse than Fidel. As reported in subsequent congressional revelations concerning CIA's role in assassination plots, it was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January 1960 that the Director of Central Intelligence "emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." 13/

At this same Special Group Meeting, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses in the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation. According to the report on the Special Group Meeting:

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Mr. Gray commented that a problem would be posed for administration officials if a decision should be taken to change our attitude toward Castro, as outlined earlier in the meeting. He acknowledged that any such decision must be kept highly secret, but he foresaw difficulties which would arise, for example, during testimony by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury before Congress, at public gatherings, etc., if they should have to give an impression that the US was not doing anything about Cuba. 14/

This in fact, was the "damned if I do, damned if I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United States found itself with reference to both the United Nations and the Organization of the American States throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as the myth of "plausible deniability" overruled common sense. Following the initial Special Group meeting, there was a flurry of activity seeking some solid proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960, C. Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDP for Action), J. C. King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others, discussed a whole series of issues which would be basic to the program from this time forward: identification of the principal Cuban leaders -- Ramon Barquin, Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually

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head up the principal anti-Castro organization supported by the Agency) were mentioned; radio propaganda operating out of either Third country or US areas was raised; the training program for both communicators and for PM trainers at Fort Randolph in the Canal Zone was discussed; and the possible acquisition of aircraft for support operations and the question of US business as a cover for the operations of the exile groups in the United States were all discussed. The possible involvement of US businesses to put overt pressure on the US government for the possible imposition of economic sanctions and as a covert means of raising money for the support of Cuban exile organizations also surfaced. This initial meeting also recognized the problem of trying to gain the support of the more liberal Latin American Governments (e.g., that of Betancourt in Venezuela). 15/

Al Cox, one of the senior officers in paramilitary operations was in attendance, and he would subsequently note:

Stringent security precautions were placed on JMARC, including the exclusion of the PP Staff and other Agency components from all cable and dispatch traffic and from access to correspondence between

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the project and the office of the DDP. ... In point of fact, such restrictive measures were somewhat meaningless insofar as keeping awareness of the project's activities away from PP/PMG. The A/DDP/P granted permission to PP/C/PMG to read the daily project traffic, (with Esterline's knowledge and permission). Esterline personally knew the majority of the PP/PMG senior officers, and in no time he had drafted six or seven of these, including the Deputy Chief, PMG, for assignment to JMARC ... This, of course, was valuable as a built-in penetration of JMARC in the best FI and CI tradition.* 16/

Early in February of 1960, Allen Dulles was briefed in general terms on the planning that was being initiated by WH Division, and at the same time J. C. King told the Director "that the Branch concept was used [in establishing WH/4] rather than the term Task Force for greater security and to simplify channels of command." The Director subsequently explained to the Special Group (3 February 1960) some of the activities that were being undertaken, noting that within the next week or two, the Group would receive

* The crypt for the WH/4 anti-Castro operation was initially JMARC. Following compromise of this crypt, the project became JMATE (sometime in the period between 6-13 December 1960). Throughout this volume the project will be identified as JMATE, except in direct quotations.

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a paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs which had been initiated against the Castro Government.* 17/

The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were discussed in a DDP review session on 11 February 1960 which was attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline, Al Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry,** propaganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division had roughly \$50,000 available for immediate use, it was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars -- an estimate that would, in effect, be some 40 million short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however, that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning session, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and

* In addition to the Special Group, which included a DOD representative, WH/4 worked directly with other representatives of DOD regarding current developments and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis Cuba. 18/

** "The big sugar sack?"

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here, too, the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnes for an attitudinal survey of "Cuban society" which could have (and should have) caused CIA planners to re-think the whole anti-Castro effort.* 19/

A very similar briefing, with somewhat more emphasis on possible paramilitary action, was given to a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960; and the agenda for the 17 February 1960 meeting of the Special Group, again emphasized that the Castro Government was dependent on sugar revenues for both continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric subversion programs.** 20/ It was further suggested to the Special Group that dissidents within Cuba might also be stimulated to sabotage, with the ultimate result leading to Castro's ouster. 21/ The recommendation that the DCI made to the Special Group was as follows:

* This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is discussed subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222-226.

** The DOD representatives who were briefed were the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale.

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That CIA be authorized to initiate operational planning, including covert spotting and assessment of potential agents, for eventual sabotage of both Cuban and American-owned sugar mills. Should this course of action prove feasible and desirable, the operation would be designed to deny Castro as much as possible of the revenues anticipated from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/

Interestingly enough, although the briefing for DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary planning, apparently no mention of the subject was made to the Special Group.

On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he emphasized that he was not asking for permission to engage in action, only that he was looking for a Special Group approval. Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the President's reaction.

President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic about the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting that the loss of sugar revenues would impact on

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Castro's ability to continue to finance subversive activities in other Latin America areas. President Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic sabotage, and he would not agree to the plan to identify assets specifically for sabotage operations against the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing to support a program to identify assets for the sugar industry " and other things as well ... including even possibly things that might be drastic." In addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the President also requested that a comprehensive covert action program be prepared by Mr. Dulles. This, it was suggested, should go to the Special Group; and if they approved the plans, then the President wanted to discuss them. In any event, action on the PM program would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his specific approval.* 23/

* The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960 also noted that

Mr. Joseph Scott of State also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point.

This appears to have been one of the few instances where Department of State representatives indicated support for possible direct action programs rather than political solutions to the Cuban problem.

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Despite the rather positive doubts that the President had about the sugar sabotage activity, J. C. King charged ahead almost immediately following the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960. On 18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed discussion concerning the disruptive effects which might result from interference with the Cuban sugar operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Ambassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran, and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran had been willing and able to provide valuable assistance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month, Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs) who reportedly was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King, Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in US oil companies deliveries to Cuba and actions which might cut back on US tourist trade with the island. 24/

Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements for the publication of *Diario de la Marina* in Miami,

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and also "to raise at least a portion of the money, which would be needed for this operation." In addition to Pawley, King also contacted Henry Holland in New York City, suggesting that Holland raise money, through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL. King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors that the "money was going to be used on behalf of non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious effort to remove Fidel Castro." 25/

In addition to J. C. King's high level contacts, Jake Esterline and Mr. Dulles had a meeting with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the US Information Agency who had requested a briefing on the current state of activities in Cuba -- Washburn was concerned lest there be a conflict of interests between USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area. Washburn presented the Agency with a copy of some proposals which the State Department had approved for implementation by USIA in Cuba. USIA's pitch would be that the long-standing friendship between Cuba and the United States was being endangered by the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology

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into Cuba -- at the same time not denying that the US was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba. The Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it would be advisable for Mr. Washburn, who was planning to visit Cuba, to meet [3], COS Havana, and outline the USIA program for [3] benefit.* 26/

As the propaganda activities were being pushed forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban exiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM action, and other measures against Castro were being contemplated, a cautionary memorandum apparently was drafted by one of the individuals most closely concerned with the potential anti-Castro operations. The memorandum, undated and unsigned, reviewed the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of what was being planned for Project JMATE. It noted some of the similarities or differences with respect to the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the possibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light of the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of the

* One result of the meeting with Washburn was a decision to turn over a planned USIA anti-Castro cartoon effort to CIA.

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key points made in this memorandum are worth repeating -- even though it is not known who read the piece. Among other things, for example, the author of the memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favorable factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested that it was unlikely that any of these would operate with reference to Project JMATE.

It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was "unusually inept"; that "Communist support for Arbenz came from the local Communist Party, which was immature, badly led, and generally weak"; and, that "we had unbelievable luck." 27/ The memorandum also noted that there were a number of circumstances which would not recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity. Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a weak leader, Castro was obviously a strong leader; that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high character and standing, but no one of similar stature had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he could not depend on his army. Castro, on the other hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled

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the key military positions with his own followers and "introduced a system of intense ideological indoctrination." Furthermore, the unknown author pointed out that while Moscow's interest in Guatemala was comparatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico City was the nearest Soviet official available to the Arbenz Government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and propaganda support from both Moscow and Peiping were a matter of record. 28/

The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic -- errors were being made. It stated that the blunt propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro, as a victim of international Communism, and the Communists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US commercial radio stations, even if the time were legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups, would be a "kiss of death" for anyone who tried to deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part related to the propaganda activities, the planned use

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of US business groups as a cover for the Agency's support of the Cuban opposition, particularly the use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum under study. If the author was correct in assuming that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny, it would mean that the anti-American contingents would have additional ammunition to use against the US. The memorandum suggested that many of these risks could be eliminated if propaganda activities were moved to Third countries and if fund raising activities were run out of Latin America or Western Europe. 29/

Based on the language, the familiarity with the Guatemala activity and the nature of the critique, it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum in question. The memorandum may have been prompted in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out of the United States. The Agency fully supported General Quesada's effort to put an end to such flights.* 30/

* Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency.

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From 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba and the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960, when President Eisenhower formally approved the covert anti-Castro plan, CIA personnel most closely involved in the anti-Castro effort were fully immersed in the efforts to define -- and refine -- a US policy which would be acceptable to President Eisenhower. In the course of this two week period, they were engaged in efforts to satisfy the 5412 Group, the National Security Council, and themselves that they had developed a viable program which would lead to the downfall and ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal cohorts, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elimination of Communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect, from the Western Hemisphere.

During this period of evolution of national policy, WH/4 held its first official meeting as a branch on 9 March 1960. J. C. King and Jake Esterline were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general nature of the programs that were going to be put into operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation

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and support from all of the offices that were represented at the meeting, including, among others, the Office of Training, the Office of Communications, the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff, Personnel (particularly the Military Personnel Division), and the Office of Security. At this initial meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer, Phil Toomey, Political and Psychological Statelist, [3], the Economist, and Ed Stanulus, his Plans and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would be in contact with other Agency elements which would be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also noted that liaison channels would be established with other elements of the US Government, particularly with the Office of Special Operations of the Department of Defense. 31/

It was during the period between 8-17 March 1960 that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro program which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February 1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were

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C. Tracy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, Jake Esterline, J. C. King, and Tom Parrott, among others. Those who figured most prominently among the Special Group representatives at this time were Livingston Merchant, Department of State; John Irwin, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Operations; and Gordon Gray, the President's National Security Adviser. Other than the more than a dozen memorandums and drafts and other papers related to the development of the policy paper, perhaps a note from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960 best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency approached the task of writing a paper for the Director. Mr. Helms's note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:

Tom Parrott gave me for security late this afternoon the attached paper for the 5412 Group outlining the proposed covert action program against Fidel Castro. After reading it, I asked Tom to defer consideration of Cuba until next week since I feel that this document needs re-drafting whether it is used by the Director for an oral briefing or handed to the designated representatives for their enlightenment.

I think you will agree with me that the paper is poorly drafted and needs considerable pointing up in various

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places. I do not disagree with the listed recommendations in paragraph 6, but I do feel that the backup material in paragraphs 2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the reference to a "short-wave radio station patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no way, in my opinion, to describe what we have in mind. Also the paragraph on covert economic action is not sufficiently precise and raises more questions than it answers. There are other points, but there is no sense in belaboring them in this note to you.

May I ask that you take this matter in hand and advise WH how to put it in suitable shape for use by the Director with the 5412 Group next week. 32/

In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the problem facing the US was stated rather simply as follows:

To replace the present Government of Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with one that will be acceptable to the United States; and to cause this change to occur in such a manner that anti-US repercussions are not induced in Latin America. 33/

Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role in the anti-Castro activity, there was a tremendous concern that there be no "anti-US repercussions," not only in Latin America per se, but particularly among the Latin American representatives in the Organization of American States and in the United Nations. The constant quest for plausible deniability would

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become the holiest of grails -- constantly, and unsuccessfully, to be sought throughout the course of the operation by Agency planners.

The proposed paper for the Special Group (the paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking) emphasized those areas highlighted in previous Special Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, disruptions of the Cuban economy, including large scale sabotage operations, and the development of instructor cadres to provide both communications and PM training cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba. Interesting, too, is the fact that at this early stage of US planning mention was made of the offer from the Guatemalan Government of a training site for the PM cadres, or "action groups" as they were called. A financial annex included in the proposals for the Special Group indicated the need for \$900,000 for the remainder of FY 1960 and \$1.6 million for FY 1961.* 34/

* Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement for fiscal 1961 which is shown as \$1.6 million, was either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition -- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is \$1.7 million. It also was noted that for the remainder of FY '60, the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to meet these "non-program requirements."

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As the paper was being prepared for Special Group consideration, J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him with additional information for use during the Special Group discussions; and the transmittal to the DCI recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr. Nixon on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered much the same ground as the paper which went to the Special Group, but contained considerably more detail about the activities of the Castro Government which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legitimate governments and replacing them with Communist oriented governments. Col. King's paper also revealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua -- the only two governments in Latin America which were to throw their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro activity -- had made offers at this time for both radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the Agency might wish to sponsor. 35/

Despite President Eisenhower's previous objections to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's

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sugar industry, King's paper did reflect considerable emphasis on disruption of that economic sector.

Another item which Col. King saw fit to include in his memorandum was the following:

We have available, a drug, which, if placed in Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him.* 36/

Even as the Special Group was planning its sessions on the anti-Castro program, so, too, was the National Security Council being geared up for discussions of the same situation. Again, there was great concern over the question of possible loss of prestige should the US act independently of the international organizations. There also was interest in protecting US business and in the protection of US lives, and the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was of considerable concern to the President's National Security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray was advised to recommend to the National Security Council regarding US bases stated:

Take action as necessary, including military action, to insure the continued

* For comments on this subject see Part VII of this volume.

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availability to the United States of bases and base rights in Latin America that are considered vital to the security of the United States. 37/

An additional aspect of the basic national security policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was being encouraged to promote with the National Security Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that:

In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, take all feasible measure[s] to thwart it, including military action if finally required and appropriate to cope with the situation.* 38/

Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National Security Council on 10 March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the following rather innocuous actions:

1. Every effort should be made to influence the other members of the Organization of American States to recognize the dangers involved in the Cuban situation and support action with respect to them.

* Mr. Gray also was advised to play both sides of the street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged to promote was the following:

The United States should be prepared, if required to protect US interests, to take similar actions against subversion or armed rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile to US interests.

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2. The responsible Departments and Agencies should keep current plans to deal promptly with likely contingencies which might develop with respect to Cuba, especially those involving the safety of US citizens in the Guantanamo Base.

3. The developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should be reviewed by the Council each meeting, for the immediate future. 39/

Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, . Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March "to discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities in Cuba." 40/ Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs. Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum from Allen W. Dulles offering "some suggestions as to possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper; use your own judgment as to adding them." 41/ Among these starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load "dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles made the following rather unusual suggestion:*

* In addition to the International Transport Union, Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to induce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out, Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the dockworkers refuse to do the unloading.

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Stress point that while the dynamism is running out of the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Russia, it still remains in China. This explains ChiCom special interest in supporting the Cuban revolution and expanding it, with the ultimate aim of facilitating mass emigration of Chinese to the Latin American continent to meet their over-population problem. (This may be premature, but there may be something to it.) 42/

As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar to the participants, but the memorandum of the meeting reflects a number of items worth review. Even though Dulles's paper placed heavy emphasis on the propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged for covert and overt propaganda activities, not only through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation, but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for Latin America -- programs which apparently had been sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting activity was again raised and discussed, the question being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida

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Keys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere.

Somewhat more attention was focused on the paramilitary plans during this discussion than had occurred before, and Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the Agency estimate that: "it appears no large scale paramilitary effort (other than wholly overt) will be feasible in less than 8 months"; and he wondered if a crash program was feasible to speed up the training program. 43/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS and individual Latin American country involvement, the choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the government in exile, and the question of a budget -- the \$900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the \$1.6-1.7 million for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion.

One additional subject of discussion at this Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King was:

What would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevarra[*sic*] should disappear simultaneously. 44/

In the reported context of the discussion it is not believed that the term "disappear" was a euphemism for assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of

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Castro's government from political power. The paragraph which had raised the question then continued:

Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were[sic] the Communists, and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King said that there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified. One possibility was Nunez Jiminez, the head of the Agricultural Reform Program. No other names were widely enough known to be mentioned.*

Other discussion, notwithstanding, the focus of Mr. Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized to take a number of steps which were specifically related to the development of the guerrilla capacity of the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba. The Agency should be responsible for broadening its contacts with such groups and attempting to unify

* This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March 1960) by J. C. King that "unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package -- which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a long drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force" were discussed (pp. 93, 114-116) in SSC report on *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, and it is apparent from the recollections of the participants in the meetings that assassination was not the issue in these two instances.

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them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting these groups to develop friendships among various of the Latin American Governments which were skeptical of Castro and that the Agency should be responsible for identifying and training -- in facilities in the United States or elsewhere -- those who would be the leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the conclusion of the 14 March meeting, it was agreed that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis of the discussions and plan to present it to President Eisenhower later in the week. 45/

As part of the effort to improve the paper on the proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency prepared additional backup material which could be cranked into the version which would eventually go to the President. On 14 and 15 March, the records reveal copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which was labeled as "revised version, done by [C. Tracy] Barnes, evening 14 Mar," which went into more detail on both the political opposition to Castro and on the propaganda activities that were being mounted against Castro. These papers also noted that paramilitary

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activity would "take the longest to become a usable asset." 46/ The most important difference between these papers and the covert action plan presented by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp, upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY '61 -- from \$1.6-1.7 million to \$3.5 million -- with the heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed paramilitary operation. The sum for PM operations was revised from an estimated \$500,000 in Dulles's 14 March presentation to a total of \$1.3 million for that same year.

From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert action plan (14 March) until President Eisenhower approved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of bi-play between the National Security Council and the Special Group 5412. One of the principal concerns of the National Security Council was the proper US response should the Cubans try to intervene or interfere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, including a possible takeover of the Base. On 16 March 1960, after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing

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note from a member of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk, for the planned National Security Council meeting of 17 March which again focused exclusively on the situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though Mr. Belk, even though he was a member of the NSC Staff was completely in the dark as to the planning that had already been undertaken with regard to Castro's ouster. At a time when the President had already indicated that proposals for economic action or direct sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were less than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whatever reason, suggested again that with the new sugar legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened out. In addition, Belk suggested a plan which was "unconventional and radical" -- having President Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro telling him that he was concerned over the deterioration of relations between the two countries and suggesting that Castro have private conversations with an emissary whom the President would personally designate.

Staffer Belk believed that this was a "can't lose" situation for the US. If Castro refused to meet with Eisenhower's representative, then he would

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be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet with the President's representative, then relations between the US and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/ Mr. Belk's suggestions apparently never went beyond Mr. Gray.

At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960, Mr. Dulles presented his covert action plan to a combined meeting of the National Security Council and the principals of the Special Group. In attendance with the President were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Anderson, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell, Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Eisenhower, and General A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster's report on the meeting:

The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situation. The great problem is leakage and breach of security. Everyone must be prepared to swear that he has not heard of it. He said we should limit American contacts with the groups involved to two or three people, getting Cubans to do most of what must be done ... He understood that the effort will be to undermine Castro's position and prestige ...

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The President told Mr. Dulles he thought he [Dulles] should go ahead with the plan and the operations. He and the other agencies involved should take account of all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the actions that we would take in response to these ... The President said he would like some groundwork laid with the OAS to let the Latin American countries know that if the Cubans were to start to attack our people in Cuba we would be obliged to take action ...

The President said that at the next meeting, he would want to know what is the sequence of events by which we see the situation developing -- specifically what actions are we to take. He said our hand should not show in anything that is done. In the meantime State should be working on what we can do in and out of the OAS ... Essentially, the job is to get the OAS to support us. 48/

During the course of this meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba; and he was pushing for US intervention to protect these private property rights. The President, however, cut him rather short on this. Vice President Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American business interests in Cuba; and suggested that steps might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital investment by US firms in Cuba, terminating private

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businesses already there, and reducing American tourism.* 49/

President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March 1960 covert action program against the Castro regime thus set US policy. Briefly restated, the four major courses of action called for the formation of an anti-Communist exile political opposition located outside of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propaganda offensive against the island, perfection of a covert intelligence-in-action network organization within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba, with the necessary logistical support for covert military operations on the island.**

* Col. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting, but, strangely enough, failed to include a list of the participants. The fact that the President, Vice President, and Secretary of State were in attendance could not be known from King's memo alone. 50/ Not in attendance at this meeting was Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. This was one of numerous instances where higher level personnel -- in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which Esterline would seem to have been an equally legitimate participant.

** Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate was in process and would state that Castro was not "demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement." (SNIE 85-60, 22 March 1960, p. 3. S.)

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It is particularly important in light of changes which were subsequently made in the covert action plan to note the language of the approved policy with reference to the paramilitary operation:

Initially, a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase, a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the US so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance forces recruited there, both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance.

At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of invasion. The paramilitary activity was clearly to be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leadership and training to the dissident activities inside Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States technicians.* Finally, with reference to the approved

* Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WH/4/PM correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM operations for Project JMATE that:

The only *approved, written policy* governing paramilitary action against Cuba is contained in paragraph 2c of the Policy Paper approved by the President on 17 March 1960." (Emphasis added by author.) 51/

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plan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60, and FY '61 of \$4.4 million was approved with the caveat that should there be cost overruns, these could be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingencies.*

* A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B. (Appendix B, page 300). The reader is also urged to examine Appendix C, a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. (Appendix C page 311.) Admiral Burke apparently had become extremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded a paper on US action in Cuba, to both Secretary Merchant and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine the various options available to the United States to reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis the growth of Communist power represented by Castro. Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were available to the United States, such as multilateral action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by the US, or covert unilateral action by the US.

Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947) Burke made a series of recommendations covering the same ground -- propaganda, organization of the anti-Castro exiles who were in the US, or direct US military intervention -- which had already been considered at high levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries Merchant and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, Merchant replied to Burke's memorandum noting "a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve (footnote continued on following page)

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With reference to his action of 17 March 1960,
President Eisenhower subsequently wrote:

this result." Merchant then went on to review the bidding that had already been done, particularly in the Special Group, on the question of how to handle Castro, emphasizing, of course, that State was very much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's government would work, if not immediately, certainly in the long run, to the detriment of the United States, particularly in its relations to the other governments of Latin America.

Whether the response did not satisfy Admiral Burke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy, more than any other US Agency, should be principally responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not known. In any event, on 16 March 1960, he forwarded another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles. Burke's comments on the transmittal sheets to these two individuals are interesting. To National Security Adviser Gray he wrote:

Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a memorandum on U.S. Action in Cuba which may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours,
Arleigh Burke.

To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote:

Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum my Staff prepared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum but I know that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered. Warm regards. Sincerely,
Arleigh Burke.

Why one of the recipients was cautioned about "the impatient young lad" and the other was not is something
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On March 17, 1960, less than two weeks after my return from Puerto Rico, I ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin to organize the training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against the possible future day when they might return to their homeland. More specific planning was not possible because the Cubans living in exile had made no move to select from among their numbers, a

of a mystery. Certainly the proposals by one J. E. Pond, Jr., reflect at least, Pond's youth and immaturity. For among other things in his memorandum, Mr. Pond suggested that the Navy: "Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of a complete briefing of State Department activities vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster." Or, with reference to action that the State Department should take, he suggested: "Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. nationals going to Latin America on the Kommunist [sic] threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel." Two items which had not appeared in other of the papers related to the evolution of US policy to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond, were that the IADB (Inter-American Defense Board) become involved in the anti-Castro effort -- an exceedingly naive suggestion considering that the members of this group were far from unanimous in condemning the Castro Revolution. And the second unique contribution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to forward to two very senior members of the Executive Branch, was the spelling throughout the paper of Communist with a "K". These last proposals that Admiral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The memorandum having been sent down from Mr. Bissell's office, with the following notation to Col. King:

Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March, and the latter handed [it] to me. I do not believe it requires a reply, but pass it to you for any value it may have.

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leader whom we could recognize as the head of a government in exile.* 52/

* In preparing this comment, the former President apparently had to call on his own memory, on the memory of Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray. Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly, Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower:

You may recall that not so very long after I became your Special Assistant, in a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and me you gave instructions that activities of the so-called "Special Group" should not be recorded in any place except the files of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. You did not wish that there be other copies. It was for this reason that I did not seek a copy of the March 17th paper for my files, nor did I make notes at that meeting.

Subsequent to March 17th, I began to make memoranda of every meeting on that particular subject because I had a hunch that someday these might be important, and I intended to put them in your hands at the appropriate time, understanding, of course, that you might wish to have them destroyed. Incidentally, there were no carbons or other copies made of these memoranda. By not making copies, and by planning to put the documents in your own hands for whatever disposition you wished to make of them, I sort of rationalized my violation of your instructions about not making such memoranda. I hope I need not assure you that it was not my practice to violate your instructions and this is the only instance of such that I can recall. 53/

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B. Forging the Tool

Following President Eisenhower's approval of the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings previously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced the problem of acting directly to implement the anti-Castro program. Problems which had been discussed philosophically prior to this time now had to be put to the test of practicality. Among the problems of principal importance during the period from March to September 1960 were the following:

The establishment of the leadership of WH/4 and the acquisition of personnel for WH/4;

Extensive coordination between Agency representatives and representatives of other US Government Agencies and, at the same time, a high level of intra-Agency coordination.

The initiation of a paramilitary training program for those Cubans who would be directly involved in helping to dispose of the Castro Government:

Attempting to establish project parameters and to give proper consideration to possible changes in the concept of the program as time passed;

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And, finally, to retain the credibility and viability of the operation despite numerous wild haired proposals that were being put forward at various times during the months under study -- proposals which never should have been offered let alone given any serious consideration.

As previously noted, WH/4 was established by Col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bissell apparently officially got around to approving the new Branch, for in a memorandum for the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), it was noted:

The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP's approval of the creation of a new operational Branch, the abolishment of an existing Section, and the creation of a new Section within the WH Division Headquarters Staffing complement.

The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be more than offset by the decrease in the DDP complement.

The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and Salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved the various grades that had been proposed and then the memorandum went on to state:

The approval limits the usage of the requested positions to the duration of the

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Cuban crisis; after which all the positions in the new Branch and Section will be reviewed for reclassification purposes. 54/

The question of financing and budget for project JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon after the President's approval of the project, the question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March 1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that:

"Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved of the paper calling for the release of \$900,000 from the reserve for Project JMARC." 55/ Indeed the Director had signed such a paper calling for the \$900,000 as "an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds are not available." 56/

In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director was also careful to point out that it would be the responsibility of Chief, WH Division to certify that the funds had been expended as specified for the project; that additionally, the DDP or his designee would have to approve each certification; that the only Headquarters file on the budget for the project would be maintained by WH/Division; and that the

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file would be complete as to the purpose of the expenditure, the date, those who were involved as payees, and any other details; and finally that access to this financial file would be "limited to persons specifically authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans)." * 57/

In the first meeting following the Presidential approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline called the members of WH/4 together to announce that the program had been given the crypt of JMARC; and he further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target date for the beginning of training at Fort Randolph in Panama. (This date was predicated on the assumption of a satisfactory report from the Inspection Team which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March.) Medical and security officers were to be assigned to the training base and the communications link was to be established with Headquarters. In this early

* Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by the WH/4 Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the DDP and Chief, WH Division. Chief, WH/4 was not even included on the routing for the Director's Memorandum. The WH/4 Financial Officer, on the other hand, had suggested that certain of the responsibilities for approval of funding be given to the project Chief, or the Chief, WH/Division. 58/

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meeting, Esterline emphasized that training at the Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Panama was going to be extremely limited; and since there would be no training areas in the United States, third country training activities would need to be established. He emphasized again that secrecy was of paramount importance if the operation was to succeed, and stressed that the establishment of a Government-in-exile was a key point to making the planned operation credible. Esterline further indicated that such a government hopefully could be announced by the early part of April and that the Headquarters for such a government could be located either in Puerto Rico or Costa Rica.

Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two, the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be known as JMWAVE. One interesting point made at this first meeting was that:

Mr. [Scudder] Georgia reported that the DDS Offices concerned had nominated nearly all of the personnel required by 1 and 15 April respectively. Action was being taken to make all these available at once ... [and] it was agreed that DDS representatives would meet once a week

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to review activities, determine the status of commitments, and prepare a brief report for Chief, Branch 4. 59/

In another Branch meeting soon after the one just mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and others would do throughout the course of the operation, the need for security practices designed to protect the fact of Agency involvement in this covert operation. He also indicated the considerable degree of cooperation which already was being required from other services. Dave Phillips provided a specific example of this, emphasizing that without the close cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters which were going to be installed on Swan Island. Moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees would be responsible for constructing the facilities to house the transmitters and the quarters for personnel who would conduct the propaganda effort from Swan Island. Because the activities then established on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal Aviation Administration, C. Tracy Barnes (the A/DDP/A) was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were

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involved in establishing this Agency activity on the island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected with the United States Coast Guard in order that there be no interference with maritime activities; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban defectors. 61/

As attempts were being made to establish the parameters for the operations against Castro, a most prescient memorandum was directed to Chief, WH/4 from Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division. Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS, the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz Government in Guatemala in 1954; and recalling some of the "pitfalls and counter-productive aspects" of that particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows:

I have the impression that our basic JMARC plan commits us to a rather firm timetable. In my judgment, we should have great flexibility in deciding the appropriate time for kicking off any paramilitary operations. Before such operations are initiated, we should have firm evidence that our propaganda and political action operations have irrevocably undermined Castro's prestige, both in *Cuba and abroad*. We should not initiate paramilitary actions until we are convinced that they will not enable

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Castro to recuperate lost prestige and rally local and foreign sympathy and support. Generally speaking, current area attitudes toward the Castro regime are satisfactory from our [CIA] point of view. However, this could change radically and rapidly, if there are any premature paramilitary actions. When the time comes for paramilitary activity, we should make every effort to conceal any invasion actions. To avoid or minimize Castro's counter propaganda, the paramilitary operations must appear to be an *internal uprising by dissident elements within Cuba*. This, of course, would require clandestine infiltration of personnel and arms before the hostilities begin.

In my opinion, Castro will inevitably charge the US with responsibility for JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans and other foreign observers will be inclined to accept such charges with or without supporting evidence. Therefore, what we need is a massive diversionary effort that will either obscure the fact of our involvement or make our involvement palatable. This diversionary tactic might be accomplished by exploiting unanimous Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo regime ... If it became known, or strongly suspected, that we were supporting operations to bring about a transition to democratic government in the Dominican Republic, the waters would be suitably muddied, and a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* 62/

* Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his initial comments regarding paramilitary activities against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously altered -- the operations which would ultimately conclude at the Bahia de Cochinos. As with other of the cautionary and restrained proposals which would be put forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed
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In mid-April of 1960 WH/4 made the first presentation for the DCI since the basic program had been approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. In attendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell, Mr. Helms (C/OPS), Herman Horton (CI Staff), and C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. This high level group was informed that broadcasting activity from Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and that very special operations were being carried out in order to provide stories for propaganda use. According to Dave Phillips who made the presentation

apparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals.

About the same time that Oberst's memorandum was going forward, the DDP was calling for WH/4 to prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminating the need for crash-type responses or actions. In discussing the contents of such reports, it was indicated that:

The Progress Report should generally not exceed one page in length, and that we should not hesitate to include it in items which were not favorable to our progress, in other words, setbacks or handicaps which we might have encountered. 63/

Also, by way of keeping informed about developments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational elements of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring operational coordination similar to that achieved by the meeting of support elements every Tuesday morning." 64/

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on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained. The reports on the evolution of the government in exile and the buildup of the stay-behind network and on paramilitary activity indicated that much work still remained to be done to get these activities off the ground. Further, it was pointed out to the DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly escalating, principally because:

Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment [were] being charged against the project which, in fact, was the major cause of the project's over-obligation. It was the opinion of all concerned that such property should be held on a Memorandum Receipt basis without cost to the project, and that charges, if any, should be reflected as direct costs only if property was found unserviceable or was not returned to communications stock supply after the project is terminated. The DCI was advised that this matter would be discussed with the Comptroller for resolution. 65/

Most important in connection with this briefing, was the DCI's comment that:

With respect to personnel needs, he assured all, no matter whether personnel were overseas or in the US, he would arrange to obtain personnel required in support of JMARC. 66/

The meaning of Chief/WH/4's comments to the DCI, was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment No. 1 to the project was submitted to the Director

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for approval. The amendment concerned the need for more money and pointed out that:

Not only has the initial \$900,000 already been expended, but it is currently estimated that an additional \$1.0 million is immediately required to carry the activity through 30 June 1960 ... Note is also made ... of possible contingencies amounting to an additional \$1.4 million for which no funds are requested at this time. 67/

In addition to an early updating for the DCI, WH/4 also undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisenhower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April 1960, General Cabell headed a CIA delegation including Mr. Bissell, Col. King, and Jake Esterline which briefed a very high level group of Department of Defense representatives in the JCS conference room at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introductory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was conducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from

* Included among the Defense participants were Thomas Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman, JCS; Gen. Shoup, Commandant U.S. Marines; Admiral Burke; CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S. Army; Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, representing COS/Army. 68/

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J. C. King. Apparently Jake Esterline, the man who had the monkey on his back as project chief sat quietly by.

The suggestion which had been made by Paul Oberst that the "waters be muddied" by making it appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced during the course of this briefing of the JCS, even though the Dominican Republic was included as a part of the overall briefing. What did emerge with reference to the Dominican Republic was a concensus that if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic where he probably would be received as a conquering hero.

In the course of the discussion which followed the briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal "hawk," indicating his willingness to move fleet units into the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the suggestion had been made that if Castro went into the Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time before he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In addition, Burke made it quite clear that should the

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Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the Navy was prepared to defend that base. In Burke's opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do that.* 69/

Whether a direct result of this briefing of the JCS or not, there was a noticeable improvement in WH/4's relations with the military services before the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example, \$150,000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director of Logistics to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly as a working fund for the [29]
[10] This money, of course, was to be used for necessary construction, renovation, procurement of material, and hire of native labor as necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site for the PM instructor cadre. 71/

Before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's

* This briefing for the senior personnel in the Department of Defense, would have taken place in any event; but it may have been prompted by the reluctance of the designated DOD liaison officer with WH/4, Capt. Burns Spore (USN), to do much more than listen to WH/4's requests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the project and for real estate for use in the training program until he received a green light from the SecDef. 70/

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request for overflight photo coverage of the islands offshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter was taken up, not only with the Air Force, but also with J. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Although the authorization and plan for these overflights, presumably by the U-2, antedated the shootdown of Francis Gary Power's U-2 in the Soviet Union, it was recorded that:

Ambassador Berry had called to say that the Department ... had approved the mission, but insisted that extremely tight security be exercised throughout and that Col. Benson (USAF/Operations) inform Ambassador Berry before each sortie so that the Department would be properly prepared to respond to any emergency. 72/

The first flight, incidentally, was tentatively scheduled for the weekend of 30 April - 1 May of 1960.**

In April of 1960, in addition to working with the Army, the Agency representatives also began to work with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of

* Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (AE&P) to Ceylon who was at this time assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

** Powers was shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960.

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the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense. One of the particular problems of concern in this relationship was that of covert sea transportation which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro forces back to the island of Cuba. Even though all the planning about which there is a record at this time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare training and the infiltration of communications experts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of DDP's Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and a Col. Anderson (USMC) who were members of the DOD/CIA Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and discussed among other interesting subjects:

The acquisition from the Navy of two Landing Ship-Tanks (LST) and four Air-Sea Rescue Craft (AVR), the training of the Cuban crews for these vessels, and the means of covert transfer of the vessels from the Navy to the Agency.* 73/

In addition to the requested overhead reconnaissance of the Cuban coastline by the Air Force, the

* It is rather strange that at this early date in April 1960 discussions were being held concerning the acquisition of LST's. There had been no discussions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban troops back into their homeland; and, consequently, the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place.

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Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach gradient problems with the Marine Corps and representatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It was ascertained that much work needed to be done in order to upgrade information suitable for planning the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops and vehicles. 74/

In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department of State seemed to be operating in a world of its own -- making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the flow of information on Cuba's internal developments. On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which provided a check list of current operations and ten categories of activity related to developments in Cuba. From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems as though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues before the Special Group, of the discussions among CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the President's approved plan for covert action. Nor was there any evident awareness of the various overt

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programs with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/
About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to the Special Group his displeasure that the Department failed to consult with the Agency prior to announcing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US Ambassador to Cuba. 76/

The Rubottom plan apparently had some impact, for by the end of April 1960, Gordon Gray was calling on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to find someone in the Department -- Dillon himself -- to be "constantly seized of the Cuban problem and who would take steps to assure that all of the activities of various groups were in harness and that all needed decisions were made when needed."* 77/ Mr. Gray also specified some of the problems which would face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting:

[Livingston Merchant] has set up two groups, one under the chairmanship of Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the Special Group, of which Livie is a member, and in his absence Ray Hare sits. Further, there is a special activity

* This, of course, apparently ignores or disregards the creation of WH/4 and the responsibilities designated to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisenhower.

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proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob Anderson, with which you may or may not be familiar. Allen Dulles has a particular liaison with Bob in this matter. The Defense Department, of course, has many interests. 78/

The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April, Chief, WH/4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with reference to Dillon:

The Agency would not look with favor on this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the Director, therefore, plan to go over to State on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960] and head off this new development. Mr. Barnes believes that a short paper setting forth what we are already doing in the fields of coordination and liaison should be adequate to support their point of view. 79/

Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon become Chief of Staff for the nation's anti-Castro program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State should take over the direction of a program which would basically be carried out by the Agency is not revealed in the records. Presumably both elements

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entered into the picture. In any event, Gordon Gray seemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH/4 and the liaison arrangements which had already been made. (See Appendix D.)* But whatever the explanation, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for the nation's Cuban program.

Although it was not included on the list of Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and contacts at this time, mention should be made of the CIA-FBI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the FBI was prohibited from engaging in intelligence operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief, WH/4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had plans for installing a stay-behind network -- using Mexicans and Cubans -- to be activated in case diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief, WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an explanation of the Bureau's plan. 80/ About the same time that Chief WH/4 was evincing concern about FBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in

* Appendix D, page 332.

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a memorandum for the Acting Director of Central Intelligence that:

A thorough investigation has been made of the relations between the Havana Station and the Havana Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It has been concluded that the operations of the FBI have neither interfered with nor conflicted with the Station's operations. 81/

Col. King's memo also stated the Bureau's long-time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that frequently the Station was called on to participate in, or actually undertake, the debriefing of various individuals who had come into the FBI offices to volunteer information. On occasion, the Bureau had even turned over specific operations to the Station.

Chief, WH Division went even further when, during the course of one of the weekly interdepartmental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr. Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its jurisdiction, and that perhaps this should be brought before the NSC for consideration. Col. King reported that he remained non-committal at this time, but did point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue should be "soft-pedaled." He did say, however, that

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the memorandum he had prepared on this subject was being held in the files should questions about this particular Bureau activity ever be raised. King also recommended that the Agency not take the initiative in raising the question. 82/

Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded activities at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH (later JMWAVE) in Miami. In one report concerning the number of the Cuban exiles in the Miami area who were under suspicion of -- or were -- working for Castro, or who were trying desperately to get support from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA representative with whom he was exchanging information. According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent

told me that his personal opinion was that it would be virtually impossible, if not completely impossible, to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime using Cuban exiles. He thought the only solution to the problem, and the one that stood the best chance of success, was to

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go in with the US Marines. He admitted that this was only his personal opinion, but he felt that in view of his experience and contact with the Cuban exiles, he had a good point. I could not help agree with him. 83/

Agent George Davis apparently was extremely interested in full cooperation with the Agency, quickly accepting the Agency representative's proposal that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each week to compare notes; and the CIA field representative, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the FBI any information which the Agency might acquire pertaining to FBI interests.*

* The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May 1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second FOB that had been established since the formation of WH Division -- the initial base having been set up during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953-1954. In general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organization of Headquarters with FI, CI, CA, Support, and PM units. FOB reported directly to the Chief, WH Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. Initially the satellite communications center for relaying commo between Headquarters and the field -- including facilities in the Florida Keys concerning the maritime operations -- was established; and ultimately the commo link would connect Headquarters with the operations in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The cover firm for the base, was Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover for an organization engaged in classified research.

A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on the FOB, and the reports are available through the Records Management Officer of WH Division. These
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In addition to its concern with the interests of other government agencies in the Cuban problem, in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major political parties. While the intelligence briefings were scheduled to consider the world situation, considerable emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In preparation for Mr. Dulles' briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, on 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban briefing paper touching on the principal aspects of the exile organization, the propaganda plan, penetration of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (including the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany), and the play that Castro was making in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympathizers. In addition, emphasis also was given to the

reports deal basically with the period between 1962 and 1968; and while there is some feeling that the story of the Bay of Pigs operation should go into extensive detail on the initial operations of the FOB, this author has chosen not to do so, focusing instead on only those broad aspects of the problem relating to the Miami Base. 84/

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planned program for paramilitary training and operations under the aegis of CIA. Insofar as can be determined, however, there is no indication that in his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics on the Agency's anti-Castro plans. 85/

As mentioned previously, one of the continuing problems requiring coordination within the Executive Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project JMATE. From an estimate of some \$2.5 million of budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made available for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell appeared at a special Group meeting, requesting that an additional \$10.75 million be released from reserve funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's appeal was that:

This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which

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should not be undertaken without a reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward. 86/

On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr. Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the requested \$10 million for FY 61 would be made available from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* 87/

C. Cooperation and Challenge

As already mentioned, immediately following the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro program, there was a considerable degree of cooperation between CIA and other of the concerned Agencies -- the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued to expand and develop the various programs -- propaganda, covert action, staybehind networks, and paramilitary operations -- there were ever increasing contacts between CIA and the representatives of other

* One explanation for the sharply increasing demand for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel was being written off upon issue, rather than upon consumption -- an aspect of the operation that was explained to the author by William E. Eisemann, formerly Chief, Support WH/4. 88/

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government agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe the period from the summer of 1960 until the early fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge. Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented National Policy. Challenge to most if not all of CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make-up of the exile military force which was being organized, the location of training sites, the types of technical materiel (including aircraft) being requested, and, most important by the end of this period, the specific nature of the military operation which was to be mounted against Fidel Castro.

By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees -- even though the actual training of the initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated that the increased number of PM trainees would be recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin American countries where Cubans had taken up residence,

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and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba. The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was to be with the M-1 carbine, the Garand and Springfield rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the .45 Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard arms packs. 89/

It must be presumed that the call for increases in the number of PM trainees was related to the continued importation of Soviet weapons and technicians and the increasing strength of the Communist Party in Cuba. An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on "The Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro regime was "deeply and increasingly influenced by Communists .. no longer any prospect of democratic government under his [Fidel Castro's] regime." As was past estimates, this particular NIE was unable to answer the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist. The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the opposition at that time "pose a serious threat to

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the regime." One weakness touched on by the National Estimate concerned the Castro militia which was characterized as "only partially armed, and for the most part poorly trained ... [and] appears to have little, if any, effectiveness as an organized combat force in conventional operations." For either of the foregoing reasons, perhaps, an increase in the number of PM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strong dissident leader to the fore, or (b) develop the capability to overcome the Castro militia. 90/

The question of an increased number of PM trainees surfaced in a late August briefing for President Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and Anderson, and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster by the DCI and Mr. Bissell. After President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized developments since the March announcement of the anti-Castro program, Mr. Dulles provided some specifics concerning the organization of the FRD and its principals, noting that the Headquarters for the FRD had been established in Mexico City, in lieu of the invitation of President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit the FRD to operate from his country. Mr. Dulles

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noted that at this time, it was particularly important that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed. When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the Department of Defense representative, Mr. Gates, made it quite clear that he was concerned about the possibility of US military personnel being involved directly in the military operations inside Cuba. Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel in third countries would be used only as instructors -- not as cadre leaders for either an invasion or a guerrilla warfare effort.

Bissell did stress, however, that there was need for a standby force, preferably of non-Americans, with special training in guerrilla warfare to provide a leadership complement to the Cubans when "push" came to "shove," a recommendation that provoked some differences of opinion during the course of this briefing for the President when it was suggested that US officers might be required to direct these forces. Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this discussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk the matter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined that the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved

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at this particular time. According to his own report of his position at this meeting,

Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation without the determination to see it through and that an abortive effort would be worse than no effort at all. He therefore thought that if this backup force was essential to ultimate success, full consideration should be given to it at this stage in the planning. Mr. Dulles again urged that a decision on this be deferred.* 91/

In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction to Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force would be able to carry off the effort without any outside help, the President was reported to have indicated that

He would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we have a good chance of being successful. He wouldn't care much about this kind of cost [the \$10 million increase noted earlier]; indeed, he said he would defend this kind of action against all comers and that if we could be sure of freeing the Cubans from this incubus, \$25 million might be a small price to pay.

* In light of today's relations between the United States and other of the major world powers with the third countries, Gordon Gray displayed -- in the summer of 1960 -- a degree of foresight with which he has never been properly credited. For he noted at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other small nations would be encouraged to undertake harassments of the major powers. 92/

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The President concluded the meeting, by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result of starting something before we were ready for it.* 93/

One of the most persistent problems which was to surface by early fall of 1960 concerned the need for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk of the questioning came from the Department of State, principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for

* In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discussing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in addition to Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, a third CIA officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also noted that the Vice-President had been invited to attend the briefing. According to Gray's record, however, neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA representative were in attendance at the briefing of 18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr. Bissell, but with no CIA representative from WH/4, was further illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism that at too many high level briefings, CIA's representatives were individuals who, high ranks notwithstanding, were the furthest from the operation -- yet they were responsible for informing the nation's policy-makers about the details of the anti-Castro program. 94/

It is also interesting to note that this off-the-record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary Powers. 95/

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Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief, WH/4 learned from a member of the Department of State that Mr. Mann was going to ask for a restudy of the basic concept of JMATE, or, if he did not ask for that re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate review and rescheduling of the timetable for the JMATE operation. At this time and in view of the lack of progress both in developing any great cohesion within the FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba, the questions seemed in order. The reaction of Chief, WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made to blunt Mr. Mann's efforts, noting for example:

The degree to which we are already committed in JMARC would pose a monumental security problem alone if we were suddenly instructed to cease and desist from further activity. As of this moment, they have well in excess of 200 people engaged in air, ground, and communications training in Guatemala. Additionally, our across-the-board propaganda activities are being stepped up daily. A drastic rescheduling of either activity, therefore, could bring about serious repercussions. 96/

The precise nature of these "serious repercussions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however, it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency-sponsored training activities would loose a flood of

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Cubans back into the exile community; and they would charge that the United States feared to undertake the task of ousting Fidel Castro. This, in turn, would mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline speculated that Mann did not believe that the Cubans were willing to support an insurrection against Castro. A suggestion which was made to counter the possible Mann proposals was that:

To strengthen our position, therefore, we are bending every effort to get at least one supply airdrop into the target country, prior to the Assistant Secretary's return to the United States ... Successful action in this area should weigh heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann's alleged new attitude. 97/

Just how one -- or even more -- successful air drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a possible insurrection effort was not explained. That there were dissidents on the island was unquestioned, the problem was the degree of strength and effectiveness that they might be able to demonstrate.*

* Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE, the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred did not set the criteria for the continuation or dissolution of the project. This air drop was a complete
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Mr. Mann would continue to raise questions concerning the feasibility of discontinuing the training in Guatemala, and in on-going meetings with Agency representatives including the DCI, the DDP, Chief, WH, as well as Chief, WH/4 and others, Mann continued to raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE should all the American trainers and Cuban trainees be pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mann also questioned the exact timing for Project JMATE. As he raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they would much prefer that the training of the Cuban exiles take place in US bases, both for purposes of security and for efficiency. But they also pointed out that it had been the decision for the Special Group and the "highest levels" that such training should take place in third countries, rather than in the US. Mann persisted, however, suggesting that the question of maintaining the training base in

and total bust, the supplies being dropped to the guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces; and the aircraft itself made a forced landing in Mexico and was not recovered. See Volume I of this history, Air Operations.

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Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised again with the Special Group. The Agency's representatives agreed to this suggestion "with the strictest proviso that no move from Guatemala could or should be made until adequate staging facilities in the Zone of the Interior have been prepared." 98/

Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in a somewhat different context than had been suggested by Esterline and J. C. King. Barnes recommended consideration be given, among other items, to:

The fact that a move from the present training sites to the US should not be made too hurriedly and the importance of avoiding a decision at a later date that the training in the US is a bar to operational use. I realize that this latter point would be a complete contradiction of the present theory but, after all, there is an intervening election; and political views can shift so that everything possible should be done to avoid our getting ourselves into the box where we move to the US for one reason and then find that the US move is used against us to prevent or limit ultimate operations.* 100/

One additional point which was made by Jake Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations with

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Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the training program in Guatemala might very well lead to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro-communist elements which were already in evidence in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indicated that should the troop training be moved from Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops would be trained as a special security force for the Guatemalan government. 101/

During these discussions in the late fall of 1960, Mann also raised the issue of economic sanctions which had been touched on in the early spring. At this time however, the Agency's representatives believed that Mann was talking in terms of a one to three year quarantine period, in an attempt to disrupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine, however, which would not interfere with the flow of goods from the Communist countries. This was a point of some contention between State and CIA, with the Agency people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the economy of Castro's Cuba. 102/

In the context of a possible move of the training facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared

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a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need for training bases to be located in the southern part of the United States should include an infantry training base capable of handling 3,000 men with range facilities, tactical training areas, an airfield for training air and ground crews in the utilization of B-26, C-46 and C-54 aircraft, aerial gunnery and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and staging facilities. It was suggested that the airfield logistical base should be located in southern Florida, and permission to use Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights to Cuba should be obtained. The maritime facilities would be located on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico and also in southern Florida.

In a meeting with the Special Group, the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence put forth the proposals concerning the movement of training bases to the United States; and although he was supported by the Department of Defense representatives -- Mr. Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant of the Department of State, normally one of the hard liners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent

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feelings at this time about the training program.

Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann's arguments suggesting that the time for military action was so far down the line that US efforts should be concentrated on economic sanctions at this time. 103/

Adolf A. Berle, who would become one of the Kennedy administration's principal advisers on Latin America, also seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in favor of economic sanctions, Berle suggesting that the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of arms and ammunition both to Cuba and from Cuba to other parts of Latin America. 104/

Although it has been indicated that the Department of Defense would apparently support the Agency in its request for the establishment of training facilities in the continental United States, DOD did balk at the use of military personnel in third country areas in support of Project JMATE. Although Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to question whether his department had actually been committed to support CIA's anti-Castro effort, it seems clear that policy approval for the use of Department of Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established

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with the approval of the President's comprehensive program of covert action against Fidel Castro in March 1960. 105/

The difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense concerning the assignment of Special Force trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training bases has already been spelled out in considerable detail in another volume, but even as the Department of Defense was taking a negative attitude toward the possible use of DOD personnel in either training or combat activities, the Agency was proposing the recruitment of either American or foreign volunteers to serve as combat troops for Project JMATE. The Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department of State, however, put the quietus on the plan for obtaining foreign volunteers; but J. Foster Collins, the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested to the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (the DDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the need to re-examine the Department of State policy.*

* The problem of the Special Force trainers is discussed in Volume II of this history, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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Collins was particularly enthusiastic about the prospects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and Turks to serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's view prevailed, and there were no contingents of either American or foreign volunteers. 106/

During the period of buildup and organization of WH/4 for the JMATE effort against Castro, the Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy, but none of these were as serious as the difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense per se, the Air Force, or the United States Army. The existence of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation in view of the planning that was taking place. Apparently, however, there was no disagreement between the Agency and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo from being used to mount anti-Castro activities or from being used as a safe haven area for those who might have been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans from claiming violations of the legal and binding international agreement between the United States

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and the Government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo Bay. So serious was this issue in fact, that the Agency agreed

that all Cubans participating in overflights of Cuba would be told that Guantanamo Naval Base was not to be used as a safe haven, and that if they landed there, they would be turned over to the Cuban authorities. 107/

The Guantanamo Base also presented a major difficulty for the Department of State. Evidence of this surfaced in early October of 1960 when it was reported that during a meeting of the State Working Group on Cuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try to influence Latin American nations to approve US retention of the base. One proposal had been made that this be done through the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), where a resolution apparently was about to be introduced asking for a definition of the relations between Cuba and the USSR, with the expectation that this might force Cuba's resignation from membership on the IADB. According to Col. John F. Mallard, the Agency's liaison officer with the State Working Group:

In addition, State desires that the IADB, make some statement on the importance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin American hemisphere defense. This statement would, in effect, give Latin American approval to U.S. retention of this base. 108/

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This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo Bay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis, to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief, Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were when they were raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote as follows:

I realize that this Agency is an implementing arm of the Executive Branch and has no right or privilege in the area of formulation of U.S. national policy. I believe that within this framework we who are part of this Agency are permitted to comment on certain State Department or other Executive Department propositions that appear, on the basis of our own personal observations and experience, to be counter-productive to the best interest of the United States. I am convinced that the course of action, described in paragraph 1 [that the U.S. use the IADB to win Latin American support for the U.S. retention of Guantanamo] is in fact within this category.

It is high time that the U.S. take an understandable public position in matters of international agreement, compact, contract, and treaty. The rights of the U.S. to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clearly and legally described in several documents which bear the signatures of the then reigning and cognizant governments of the United States and Cuba, respectively. Certainly the assistance of any single or plural Latin American national entity (ies) seems to me to be indicative of an admitted weakness on the part of the United States

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and its conviction of its legal international rights.

I suggest that this Agency make known to the State Department its feelings in this matter, as described above (if addressees agree). I realize that considerable discussion could be waged in terms of legally and/or logically presenting our case. This memorandum is not intended to meet these requirements.

One observation that might be included is the fact that the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, has on at least two occasions in U.S. mass media of sizable circulation stated that the United States would not tolerate any invasion of Guantanamo or hostile abrogation of our treaty arrangements to the base. I believe it is significant to note that no responsible member of the Executive Branch (including the President of the United States) has contradicted his statements. On the basis of this evidence, it would appear to me that the official overt position of the United States is crystal clear and we need not at this time place ourselves in a position of indebtedness or vulnerability with any other Latin American nation in terms of the Guantanamo issue. 109/

By early November 1960 Secretary of State, Christian Herter, had decided that the matter of Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level; and, consequently, he introduced the subject on the agenda for the National Security Council meeting of 7 November 1960. The Secretary emphasized the need for coordination of military and political planning

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in case of an attack on the naval base. Herter indicated two extreme possibilities: one, that in case of an attack, the United States respond with only sufficient military force to protect the base itself; and another, that the United States decide that an attack on the base was in fact an act of war and apply such military power as necessary. Herter also suggested, of course, that there would be possible responses between the two extremes, with activities in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on the US response -- the sort of contention that undoubtedly must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis again. The Secretary of State did specify, however, that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would be the result of a decision made by the President of the United States.

As will be pointed out subsequently, the Cubans would make charges about Guantanamo being the center for anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find refuge within the confines of the base. Overall, however, there was a surprising degree of neutrality with respect to the naval installation during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation.

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It is also important to mention at this time the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief, CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison. Before the end of October 1960, the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's representatives that he believed it impossible for him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in the Cuban area properly until he received further information -- specific information -- about the Agency's planned operations against Castro. When this report on Dennison was brought to the attention of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. P. Holcomb, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request for information which he cared to lay on the Agency would be promptly answered. By this time, Dennison indicated that he had already been in touch with General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs by CIA was being laid on.

Holcomb, quite truthfully, indicated that neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT, Commander Ray E. Millard, were privy to the planned operations of WH/4. Once having assured the Admiral of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide

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him with the necessary information, Holcomb then noted:

It was the impression of the CIA officers present that Admiral Dennison is a cooperative officer and favorably and objectively inclined towards CIA, and that if his needs can be met, he will undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful course. 111/

On 2 November 1960, Richard Bissell, Jacob Esterline, and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to Admiral Dennison's headquarters. The CIA representatives received a general briefing by the Navy on contingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return, they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. Mr. Bissell gave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline discussed the political and propaganda aspects, and Hawkins talked about the PM program, including the plan for a 1,500-man invasion force to seize a lodgement on the island of Cuba. Hawkins emphasized that this last objective could not be met until March or April of 1961.* 112/

* In a telecon with the author of this history on 15 May 1978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it was extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs operation before he received any briefing from CIA on the anti-Castro operation. He made it sound, in fact, as though he was not briefed until shortly before the
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D. Personnel and Training

From the time of the official approval of the anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question of personnel and personnel management for Project JMATE was of constant concern. Even though the Director of Central Intelligence "emphasized the significance of the Project, by saying that he would recall Agency personnel from any station in the world if the individual's abilities were required for the successful achievement of JMATE objectives," some of those who were closest to the personnel problem believed that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that promise. 113/ Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 has remarked as follows:

It was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size that the Divisions didn't have the personnel, the senior personnel, to staff out the organization; or if they did have them, they weren't about to release them from the

LSD (Landing Ship Dock) which was to carry the landing craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion. As the text above confirms, however, the Admiral was read into the act relatively early in the game and should have had plenty of time to make preparations for the activities of April 1961.

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things they were doing, because they were considered indispensable, which was probably correct. It was on that basis, I think, that when people like Dick Drain came back home from -- in Dick's case, I think he came in from [113] -- where he had a pretty good record -- but he was not returning to Headquarters to go into an assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in the operation with us. Gerry Droller had been around Headquarters for a long time, had been quite a bit of a replacement problem. He was very bright, he was a German specialist, had a pretty good political background; and Gerry and Howard Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of selected, not by us, but they were told they were going to be the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation. 114/

Esterline also noted that the shortage of competent personnel became particularly critical when the operational concepts began to change and to expand. He claimed that when serious problems came up none of the GS-18 case officers were available to make decisions. 115/

Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/4, was more specific in his criticism of the personnel management for Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), did insure that the support elements got the best people for Project JMATE, "he [White], directed all Support office heads that if there was a need for any

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senior officer or any position to be filled that they would fill it without any hesitation whatsoever." 116/

But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out:

I can't say that was true on the operational side of the shop. A Contingency Task Force, a program developed by the Clandestine Services, was designed to make available Agency personnel who could be pulled out of any position that they were assigned to and moved into any urgent, high priority type of project. JMATE Project, was a high priority project; and the Contingency Task Force concept, in my opinion, failed at that point because the Clandestine Services did not provide the top quality people we needed for the position to be filled. After JMATE Project ... the Contingency Task Force was completely abolished. Many people in the Agency were designated from the Support and the Operational side to fill various positions as they would come up, but it didn't work from the Clandestine Services side. We had real problems, trying to get qualified ... top qualified people ... to do those jobs. In my opinion, the Contingency Task Force was a failure. It was set up and designed so that qualified personnel would be completely immunized and processed and ready to go with passports at any given time. But you couldn't get the people you wanted -- I'm talking about qualified key professionals in the Clandestine Services -- because the Division heads in the Clandestine Services would not release those people. 117/

Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations for Project JMATE was among the severest of the critics with reference to the personnel assigned to Project JMATE. Pointing to his own case, Drain stated:

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I don't mean to be unduly immodest, but really, I didn't have any qualifications for this [WH/4] except that I was there and unemployed -- had no Spanish language whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been punching cows in Arizona in 1940. That doesn't really bring you up much on Latin America and latinos, and any of that ... I had never been on an amphibious operation, and if that was characteristic of my qualifications, it really characterized the whole damned operation ... about which, it seemed to me, there was a good deal of well-meaning hypocrisy. Allen Dulles, always meaning what he said, would say repeatedly, "now, I want the very best people assigned to this project ... there is nothing more important that we are doing than this; and I want directed assignments ... I want people pulled out of tours overseas if necessary, this thing must be manned." Everybody would solemnly nod and, then, much like the case of Vietnam ... humans being humans ... we would tend to get the people that the area Division Chiefs found "excess" -- which normally meant "found insufficient." With many notable exceptions, we did not get the very best people available. 118/

Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of the Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the Western Hemisphere Division:

More of this staffing would have come from WH if there had been more competent people within WH. WH suffered, in my opinion, from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers who had been picked up at the time that the Agency took over from the Bureau in Latin America ... but there were damned few of them that had any particular experience ... One of the main things that plagued me was that I could never

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figure out, because nobody ever made it clear, where the hell the project stood vis-a-vis WH ... J. C. King never was told, I think for understandable reasons, to what extent he was in it, and to what extent he was not in it. 119/

As with other of the principals who were involved in the WH/4 effort, Drain was extremely complimentary of the Support element assigned to WH/4, stating as follows:

This is a little ironic, because with Bissell as the DDP, you would have thought that if the directed assignment thing worked anywhere, it should have worked within the DDP. It worked less well there than it did within the DDS. Red White, soldierly like he was, took absolutely sincerely, what the Director said, when he said "I want the very best people assigned to this." So we got Mike King to run the finance, not some stumblebum with garters on his sleeve ... the best finance officer they had. Our logistics support and Bill Eisemann, they were really hand picked by Red White ... The DDS or the DDA, whatever they called it then, deserved very high marks for being uniquely the people to put their back into it. The DDI really wasn't asked; and that was too bad, because we could have used, it seems to me, some input from the DDI. Our own intelligence report structure was not bad. The Chief, FI was a nice old guy, [3]; and we had some reports officers who were quite competent in the DDP sense; but the thing was so compartmented from the DDI, in any event, that the idea of drawing down on DDI talent to get in on this, was not well received. I had suggested it because I had been

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in the DDI and I knew where the talent was. For example, on just such a mundane, but important thing, as topography and geography and beach stuff ... Christ, I well knew from the time that I worked for Lofty Becker ... that there was in old ORR ... in the geographic thing ... Jim [Brammell], ... Otto Guthe ... I mean, they would have been glad to supply people ... and we didn't ask. So you can't say that DDI didn't provide, unless you understand that they didn't provide because they really weren't asked.* 120/

Although the Agency's own personnel assignments have been criticized, the assignment of two of the key military personnel involved in the JMARC operation proved to be quite successful. Col. Jack Hawkins, United States Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Frank Egan, United States Army, were in charge of the overall PM activity (Hawkins) and the PM training (Egan) for the Cuban exile brigade. Hawkins, who was serving on the Staff of the Marine School at Quantico, Virginia at

* Drain's suggestion that the DDI was left completely in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates the case. As early as January 1959 there is evidence that Mr. Helms agreed to cut the DDI in on "useful intelligence to which it would be well for the DD/I to have access" from State cable traffic on Cuba being carried over CIA channels. A "massive" study of Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR in the fall of 1960 led Mr. Bissell to send a memo of commendation for the Communications Branch through the DDI. Obviously the DDI knew something was a-foot. 120a/

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the time that he was assigned to Project JMARC, had taken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor; had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor; and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp at Davao, Mindanao; and joined the Philippine guerrilla forces, leading raiding parties and harassing attacks against the Japanese army in the Philippines. After seven months of such activity, he was evacuated by submarine from the Philippines in November 1943 and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for these actions. After returning to the United States for additional training, in November 1944 Hawkins again returned to the Pacific area where he was an assistant operations officer taking part in the assault and capture of Okinawa. For this service, he received a Bronze Star Medal. During the Korean conflict, he was Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines; and he led the Battalion in combat during the Inchon landing and in subsequent operations in Korea. For his participation in the Inchon-Seoul operation, Hawkins had received the Silver Star Medal for heroism. From March 1956 to the summer of 1959 when he entered the Naval War College, Hawkins had

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served as liaison officer with the Amphibious Forces Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia -- a pertinent assignment for his transfer to Project JMARC.

Lt. Col. Egan's military record showed a well-trained infantry officer who had served overseas in the European Theater during the course of World War II; an infantry officer including an infantry training officer in much of the period following World War II; and a staff officer in the Special Warfare Division of the United States Army in 1958, serving with the Director of Plans, in Washington from 1958 to 1960. Immediately prior to his assignment to Project JMATE, Colonel Egan had been on the Operations and Training Staff of a Joint Support Group, headquartered in Washington. Egan EOD'd with Project JMATE, 27 June 1960, and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960. 121/ Both officers received high marks from Mr. Bissell and Jake Esterline, and, particularly from Dick Drain, who stated:

I thought they [Hawkins and Egan] were first rate ... I mean first rate, not compared with the jaded World War II memory, but first rate in terms of officers then serving in the armed forces of the United States. The Hawkins selection was an excellent one. I don't myself, know how

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one could have found a better man. People have said ... "Well, the son of a bitch just worked out in the Philippines as a stay behind ... what did he know?" He knew a lot. He had written a book on guerrillas. He was sharp, he was smart, and honest, and not overly ambitious. I am sure that he saw this as a way to further his career, of course. Military men, I think, tend to maximize that more than Agency people. But that was not his motivation -- or his primary motivation. He had around him some really first rate help ... not very high ranking ... but we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking ... we needed some hard workers. Frank Egan, who went down to do the training, was the man that I would have picked. He was probably the most disputable of the bunch because he was pretty volatile. He has been condemned for leading the Cuban manpower to believe that they were going to get more support than he had any right to let them know about. Well, I wasn't there, but I know damned well that if I had been, I would have been priming up the Brigade to do this tough job, not by counseling them as to the difficulty of it ... at least, exclusively ... or, giving them lectures about now you will really have to do this on your own, because you are not going to get one iota of assistance from the armed forces. You don't normally train a group to conduct an operation of this sort by playing on their fears. If, down there at the end of the line -- first in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan led them to believe that they were going to get them more help than he had any right to let them know, well, I can understand why that would have happened.* 122/

* With reference to Colonel Hawkins, Jake Esterline has noted:

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By way of illustrating some of the problems encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the JMATE operation, on the very day that President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for Plans from the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division noting that two individuals assigned to the Office of Training were urgently needed for service in WH/4. Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel Matt Baird, Director of Training, was agreeable to the release of the two individuals to serve as PM trainers, Baird insisted that the men could not be

I guess that it is only fair to say that that assignment [Project JMARC] cost him his general's star, and a good many other things in terms of his record. 123/

The author of this history attempted to arrange oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan, but in neither case would the individuals consent to such interview. In addition, the author also asked each man if he would be willing to respond to a series of written questions, and neither would agree to this. It was made quite clear to the author that both individuals harbored considerable resentment about their relationships and association with the Agency at the time of the Bay of Pigs. In a similar manner, Col. John F. Mallard, United States Marine Corps who was Liaison Officer between the Agency and the Department of Defense, at the time of the Bay of Pigs, also rejected the author's request for either an oral interview or a response to written questions.

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released until suitable replacements could be found to take over their tasks in the Office of Training. King, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Director for Plans for their immediate release. 124/

Not only did the Clandestine Service encounter difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its own units to serve in WH/4, it also appeared to draw blanks in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the struggle against Castro. In response to a November 1959 memorandum to all WH field stations and bases asking that they supply the names of Cubans who would be willing to work as agents against the Castro Government, WH/4/FI reported the results of its search, stating that as of June 1960:

Many of the Agents who were proposed by other WH Stations for use in Cuba were either found unacceptable, or did not want to accept such an assignment. Other stations were unable to come up with any assets who might gain access to the desired targets in Cuba. 125/

The problem which Col. Baird had raised back in March concerning replacement for personnel who might be assigned to Project WH/4 was not actually resolved until June of 1960 when:

Colonel White announced that DDS personnel on full time detail to JMARC

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would be transferred to the project Table of Organization, effective the beginning of the first pay period in July 1960. Employees on detail to the project from the Clandestine Services offices will not be transferred since DDP considers them temporary assignments with the personnel returning to their parent office when the project is completed. Colonel White pointed out, that although DDS personnel would be transferred to the project, thereby relieving slots in the various DDS elements, each office head should keep in mind that his employees will be returning to him, and he should plan accordingly. 126/

Colonel White's comments are quite understandable in view of the fact that of 104 personnel on duty with JMATE on 7-8 June 1960, only 32 were Clandestine Services careerists; and excepting a few with DDI career designations, the bulk of the personnel were Support careerists. By 14 June 1960, Colonel King was appealing to the DDP for an increment which would bring total JMATE personnel to 234, including 131 employees who were to be in the field. Apparently, however, the Deputy Director for Plans approved a total ceiling of only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960; and in August of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwarded a revised staffing guide, calling for a total of 274 positions and requesting that "as soon after 15 August as is possible, a total of 40 additional staff personnel"

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be added to the 158 who were then on duty -- making a new total of 198.

Although Mr. Bissell approved the recommended increment, he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A, suggesting that Barnes and Dick Helms (surprisingly) take a close look at the JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of duplication, particularly between the field bases and Headquarters. The DDP suggested that in the areas of FI and PM there might be slots in either the Forward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the Panama Training Site -- where possibly the staffs could be transferred during slack periods to conduct similar operations in other parts of the JMATE operation.* 127/

* Lest the reader be confused by the term "Forward Operations Base," this was the JMWAVE activity in the Miami area, which continued to operate subsequent to the Bay of Pigs. At the same time that the Bay of Pigs operation was getting under way, there was considerable emphasis from various individuals in Headquarters for establishment of a "Forward Command Post," which also might be located in the Miami area, possibly in the communications complex. Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command Post was established. 128/

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By early November 1960, as the concept of the operation was shifting from one of guerrilla warfare and infiltration to invasion, the staffing pattern for WH/4 was again increased. Mr. Bissell authorizing a total of 308 positions. Even as he signed the approval, however, Mr. Bissell noted his reservations, saying:

I have signed this request to indicate my approval, but do so with a good deal of concern. I realize that this is a very major and top priority activity and I also realize that the senior officers engaged in it continue to be heavily overworked. On the other hand, I am fearful that the addition of large numbers of personnel will not in fact reduce the load on those individuals who are most overworked, but may instead create additional burdens of management without contributing significantly to the success of the underlying activities. I am concerned also that we may be simply running out of suitable people in the Agency in certain categories. Accordingly, I urge you to re-examine even the double-starred positions in the staffing guide submitted with your request to see whether they are all in fact of a high order of essentiality.* 129/

* Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that only the best people be assigned to the WH/4 project. As early as August of 1960, it had been indicated that the DDP might be leaning toward the use of directed assignments, but nothing ever came of this. 130/

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Even before Mr. Bissell's memorandum of early November 1960, indicating the possibility that experts in certain areas might no longer be available from within the Agency, proposals had gone forward requesting permission for the use of American contract personnel in the maritime operations. Unlike the brouhaha that was precipitated by the early suggestions for the use of American volunteers from the ground forces, the authorization for the use of US contracts in maritime activities apparently was granted without much debate. The statement of the requirements for the use of the US contracts indicated that US citizens would be put under contract to act not only as trainers for the crews of LCI's, LCU's, LCVP's, and SK's, but also, that they would serve in key positions

as LCI captains, LCI diesel engineers, and LCU coxwains during training and operations, where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained. This would require their entering Cuban coastal waters and, on occasions, touching on Cuban beaches, when operations so require.

It is essential for operations that these key positions be held by qualified and dependable men. At this time, it is not expected that Cuban trainees qualified for such positions or possessing the necessary aptitude and character to permit successful training will be found. If

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they are located, the use of U.S. contract personnel will correspondingly be cut down. Staff personnel will assist in the training of all crews but will not be used in operations. 131/

Not only were such contract employees authorized, but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters to the Forward Operations Base noted:

In view degree risk involved rendezvous-type mission request Case Officer advise all Maritime contract personnel bonus this type mission be hereafter \$100.00. Bonus for Cuban territory beach landings or caching would remain \$500.00. 132/

By the early fall of 1960, the question of rotation of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a serious matter. Many of those who had initially joined the project had come in on 90-day rotation periods, and in a cable to Headquarters, Ernie Sparks, the overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS Guatemala, requested that Headquarters approve a rotational plan since:

Most personnel adjusted family and business problems to period they told they be absent and fact they on duty seven days a week as well as being confined to training areas which lack recreation facilities. 133/

Bill Eisemann, who was Chief of Support for WH/4, was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments, saying:

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They [the DDP] would bring a man in, and then another man would come in to replace him. It was really a tremendous task to keep up with it, because a lot of these people had personal problems. In some cases they would cable and request release from their assignment for personal reasons. We attempted to satisfy most of these requests. Herb Juul was the assigned Personnel Officer within the project. He had to constantly keep a check on the location of our personnel, and when their time was up for replacement, he would then visit with the Clandestine Services, and also the Support components, and give them a listing of the names of potential TDY returnees. The Support components and Clandestine Services then provided names of people who would be replacements. That was a hell of a task, now, believe me. When you have a full time project running 15 months or more, you have people returning on a 90 day basis, and constantly being replaced ... you can't expect the greatest efficiency in operations. 134/

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Part III

Changing Concepts

It has already been pointed out that the initial planning for paramilitary operations against Castro was to be based on extremely small units. Two or three man units, including a communicator, would be trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work with a dissident group. One trainer would be the adviser for the types of guerrilla warfare activities which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely and reasonably securely. There had been some signs of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program prior to the summer of 1960. By the late summer of 1960 and through the fall there was to be a complete and radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary operations in which the forces backed by CIA should engage. In late August-September, there were some clues that changes in the nature of operations were being contemplated. During the last week of August and in the initial week of September 1960, Savilion Chapman claimed that he and a Col. Evans, Acting Chief, PMG/DDP, were "briefed by WH/4 planners on the

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approximate number of troops, tanks, and vehicles for which sea transport would be required." In that same period Lt. Col. Frank Egan and Commander Norman Imler of the WH/4 staff reported they asked the Maritime Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving information on the foreign cargo vessels that would be required for troop transport, including their ownership, their costs, and on the methods of their acquisition. 1/

Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the project to become the trainer for the PM forces, it was apparent that some changes were contemplated. The reference to the use of vessels for the transport of tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October, Lt. Col. Egan and a representative of the Logistics Branch of WH/4 had spelled out some additional details for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations. At that time, according to Mr. Chapman's report, WH/4 was talking about deck loading of 3 LCV's, with 5 armored tanks, 5 2-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guerrilla teams. 2/

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By the first week in November 1960, it had become clear to the most senior planners of the anti-Castro effort -- Jake Esterline, J. C. King, Tracy Barnes, and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were going to have to be made about all aspects of the paramilitary program. The basic question being whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis should be launched at Castro, or whether, at this time, such a program should become a joint operation between the Department of Defense and the Agency. In the discussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions between Agency personnel and representatives of the Special Group, and in discussions within the meetings of the Special Group, the whole gammut of options was being explored. Barnes, apparently deferring to Bissell, suggested that rather than small team activities something on the order of 10-20 man teams be formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that what was needed at this time, was a willingness to run some risks -- including the risk of defeat. Barnes was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that the apparent belief of the Group was that every operation had to succeed; and that if there were "losses,

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failures, or mishaps," the Special Group seemed to want to cancel everything. This was contrary, completely, to Barnes' concept of operational activity. What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms of the smaller team activity were that:

The implementation of such teams would indicate whether the dissident elements in Cuba were likely to rally around such groups, once it had been established that such groups could provide guidance and supply for the anti-Castro activities.

These teams also would provide a test of the Castro forces. Could Castro's militia or his army contain the guerrilla forces, if such forces were led by cadres trained by the Agency? Or would the Castro resistance crumble in the face of effective dissident elements? 3/

Even as this discussion was going on, it became clear that the small team concept was going to go by the board; and when the Agency tried to jump the option to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment in Cuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious

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assault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group in a meeting of 3 November 1960. The Department of Defense supported the Agency, but State objected and suggested that perhaps the point where covert intervention was possible had passed. Gordon Gray even went so far as to raise the possibility of a fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying overt US intervention. It was at this same meeting that Mr. Livingston Merchant of the Department of State raised the question of whether plans were being made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara -- at which point General Cabell, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, pointed out that such activities as assassination were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA had no capability for such an operation. 4/

Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala (4 November 1960) that the small team concept had gone by the board and that planning should begin for training a conventional amphibious assault force of at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the infantry training base in Guatemala (JMTRAV), emphasized

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the need to instill an esprit de corps among the trainees. To do this JMTRAV was urged to provide for unit separation, competition in the military arts, and specific identities for the individual units through the use of scarfs, caps, or some other device. This new training program was to be instigated in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of January 1961. 5/

Even as the discussions over the changing concept were going on, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled to brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 November. 6/ The concept to be presented to the President was that a force of 600 men would be landed by LST on Cuban shores and that these men would move inland to create "a safe area in a mountain fastness. These men, with possibly another 600 man unit in another area, and those who joined them from within, would be resupplied by air drop." 7/ In addition, there would be new recruits in the pipeline to provide support for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nicaragua would be used to support air operations, and it was intimated that the US and possibly allied

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governments would recognize that the force lodged in Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional Government of Cuba. 8/

One strange and contradictory note which appeared during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation with the DCI in briefing the President elect was the following item stating:

Our [CIA's] original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed. 9/

How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the 1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with an airstrip was envisioned by the senior personnel in WH/4 as "unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD effort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 with only 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs

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Operation in March 1961. Certainly there was no lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted, nor in the efficiency of the military forces and militia that he had at his command by April 1961.*

One of the principal problems posed by Project JMATE -- both before and after the concept changed in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be, or could be, continued without reflection upon the position of the United States Government. Thomas Mann of the State Department became increasingly concerned about this situation; and the discussions within the Special Group and among the concerned Agencies during the period from the middle of November until the end of the year, focused very frequently on this question. Considering the continuingly favorable reception to Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala's

* During interviews with the author of this history, Messrs. Bissell, Esterline, and Drain had only slight remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16 November 1960 when they ruled out what would be, in effect, the invasion plan implemented in April 1961 at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the joint support of the Department of Defense. This point was completely overlooked by both the Inspector General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the Bay of Pigs.

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President, State's concern that the training "places too much strain on the government of Guatemala" appear unrealistic. The Department's real concerns were with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN. Certainly Ydigoras was not interested in the removal of those military units which could most effectively guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala -- the Cubans in training for both air and ground activities.* 10/

Even as the Special Group was trying to determine whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala should be removed, the Agency proceeded apace with plans for the staffing necessary to put a 600-man strike force in training. Chief, WH/4 Personnel estimated that in addition to 14 staffers, there would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if such training were to succeed. Well prior to the officially agreed-to change in concept, Chief, WH/4 had anticipated a significant increase in funding

* The internal situation in Guatemala vis a vis the training operations is discussed in detail in Volume II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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for JMARC requesting of the DDP that:

With your approval, in the interim period [as new budget estimates were being prepared], project funds will be used as required to meet operational necessity without strict adherence to the preliminary estimates of last June [1960].* 10a/

Although Mr. Bissell approved the request, he made this interesting comment:

What is disturbing is that the overrun reported in your memorandum seems to have occurred long before you could be feeling any effect of the [planned expansion] in [PM] plans. 10b/

Contrary to suggestions that the President of Guatemala was concerned about the Cuban training activity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director from Guatemala indicated that the ground training base was undergoing a major reorganization because permission for the establishment of a tactical training area at another of the *fincas* (estates) controlled by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was being undertaken. Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's right hand man and conducted the liaison with the WH/4 representatives for the establishment and operation

* The increased budget being suggested was on the order of \$42 million compared to \$3 million being discussed in June.

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of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction in positions between State and the Agency was obvious. 11/

As the Special Group discussions were going on, Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 was in Guatemala taking a first-hand look at the air and ground training bases. As noted in another volume, Esterline went strongly on record in support of the Office of Logistics engineer who had been responsible for the reconstruction of the airstrip at Retalhuleu. Jake noted that even though there had been a sizable cost overrun, the task had been performed on time under the most adverse weather conditions; and, consequently, suggestions from Headquarters that there had been gross inefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded.* Esterline's review of the situation at JMTRAV, the ground training base, indicated that the situation there was considerably more difficult than what he had encountered at the air training base. He noted, for example, that there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers, stating:

* For details on construction of the airfield at Retalhuleu, see Office of Logistics, Engineering Staff, RECD, *Agency Engineering Activity, 1947-1966*, Vol. I, 63-67; Vol. II, 132-193. DDS/HS OL-11, Feb 72. S.

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While a few of these men [from the Domestic Operations Base in Miami] impress me as being good types, for the most part I found them to be too immature and lacking in experience to qualify for the job at hand. In any event, they are not in my judgment worth the \$1,000 per month which we have to pay them. I would like most of them to be GS-4, 5, and 6 students that [sic] we trained at Fort Benning in 1951-52. Under no circumstances would I consider putting these people into Cuba with the Cubans.

In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala, Esterline presented the following critical observations of the situation as he saw it. Reflecting on the mission and on the resources available, he wrote:

I also reviewed the problem in the light of the many gaps in policy approval for JMARC, all of which complicate project planning. By the time I arrived back at Headquarters, I had fairly well convinced myself that it is unrealistic for the project or the Agency to try to "go it alone" in opening up another major base in a third country to train from 1,500 to 3,000 Cubans for a major invasion effort. I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins at length, and found that he shared my view. As a result of this discussion, we re-evaluated our capability and presented you [the DDP] with the recommendation that we limit ourselves to preparing a force of 600 maximum to be used in the manner we outlined to you on 16 November. I still feel this recommendation is quite valid given the limitation on real estate that we are presently working under. If it turns out that we can acquire policy approval for the real estate in the interior,

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I would then agree that, with limited additional help from DOD, we could train a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along the line outlined during the 16 November meeting. Even our present scope of operations, however, continues to be endangered by the gambit that Mr. Mann and Mr. Merchant are engaged with in the [State] "Working Group." I cannot emphasize this too strongly: if we are required to evacuate Guatemala for reasons of high policy or because of the situation, the project will be seriously damaged unless we have immediately available real estate where these people can be put to work. 13/

Some relief would be provided for the ground training program with the opening up of Alejos *finca* near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facilities for the ground forces would continue to plague JMARC through the course of the project. Moreover, even though the discussions concerning plausible deniability reached near fever pitch during the discussions of November 1960, at no point did the Special Group of presidential consultants ever step forward with a firm recommendation that the United States assume responsibility and so admit. The most persistent advocate of this position was Thomas Mann, of the Department of State, and why his proposals were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved

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questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.*

Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence between the field and Headquarters, with specific emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers. Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority need to secure Special Force trainers from the Army, on an ASAP basis. Requirements for materiel jumped, particularly in the number of personal weapons which would be required for added numbers of troops in training. With the acquisition of the additional training site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, requests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps to transport troops to these training areas. The

* There also is evidence that at least one of the principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contributed to the November confusion. At one point, when serious consideration was being given to the possibility of increasing significantly the training activity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced what amounted to moral objections to the association -- or to strengthening the association -- with the Somoza Government. Barnes emphasized that this would go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much in line with the position being advanced by the Department of State -- Thomas Mann excepted.

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field was aware that the increasing number of trainees would create problems, but at the same time, there were indications that the trainers were hopeful that the infiltration teams that had been developed could be held intact. 15/

Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters area over the nature of the program, so, too, was concern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters. A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to Headquarters requested:

Recent cable traffic suggests major changes in near future and COS feels it would be of great assistance to have complete story to assist in dealing with Alejos and Ydigoras. 16/

Even as COS Guatemala was requesting information, the situation in Washington remained in a state of flux. On 29 November, Col. King made a specific attempt to obtain positive guidance through the office of the Deputy Director for Plans. Chief, WH/D, outlined his understanding of the paramilitary planning as follows:

(a) On or about 1 February 1961, land by amphibious means a guerrilla force of about 600 trained Cubans to establish a perimeter defense and resistance center in a selected area of Cuba.

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(b) Continue present operations of infiltrating small paramilitary teams to organize, train, and lead resistance forces and report intelligence information.

(c) Follow up this effort by providing air logistical support to the 600-man guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional guerrilla elements who join to collaborate with this force. 17/

Having outlined his understanding of the planning,

Col. King then went on:

The following major questions must now be resolved by the Special Group or referred to the President for decision before proceeding further to implement the paramilitary aspect of this program as described above:

a. Does either the Department of State or the Department of Defense view the proposed paramilitary concept as not in consonance with policy or for any other reason open to question? If so, why and what alternatives are proposed; what course of action is approved?

b. If there is agreement as to the paramilitary concept, then is there agreement that training shall continue in Guatemala?

c. If continuance in Guatemala is disapproved, will DOD air-lift the present trainees at once from Guatemala to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited? The entire group would later be returned to a staging area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation.

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(d) Will the DOD also provide the following:

(1) Thirty-eight Special Force officers and enlisted men to be used as instructors in Guatemala or in Saipan, or both.

(2) One reactivated LST.

(3) Supplementation of logistic resupply air-lift to resistance after 1 February. (As detailed an estimate as can be made will be forwarded to DOD if the paramilitary concept is approved.) 18/

Col. King then closed this memorandum to Mr. Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary concept was approved, certain policy approvals would be required. These were listed as follows:

a. To use one Florida base, such as Opalocka, for air supply missions in support of guerrilla forces in the target country.

b. To use a small number of American civilian contract personnel in air and maritime operations. (No such personnel are to be used in ground operations.)

c. To mount air strikes against Cuban air and other military targets. 19/

Whatever else can be said, it is clear that by the end of November 1960, the original concept of the Agency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on the use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with

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the dissident elements located within the country had gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as yet to be determined -- with the concomitant requirement for heavy air support for resupply and possibly for military support as well. Indicative of the confusion which surrounded this period when the concept was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he testified before the Taylor Committee. It appears as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly as it turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May 1961 Lt. Col. Frank Egan had indicated to the committee that the strike force concept has been in being since his EOD in June 1960.*

In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony had been, Esterline reported:

My recollection is that Lt. Col. Egan came to us about June 1960 and that he

* Egan had actually testified that following the Guatemalan revolt he had been sent down to organize the brigade, and he stated that the number of Cuban trainees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November 1960 and had risen to nearly 600 by the first week of December. 20/

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arrived with certain ideas which he carried from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the Cuban problem. This, however, did not constitute JMATE policy. I am sure you [Col. Jack Hawkins] -- or more particularly, members of your staff -- will find that we had no approved philosophy of the operation within the Project until well in[to] September. The training program which Rocky Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed solely toward training an instructor cadre in small unit or "guerrilla type" operations. This cadre, when it arrived in Guatemala, in addition to working on building the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued to train the first recruits in the same kind of training they had received.

Another example of my positiveness that we were not, at Project level, thinking of the strike operation is the first conversation that we held in my office in Barton Hall when I referred to the fact that the PM staff had been talking about the development of a strike operation, but that I, myself, was not convinced of it at the time and that I preferred to put small teams into existing units at the appropriate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack Hawkins] had an open mind at that point; although without positive study of Cuba you leaned to the concept I outlined. It was at a somewhat later date, therefore (probably before the first of October), that we talked again and you [Col. Jack Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro could not be overthrown without a major or catalytic effort being made against him. After deliberation, I came to the same conclusion, and we then began to think in terms of expanding the force to the strength of a reinforced battalion, more or less.

The foregoing is important only because General Taylor is going into very

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fine points in his analysis of government policy. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to get the record straight in this manner, and, although Lt. Col. Egan may have had in his own mind the idea of a strike operation -- and I believe he came to us with some idea on hitting the Isle of Pines -- this nevertheless was not approved Project or Agency policy until quite a few months later. In point of fact, as I look back over that period, I am sure during that period I found myself drifting along, devoting myself merely to creating basic capabilities in a variety of fields without any clear-cut idea of what national policy would permit us to do.* 21/

Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a

* In a discussion with the author of this history in the fall of 1975, Esterline introduced another thought about the change in concept to wit:

That the small team concept had been planned to be put into operation early in November of 1960, and Esterline seems to believe that this would have been feasible. However, the Presidential election of that year made the Eisenhower administration extremely cautious about anything that might have an impact on the outcome of the election; and, consequently, such delays as were incurred gave added time for the buildup of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the election was over, it had become apparent that the small team concept was no longer viable. Esterline, in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the buildup in the brigade forces came from the White House. But even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the Special Group during the period from November to the end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support the idea of increasing the size of the force, there is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this came from the White House. 22/

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rather more positive recollection of the change in concept, having noted:

That decision as to the character of the operation was rather gradually modified during the late autumn [of 1960], and it's very difficult, even for someone who was close to those developments, to put a finger on the exact moment when a clear decision was made, or the circumstances, or, really, the people who made it. It was a decision rather forced by circumstances. 23/

When discussing the situation in October of 1975, however, Bissell volunteered the following observations about the change in concept for the operation. He said:

One of the clearest impressions I have of the whole planning period and of this change in concept was that by November [1960] ... and I don't think Esterline bought this view either as completely or as soon as I did ... I [also] remember the feeling that I was well ahead of King ... in my belief that we had to place nearly exclusive reliance for the initial phase on whatever force it was possible to land. So, I also remember very clearly -- and I think as early as November -- where I think there were probably under 500 people in the brigade in training -- I remember repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline that if we are really going to have to place this heavy reliance on a landing force, this is an all together preposterously inadequate number ... I remember being told that people did not see how it would be feasible to get up to the size I was talking about in the time period; but secondly ... I have a clear recollection that he [Jack Hawkins] had a lesser sense

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of urgency at that point about a buildup in numbers than I did. I felt that I was consistently urging upon Hawkins the necessity of a larger buildup than the plans then contemplated, and I also remember, at a later stage in a somewhat similar fashion, urging upon Beerli, the necessity of a significantly larger air arm than his plans contemplated ... I think that Hawkins likewise felt that he had to rely on what the recruiting mechanism would turn up, which wasn't really his direct operation, and that he wasn't at all sure that he could get the sort of numbers that I was talking about. But I do remember an awareness of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy of our resources in the light of an altered concept of the operation. 24/

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Part IV

Presidential Resurgence

The previous section of this volume has examined the activities that occurred during the period from the early fall through November of 1960, with the shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla warfare type operation to a new concept emphasizing amphibious invasion. During this period most of the discussion and the decisions, aside from those within CIA, were at the level of the Special Group. The principals involved from the Department of State were at the Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary level at the highest, and at the Agency, both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans were involved. On 29 November 1960 the level of involvement of the US Government escalated sharply with the sudden resurgence of interest on the part of President Dwight David Eisenhower. In contrast to the period from July 1960 through the Presidential election of early November -- when, as noted earlier, there was, at most, minimal attention to the developing anti-Castro program at the White House level --

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suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal decision makers in the period prior to the take-over by the Kennedy administration.

When asked for an explanation of this sudden resurgence, Jake Esterline, then Chief, WH/4 stated:

I can't explain it ... but I will say this, it probably had a political basis. They [the Republican administration] realized that they had lost, and they realized that they were going to have to brief a new administration along with the British on the things that had been going on. I suspect that they didn't want to brief on something that would emerge that they hadn't been giving anything other than their full support. I am guessing, but I would think that was a pretty good guess. 1/

On 29 November of 1960, the President had a meeting which included Messrs. Dillon and Merchant of State; Gates and Douglas of Defense; Gray and Goodpaster of his own Staff; and Dulles and Bissell of CIA. In his report on the session with the President, Mr. Bissell, the DDP mentioned among other things the following two points of particular interest:

The President made it clear he wanted all done that could be done with all possible urgency and nothing less on the part of any department, ... and the President led a discussion as to how best to organize the total US effort against the target. There was some feeling that an

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overall coordinating executive might be desirable, but it was left that the Director would make Mr. Barnes available to work closely with a State Department officer to be designated. It was also felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley's services, initially in connection with [24] assistance. 2/

The points of view attributed to the President at this time by Mr. Bissell reflect very closely the position of William D. Pawley who had met with the President immediately prior to the President's session with State, DOD, and the Agency's representatives. According to Livingston Merchant, who had a long session with Mr. Pawley on the day prior to Pawley's meeting with President Eisenhower:

Mr. Pawley said that two things are necessary, and I inferred that these would constitute his [Pawley's] principal recommendations to the President.

(1) The President should appoint a single experienced individual (he said he was personally qualified and would be available for the job if asked) to conduct the entire covert operation. In this connection, he cited the role which he had played in the Guatemala case.

(2) We should recruit several thousand good young Cubans in Florida and give them basic training. This could be done in five or six weeks, rather than months, according to him. He was extremely impatient at the thought of moving any Cubans who may now be in Central America, expressing himself

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forcefully as being sure their host would object.

I asked if he was proposing overt intervention by US armed forces. He said absolutely not. The essence of his plan would be to land in Cuba, presumably in the next month or two, a force of 600 trained Cubans, following up this landing with additional Cuban elements and then installing a government in the bridgehead which would call on us for financial and logistics support. He mentioned a number of names which were unfamiliar to me of Cubans who he said are politically unblemished in Cuba, neither pinks nor reactionary rightists.* 3/

On 30 November 1960, a Special Group meeting was held at which time Gordon Gray:

* Considering that discussions within the Agency and within the Special Group had only recently arrived at the figure of 600 men for an invasion brigade, plus the fact that this brigade would establish a bridgehead from which a provisional government opposed to Castro might be announced, one might speculate on the source of Pawley's information. Jake Esterline has tended to denigrate the role played by Pawley during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation; but, nonetheless, throughout the course of the operation Jake was charged with maintaining close liaison with Pawley. JMATE records indicate not only the numerous face-to-face meetings between Pawley and Esterline during the course of the operation, but also reflect an amazing number of telephone conversations between the two during the life of the operation. In terms of the operational plan per se, Esterline appeared to be most cagy in handling this subject during the discussions with Pawley. The recorded conversations focus on the potential leadership for the FRD -- with Pawley's "best" leadership choices usually being far to the right.

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Solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a concensus [*sic*] of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high level meeting [the meeting with the President] of the day before. 4/

According to the memorandum on the meeting, there was agreement that the US would deny its participation in any training activities in Guatemala, that there would continue to be a prohibition on the training of Cubans in the United States, and that evacuation plans should be kept in readiness in case the Cubans in training in Guatemala had to be evacuated -- the plan to evacuate was not clear as to whether the Cubans would be taken into Florida as ordinary refugees or whether the evacuation would call for transporting the troops to **[13-23]** training base.

The problem that apparently created the greatest difficulty at this Special Group meeting was the President's suggestion that a single individual should be placed in charge of the anti-Castro program. The Special Group decided that there should be two individuals with principal responsibilities -- one to handle the overt and the other to handle the covert activities. After reviewing a list of potential candidates:

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It was finally decided that, taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice. On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recognized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's associates. 5/

When Mr. Mann suggested that Ambassador Willauer might also assume responsibility for contacts with the FRD, Mr. Dulles rejected this out of hand, emphasizing that this liaison must be done covertly, and that it must be done by the Agency. There apparently was unanimous agreement that Mr. Pawley not be given any official status with the US Government, but no one objected to Pawley's plans to visit Argentine President Frondizi in his capacity as a private US citizen. 53/

Following the President's suggestion of 29 November, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December 1960 recommending that, because of the differences in responsibilities, two senior officials, rather than one, be charged with managing the anti-Castro program. Dillon suggested that Ambassador Whiting Willauer be named as a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, Thomas Mann, to act as the officer responsible for the US Government's

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overt position vis-a-vis Cuba, and with the responsibility of coordinating the covert activities of the Agency into that US position. On the covert side Dillon followed the DCI's suggestion that C. Tracy Barnes should be appointed "to devote full time to the direction of the Agency's program with respect to Cuba, and to concert with Amb. Willauer." 6/

Dillon's memorandum then went on to recommend that the members of the Special Group -- Dulles, Gray, Douglas, and Merchant -- should continue to exercise general supervision over the covert operation and to provide the Agency with general guidance in the operation, and -- now at the tag end of the Eisenhower administration -- went on to say that the Group

should continue and intensify its general supervision of the covert operation ... [and] maintain close and regular liaison with Secretary Anderson of Treasury or his designated representative ... [and] should meet, together with the member's individual principals, with you from time to time as it deemed necessary or as you desire. 7/

In response to this recommendation, the President wrote:

I approve of the suggestions regarding the reorganization of the government's

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program with respect to that country [Cuba], except that I think Mr. Willauer should have a position directly subordinate to the Secretary of State for so long as Cuba remains a critical problem in our foreign relations. There should be no doubt as to the authority of the Special Assistant to the State Department (Mr. Willauer) to subordinate covert and overt activities, nor as to his responsibility for conveying policy guidance to the operating agencies. In their broad outline, these policies will, of course, be subject to the approval of higher authority. 8/

An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memorandum is that he elevated the position to be assigned to Mr. Willauer from that of being a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary Mann, the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, to that of being directly subordinate to the Secretary of State. When Thomas A. Parrott who acted as secretary for the Special Group meeting transmitted a copy of the draft of ^{Dillon's proposed} Dulles' ^(for the President's signature) memorandum to Tracy Barnes, Parrott had been made aware of the possibility that Eisenhower was in favor of raising the position of Willauer. In an aside to Barnes in his transmittal note, Parrott indicated that even if Eisenhower did want Willauer made directly responsible to the Secretary of State, in fact: "He [Willauer] will be instructed that he

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darn well works for Mann anyway, regardless of the title."* 9/

Even as the negotiations just mentioned were underway, by early December 1960 the Agency's position on the nature of the PM action decidedly hardened. On 8 December at a meeting of the Special Group, Colonels Hawkins and Egan proposed a military program which combined the use of infiltrated small paramilitary teams as a test to see if the dissident elements would rally round and, also recommend a training program for a force of 600-750 men possessing extremely heavy fire power for amphibious assault. Prior to an amphibious invasion, however, it was agreed that there would be sorties into Cuban air space but the precise nature and number of these was disputable, ranging from possibly 100 a month for a three month period beginning on 15 January 1961 -- and including some B-26 sorties to bomb and strafe military targets -- to an undefined minimum of sorties for a three week period to soften up the opposition.

* The Agency apparently thought that it had a pretty good handle on Willauer because of his long term association as Executive Vice-President, President, and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Civil Air Transport (CAT).

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In the course of these discussions of ground and air operations there were some interesting contradictions among Agency spokesmen as to what was needed or what was wanted. Tracy Barnes seemed to have a great deal more to say than was warranted by his knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned action. In one discussion with Secretary Douglas, when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased number of troops, he stated that the number of anti-Castro dissidents who might rally round the invaders would be no different if the size of the invading force were 600 men or 3,000 men. A rationale such as that and Barnes's comment to Gen. Lansdale when he forwarded one proposal --

Please recognize that this proposal is a draft and is off the top of the head without any detailed knowledge of possible applicable regs and procedures --

help make understandable the consternation within the ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the Agency's understanding of which end was up.* 10/

* There was also an ongoing discussion during this time period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Force trainers to the Guatemala bases. This is discussed in detail in Volume II of this history, *Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy*.

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In one of the longer and more detailed papers being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower administration, the State Department drafted the political action recommendations and suggested collective action through the Organization of American States to effect the ouster of Castro. Failing in that, State then outlined a unilateral political action program for the United States. The paramilitary and covert action segments of this paper were prepared by the CIA. Neither the State nor the CIA paper introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly discussed. These recommendations were made just as if the Secretary of State, the Special Group, and the President had approved, or would approve, the courses of action that were being outlined. This being the case, it was suggested that the concurrence of the President-elect should be sought for the proposed program. In the best of all possible worlds one could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach -- in the pragmatic world it is difficult to understand that anyone would go on record with the expectation that such recommendations might be followed

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across changing political and administrative lines.* 11/

With WH/4 in the throes of revising the anti-Castro program on the basis of the increased efficiency of the Castro military forces, an SNIE, *Prospects for the Castro Regime*, was issued, belaboring the obvious -- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. The SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation about Castro's military forces:

The militia's overall combat efficiency is low; many units are still on a part time training basis. However, there appears to be emerging a nucleus of well organized, well equipped, and well trained units loyal to Castro and strongly Communist-influenced; we believe that within the next 12 months or so, these units will develop into a reasonably effective security force. 13/

The estimate continued, noting that the Cuban Army was still disrupted and "combat effectiveness of the Air Force is virtually nil." 9/ The concept for Project JMATE, however, had shifted from small unit guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of

* President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960, "Senator Kennedy" came to the White House for a briefing and that among the subjects discussed was Cuba, this being one of the first three items that Kennedy wished to talk about and that: "He [JFK] had previously been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and had some familiarity with the details." 12/

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increased efficiency of Castro's forces and it would appear that the operators and the estimators were not making evaluations from the same intelligence information.

Despite his promotion early in the month, it was not until 23 December 1960 that Ambassador Willauer called a meeting with the Agency's principals to explain both his role and some of the problems that he anticipated the President wanted him to handle. Apparently it was an inauspicious beginning, for according to a memorandum of the meeting:

Mr. Willauer stated that his role, as explained to him by Secretary Herter, was to be that of the chairman and major shareholder of a corporate board with Mr. Tracy Barnes, the executive director for operations and minority shareholder. Col. King asked for clarification on this point, noting that Mr. Esterline is the director for operations for CIA with the chain of command going from the Director to Bissell to Col. King to Mr. Esterline. Mr. Barnes is a coordinator with the other interested agencies. Mr. Willauer agreed that this was the case, noting that he had used the term operations in the looser sense of overall coordination. 14/

Once having had the pecking order set straight, Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to a discussion of various problem areas, indicating his very strong bias in favor of Agency positions as opposed to

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positions being taken by the Department of State. For example, Willauer noted that there was a strong aversion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day, with the opponents basing their arguments on the fact that the OAS would be sure to get in on the act and, moreover, that military planning should be deferred until it could be determined if the economic sanctions would work to Castro's disadvantage. On the question of economic sanctions Willauer pointed out to the people in State that since the Soviet Union was so strongly committed to support the Castro government, economic sanctions would have little or no impact on Castro's position. Willauer also argued that there was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba, whether the US had a hand in it or not; and he emphasized that, in any event, the US would be blamed for it.

Both Jake Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins pointed out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date concerned the logistics of the troop movement; and both urged as early a date as possible because of the already mentioned improvement in the military capability, equipment, and training of Castro's

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forces. Esterline also emphasized that most of the arguments urging delay of PM planning, particularly concern re the OAS, had been debated with State for months, and the time had come for direct action.

The WH/4 representatives also stressed that the period of training for many of the Cubans had been extended and re-extended, and that to hold them beyond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintaining high morale among the troops. Esterline took the position that the Cubans the Agency was training knew that the US had the force to throw Castro out any time that it so desired, but the months and months of training was indicative, to them at least, that the US was not really interested in the welfare of the anti-Castro Cubans.

During the 23 December 1960 meeting, Willauer's expertise and familiarity with air operations led him to ask almost immediately "why the project is 'so thin in the air'." Willauer was told that the rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews could be used, and this was the reason for the Agency's efforts to obtain permission to use contract American

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crews for both resupply and combat.* The air operations were the subject of considerable discussion. Concerning the possibility of launching air strikes for three days before the invading force landed, Willauer objected, pointing out that this would give the OAS ample time to get involved in the act. Willauer then raised the question of whether all of the tactical bombing could be done on D-Day. The answer to that from Col. Hawkins was "no," but Hawkins said that it could be done on D-2, if permission were given for dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air force and military targets, with additional sorties during the course of D-1 and follow-up raids on D-Day prior to the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out that if an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikes until D-Day, the Castro air force would have an opportunity to attack the ships which would be carrying the invasion troops.

In a similar manner, a strong case was made for the use of the Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua air base to

* Hawkins wanted "pilots who can work over key targets without tearing up installations we will later need."

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launch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was some discussion of limiting use of this base to only two or three days -- at least some of the State Department people pushed this idea -- but WH/4 pointed out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature of the planned air operations, that the air support operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts had been made to get permission to use US bases, or other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but without success. Willauer, himself was positive that no US bases would be made available for the strike against Castro.

One other interesting aspect of this initial meeting with Willauer, concerned the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Willauer stressed that the ground rule at the Department of State was that the Kennedy people could not be sought out to discuss specific problems unless they initiated requests for information, and it was Willauer's opinion:

That the only practical way to get decisions on the project before 20 January would be to have the Director [the DCI],

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whose position re the new administration is different than Mr. Herter's, to go to Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him committed. It would be very difficult for State people to try to approach Mr. Kennedy via Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles. 15/

During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the Special Group, Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on a meeting that he had participated in the previous day in New York, with a group of American businessmen. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland, who was one of the principal fund raisers for the FRD, and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar Company, the President of the American Sugar Domino Refining Company, the President of the American & Foreign Power Company, the Chairman of the Freeport Sulphur Company, and representatives from Texaco, International Telephone and Telegraph, and other American companies with business interests in Cuba. The tenor of the conversation was that it was time for the US to get off of dead center and take some direct action against Castro.

Suggestions were made to sabotage the sugar crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane

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fields or ruin the refineries; to interrupt the electric power supply; and to put an embargo on food, drugs, and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposed the embargo on food and drugs, but the feeling of the business group was that it was time to get tough and, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would be laid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion volunteered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship in Levisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of the nickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been owned and operated by the US Government. 16/ In his usual cautious manner, Gordon Gray suggested that the Special Group not authorize any action until he had cleared the matter with his "associate."

This group of businessmen also indicated that they were going to undertake the publication of specific papers on issues and programs related to the post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed to help US policy planners. Mr. Dulles, of course, emphasized that policy planning was not his responsibility; this was the responsibility of the Department of State. He did comment that "what he was interested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly

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as possible and in this field he had direct responsibility and would welcome any ideas or suggestions on how this might be achieved." 17/

The high-level business group which Dulles met with was also extremely concerned about the possible orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile, particularly that it should not be left-oriented. Michael Haider, Standard of Jersey's Vice President for Latin America, for example, forwarded a memorandum to Col. J. C. King in early January 1961 identifying as members of an extreme leftist group which had formed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, Rufo López Fresquet, and Dr. Raul Chibás among others. Mr. Haider worried that unless more positive steps were taken to force the conservative Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization, that any post-Castro government would automatically be in the hands of the leftists.* 18/

In addition to strong positive suggestions from US businessmen, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of

* Haider was consistent at any rate -- "leftists" with Fidel or "Fidelistas sin Fidel" were held to be equally bad for US business interests.

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Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, also had some suggestions which he made to Mr. Bissell about the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program. For whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale forwarded to Bissell a number of suggestions which had been presented to him by an Army reservist who had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lansdale's direction researching Cuban political objectives. Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to the study of this subject, and all other aspects of the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind of paper to Bissell. 19/ What response, if any, Bissell made to this memorandum is not known.

The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960 on 29 December, and there were, in addition to the standing problem of the use of US air bases to support the operation against Cuba, the questions of the use of a Nicaraguan air base, the political organization of the Cuban exiles, and considerable discussion about the possibility of initiating action against

[6, 11] It was emphasized that Mr. Pawley was strongly in favor of intervention

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in [11], even suggesting that an overt operation against [6] be mounted concurrently with the Cuban operation. The members of the Special Group, however, were unwilling to buy this particular plan of action; but they did support Mr. Bissell's proposals for some limited covert action operations aimed at the [6] regime.

James H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense questioned the feasibility of "expanding the initial beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban Government"; but Mr. Bissell pointed out that such a project was unrealistic unless "One or all of the following situations develops: (a) overt support, (b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive use of air support." 20/ The Group was apparently in agreement that the Agency should make every effort to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections be attempted to overthrow Castro. 21/

In view of the fact that the US would break diplomatic relations with Cuba on 3 January 1961, the minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960 present an interesting historical problem. In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his

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meeting with President Eisenhower, on 28 December, the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 December read as follows:

The latter [President Eisenhower] made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American Governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for US to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries some time before January 20th. 22/

In contrast to the suggestion that the US break relations with Cuba, prior to the inauguration of Kennedy, General Goodpaster's record of the Merchant-Eisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that:

He, [President Eisenhower] thought, however, that [Presidents] Frondizi, Prado, and others should take diplomatic initiative to get Latin American countries to take a position that they would like to remove Castro from power, but, lacking the means to do so, would like the US to take the lead. The President said it was clear to him that Latin Americans must be brought to see the necessity of action. He was inclined to think that it might be time to recognize the anti-Castro front as the Cuban Government. He added that he would like to see a definite move taken in this matter before January 20th, and said that the State Department should be thinking of some definite action that could be brought about before that time. 23/

"Thinking of some definite action" differs considerably from the suggestion that the President thought

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it would be "desirable" to break relations with Cuba prior to 20 January of 1961.

At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960, it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group's membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to include Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, and C. Tracy Barnes. 24/ As already has been noted, in his retrospective view of the Bay of Pigs operation Jake Esterline was quite forceful in his opinion that the Agency's representatives at such high level meetings should have been someone like either himself or Col. Jack Hawkins who were the most knowledgeable about the status of the operation and, indeed, the whole operational plan.*

* It is the considered opinion of the author of this history that Esterline had a valid criticism. A review of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, indicates that one of the most voluminous correspondents was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written material is repetitious ad nauseam, and that Barnes belabored issues which were common knowledge to the principals in WH/4. Illustrative of this, for example, was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote to Jake Esterline. It began as follows: "It has been a little while since we have had an internal DDP hoe down on your project. In the meantime, a number of important points have been raised." 25/

The memorandum then proceeded to run through all of the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge
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On 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the United States Government that it would have to cut its Embassy staff in Havana to eleven persons. On 3 January 1961, President Eisenhower held a meeting at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation. In addition to the President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the participants included the members of the Special Group, plus General Goodpaster, Mr. Bissell, Thomas Mann, and Tracy Barnes. Among principal questions, of course, were if and when the United States should break off diplomatic relations with Cuba; and after some initial hesitation, before the day was over the United States did break relations officially with the Cuban Government.*

to those who were even marginally involved in planning the anti-Castro operation and contributed nothing in particular to understanding of any of them.

Similarly, Barnes' memorandum for the DCI in preparation for a 3 January policy meeting, rehashed the same information that Barnes had presented to Chief, WH/4, just a few days before. 26/ Barnes appears to have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea.

* Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic relations, there was great concern within the Agency that the COS, a communicator, and a PM officer, and possibly a fourth individual be retained as members of the Staff. 27/

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The other subject of conversation was whether there now was cause or reason for direct US intervention in Cuba, and the decision was that no such action should be taken unless the Cuban Government took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba or damaged official US property (e.g., Guantanamo). In the course of the discussion about the status of Agency planning for anti-Castro activities, the question was raised about increasing the number of trainees. This was ruled out pending the suitability of training sites to handle additional numbers. Training sites in the US still were denied, in part, again, because of the fear of compromising the US position in the Organization of American States or in the United Nations.

The high level White House meeting also agreed that it would be useful to brief members of the new administration, particularly the Secretary of State, but "no definite schedule was agreed upon but the concensus [*sic*] of the meeting was that appropriate briefings should be considered for the near future." 28/

In the few days following the 3 January decision to break relations with the Castro Government, the

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Agency retained control of US communications out of Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred to relieve the female Department of State communications officer and retain the services of her male counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic period, the communications officer was instructed to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed, CIA's Director of Communications indicated "there would not be any extreme compromise." In any event, however, the last message from Havana Station -- on 7 January 1961 at 1638Z -- stated

This last msg from HAVA Station. All files and crypto material destroyed ... on evening 6 Jan [1961] Swiss amb placed "Carta de Proteccion" notices on emb doors minimizing possibility takeover of bldg by GOC.* 29/

Even as the debate over the breaking of diplomatic relations was taking place within the Eisenhower administration, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 which provided an excellent summary of the policy decisions which needed

* Authorization for complete shutdown had been set for 0300Z on 7 January 1961. 30/

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to be made if strike operations were to be conducted against the Castro government. In the course of his eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need for resolution of the problem that had particularly bothered the Special Group -- that was whether the Kennedy administration was interested in following through on the plans that had been made. Assuming that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow through on the program which had been initiated, Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build up of Castro's military forces the strike operations be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The question of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning -- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the general question of air operations Hawkins said:

It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run in to the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster.

Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged the following:

1. That the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day.

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2. That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted.

3. That the operation be abandoned if policy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support.

In order to insure the success of both the air strike and the air drop operations which would provide the logistical support for the troops holding the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had in the past, authorization for the use of contract American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air bases in the United States for the launching of logistical flight operations.* 31/

Much the same ground indicated in Hawkins memorandum was rehashed in preparing Mr. Barnes and the DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961.

* There is no indication that Hawkins ever changed his attitude about the need for the introduction of some US pilots into both the strike and logistics air operations, even though his much quoted cable of 13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high praise for the B-26 pilots who were about to undertake the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, *Air Operations*, Part III, A for discussion of the Hawkins cable in the context of the air operations.

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Somewhat more emphasis than Hawkins had given to it was placed on the political organization and the needs for structuring the exile political group to conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same focus was to be given to the questions regarding air bases, the size of the invasion force, and the number of trainees who could be accommodated in the camps, and other of the problems that had already been discussed time and time again. 32/ Similarly, in discussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group, much of this same ground continued to be replowed without any positive resolution by the Special Group members. 33/

During the course of the frequent sessions of the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower administration, the Director of Central Intelligence also was required to make a presentation before the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record of this meeting stated as follows:

Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba, mentioning the two-pronged program of

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propaganda including radio and publications and the paramilitary effort. Again he pointed out that this is an expensive program running to approximately \$28 million. Mr. Dulles discussed the radio effort and paramilitary effort in some detail, indicating the numbers of Cubans being trained and the supply efforts and the bases. 34/

Because of the subsequent charges which would be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and others writing on the Bay of Pigs, it is important to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attending this briefing was Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy Director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger and some of the later "experts," was supposed to be in almost total ignorance of any planning for an operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs.*

* Other Agency personnel in attendance at this briefing were General Cabell, DDCI; Colonel L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support; Richard Helms, Chief of Operations for DDP; Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel, and John Warner, Legislative Counsel. It also should be noted that Mr. William A. Tidwell, Jr. of Amory's office was appointed in January 1961 to be Chief of the Office of Operations in Miami. 35/ Organizationally at this time, the Office of Operations was under the Deputy Director for Intelligence. In view of the efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans for training in the exile Brigade, it is inconceivable that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence were not fully aware of the plans that were being made to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed at Playa Giron.

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On 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got involved in a meeting concerning the planned operations against Castro. On that day the New York Times broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops in Guatemala. As the ex-President himself wrote:

On the morning of January 10 [1961], the New York Times carried an article, with a map, describing the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala ... It told most of the story. I decided that we should say nothing at all about this article. Believing that my successor might want some day to assist the refugee forces to move into Cuba, I considered that we were limited in what we could say about them. 36/

Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the appearance of the *New York Times* article is not known, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call on the administration to send a representative up to the Hill on 12 January 1961, in order to provide further explanation of the *Times* article. Of the two candidates being considered to appear before the Senate, Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, or DCI Dulles, it was decided to send Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee. However, President Eisenhower

raised certain questions as to the right of a Committee to ask questions on foreign

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policy affecting the security of the United States. He [Eisenhower] commented that when this is demanded as a right you are "sunk," and wondered how much right have they got, inasmuch as the Constitution says that it is the responsibility of the Chief Executive. 37/

The culmination of the Special Group discussions, which had taken place with increasing frequency between mid-November 1960 and mid-January 1961, was the report of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on 18 January 1961. The conclusions were predictable -- there were decisions that needed to be made, but these could not be made until the new administration became fully aware of the extent of the anti-Castro programs that had been evolving. As Willauer himself said in his final memo:

In the absence of these decisions, or at least most of them, there is a grave danger that the December 6 plan (updated) may have to be abandoned, as an *effective* means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support, and that the only practical course of action for the *physical* overthrow of Castro, will be either: (1) open U.S. war with Cuba, or (2) a seven-month overt training by the U.S. on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force, which will be planned to strike with at least overt U.S. logistical support.* 38/

* Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December 1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff.

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Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round which the Special Group had been riding for at least two months was Willauer's closing statement:

In our discussions we weighed without coming to a conclusion the advantages of a rapid, effective action by direct war in terms of getting matters over with without a long buildup of world opinion vs. the inevitability of such a build up under any seven month program. 38/

Having reviewed the meetings during the last few weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it is interesting to review the comments of some of those who were principally involved, as they looked back on that period. One of the most immediate responses was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when he explained the invasion to them. Among other things, Castro claimed:

That on certain occasions, we have also been in danger of direct aggression. This danger always has been lurking about us and at certain times has gathered considerable support in the minds of leading circles of the United States. One of those moments when this type of direct aggression was very near was at the end of December [1960] and the beginning of [January 1961], and that is to say, during the last days of the Eisenhower administration. 40/

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So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his armed forces in a state of alert for a two week period, covering the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration. 41/

The other principal protagonist at this time, remembered it in a somewhat different manner. The former US President wrote of this period in the following manner:

Covert training of exiles for any possible future operations against Castro was going forward. Units were growing steadily in strength and efficiency against the time when actual tactical planning could be undertaken. In December [1960], I suggested to the State Department that the time might be propitious for organizing a "front" against Castro among the refugees, with the United States recognizing the leader and his associates as the legal government of Cuba, with the proviso, however, that the exiles themselves would voluntarily select from their own number an acceptable "head of government." I added that if they could do so at once, I'd like to see recognition accorded promptly -- if possible, before January 20 ...

So, to the incoming administration, we left units of Cuban refugees busily training and preparing hopefully for a return to their native land. Because they had as yet been unable to find the leader they wanted -- a national leader to be both anti-Castro and anti-Batista -- it was impossible to make specific

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plans for a military invasion, However, their hatred of Castro, their patriotism, and their readiness to sacrifice for the restoration and freedom in Cuba could not be doubted. 42/

In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's emphasis was on the fact that during his administration all that took place was a training program -- that there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba. This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held on 10 September 1965 when he said: "There was no tactical or operational plan even discussed" when he turned the presidency over to John F. Kennedy. 43/

According to this same interview:

The retiring President stressed that there had been no decision as to how the Cuban forces would be used, if at all. Eisenhower had made no commitments that might bind the new President in dealing with the Castro problem. In fact, the armed refugee group was still so small and relatively unprepared that it could easily have been disbanded if the incoming administration considered its existence unnecessary.

And, more specifically,

Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his judgment that the new administration need not rush a decision regarding the Cubans. "At no time did I put before anybody anything that could be called a plan (to invade Cuba)," declares the former President. He emphasizes that there was "no mandate, no

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commitment by me, or by anyone in my administration," and he doubts that Kennedy felt "he was frozen to any position by me." 44/

Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, also supported his former boss when queried about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigs activity, stressing that the emphasis during Eisenhower's administration was on training the Cuban exiles and providing them with equipment. Like the former President, Gray, too, said that there was "no military plan".

The definition of a military plan, however, seems to have focused on an actual site for the landing; and in this sense, Gray certainly was telling the truth because no such choice had been made at the time that Eisenhower left office. In his own words, Gray stated:

There wasn't any military plan formulated by the time the Eisenhower administration went out. Of course, the President was fully aware of and conversant with the decision to train and arm individuals. And the concept was one that was sort of changing in the Eisenhower Administration. First we were thinking in terms of the old infiltration of small groups. Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people, unit sized groups. And no decisions had been reached at that time. It was only that

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there was training. That was clearly authorized, and it was clearly contemplated that there would be or could be a military action. But it simply was not true that Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't change. As a matter of fact, the planning that was done in his administration was changed. The Bay of Pigs was not the first landing point. That was changed. But none of that, no planning process in the Eisenhower administration had got to the point of discussing what would be the landing point. 45/

What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently ignored, as has been pointed out in the preceding discussion, was the major change that was made in the concept in November of 1960. What was to have been an infiltration of numerous small teams of communicators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion plan calling for a major enlargement of the exile Brigade and an air operations plan which would be critical to both the Brigade's landing and its ability to be sustained once ashore in Cuba. What was yet undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were the issues which the Special Group had argued throughout the weeks from mid-November into January -- the number of troops that should be or could be trained, the facilities that would be available for training sites (possibly in third countries or in the United

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States), the possible commitment of the United States personnel (as "volunteers" or contracts), and possible overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro.* 46/

* Despite the availability of documentary records and autobiographical information about President Eisenhower's role in the anti-Castro program, it is interesting to the historian that the subject of the Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral history interviews conducted with Eisenhower and various of his senior subordinates who were close to the operation. Included among this group, in addition to Eisenhower himself, were James H. Douglas, Jr. (DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (USMC), Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Livingston Merchant (State).

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OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

VOLUME III
EVOLUTION OF CIA'S
ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,
1951-JANUARY 1961
(pages 204-388)

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Part V

Direct Action Programs

A. Propaganda

The desire of WH Division to undertake the propaganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro, antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by more than two months; for on 27 October 1959 in a Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, J. C.

King proposed:

That CIA undertake clandestine propaganda operations targeted at Cuba. These operations would employ primarily radio broadcasts and other means of propaganda, and at informing the Cuban masses of the truth. 1/

Col. King's memorandum pointed out that representatives of various of the Cuban opposition groups organized in the United States had requested Agency assistance to set up propaganda operations directed against the Cuban mainland, and, in addition, he also indicated that he and the Director of Communications, Gen. McClelland, had his people studying the best methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts.

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King's initial memorandum contained no information about potential locations of transmitters, personnel security, inter-Agency coordination or costs.

Almost immediately following the memorandum from Col. King to the Director, the subject of propaganda directed against the Castro government was introduced to discussions in the Special Group. Following the first such meeting at which the subject came up seriously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide more specifics on such matters as requirements for real estate, recommendations for someone to be in charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment that would be required, and how the broadcasting might be controlled. By mid-November, following additional discussions both within the Agency and by the Special Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts originate from [10] under the guidance of Manuel Benitez, and from [11] under the Monte Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. The presumption was that the [10] operation would be self-sufficient, but that the [11] operation would be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency control. The estimated costs that were mentioned in

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mid-November 1959 were roughly \$80,000 each for the operations in [11] and [10], plus an additional \$12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which would originate within Cuba. 2/

Before the end of November, the plans to utilize [10] had been abandoned because it was feared that [8] would not give his approval for such an activity; and by the early part of December, [6, 11] had made it clear that he did not want the propaganda operation to be set up in [11]. Consequently, there was considerable discussion about the possibility of getting permission from [6, 11] to agree to permit the broadcasts from his country. Some members of the Special Group also suggested the possibility that the anti-Castro broadcasts might be originated from other of the Latin American countries, a project which Mr. Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable broadcast facilities that would be available in countries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Somewhere along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A and Mr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the

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suggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be originated from continental United States. How Barnes came by this proposal is not known, for no such activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/

By early February of 1960, however, an equivocal agreement apparently had been reached with [6], for a memorandum from WH Division indicated that:

One pilot [anti-Castro] tape has been made and has been played for the benefit of [E 6, 11]. He has agreed not to interfere if we initiate broadcasts from available transmitters in [11]. 4/

Even though thought had been given to the establishment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would run the anti-Castro broadcasts, [6] had made it clear that he would not permit the establishment of special new transmitting facilities in his country.

On or about 17 March 1960, the same date that President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its propaganda program which, after outlining various phases of the activity, stated:

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It is planned to concentrate all capabilities available to the U.S. Government on the [Cuban] target. In addition, it will be necessary for CIA to create such unilateral, FRD, and third country operations as may be feasible and useful. All facets of psychological operations will be exploited through mass media means, including: radio, television, motion pictures, press and publications, books, leaflets, posters, handbills, and rumors. The major emphasis will be placed on gray materials. Liaison will be conducted as necessary with other U.S. Government agencies. Black operations will be carefully coordinated within CIA prior to implementation. All direct dealings with members of the FRD will be under unofficial cover. 5/

The outline of the propaganda program made it clear that funding of the propaganda operation was going to be a major problem, and it was also clear that CIA was going to be responsible for a considerable portion of this. But even as the propaganda program was being formulated, Col. J. C. King was in New York working with Henry Holland to approach a number of American businessmen whose companies had interests in Cuba. Their objective was to raise funds to support the FRD propaganda operations which might be operated through Station WRUL in New York, a station that was directed by Mr. Walter Lemon who worked closely with the CIA. Lemon, in fact, was ready to

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mount radio program operations almost immediately pending receipt of material and guidance from the Agency.* 6/

With reference to King's approach to [6, 29], the businessman stated that he would contribute his personal funds to the anti-Castro propaganda effort; and in addition, he would approach the directors or heads of other companies that were also involved in Cuba -- individuals whom he thought were well enough off to make personal contributions. With reference to contributions of this nature:

It was decided that personal contributions were most advisable because they would not require action and approval by Boards of Directors, and therefore could be most easily concealed. The sum discussed was \$50,000.* 7/

The plan for private funding of WRUL was in trouble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief

* Among those that Col. King met with on 15 March 1960, were [6, 29]

[6, 29] [6, 29] [6, 29] [29] and [29], made donations in the company names and the Agency notified the Commissioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions. 7a/

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WH/4 had requested Chief, WHD's permission to obligate JMATE funds for support of the station; but Chief, WHD refused, indicating that private money would be available. In October 1960 a similar proposal was made and rejected for the same reasons. By December 1960, however, payment from JMATE funds was authorized because private funds were unavailable. 7b/

In terms of the broadcast facilities that were to be established under the propaganda program, CIA was to create and control both short and medium wave shipborne radio broadcasting operations, and to investigate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmitter capable of black broadcasts into Cuba.* Aside from the broadcast operations, there were a number of additional programs calling for printing facilities for the production of propaganda materials and secure

* The airborne medium wave transmitter apparently was ruled out early in the planning stages because it was "a terribly expensive operation." Based on DPD's estimates, Phillips figured that three flights per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others, Havana, Santiago and Cienfuegos -- over a two month period would show operating costs in excess of \$83,000, plus an additional \$60,000 for transmitting equipment on a C-54, and a cost of \$250,000 if the C-54 were lost. 7c/

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editorial offices so that the propaganda materials could be prepared. 8/

It was shortly after the formulation of the propaganda program that David A. Phillips became Chief of the WH/4 Propaganda Activity. Phillips had done propaganda work for the Agency at the time of the Guatemalan activity, but subsequently retired and had been in private business in Havana. According to his own story, he had intended to stay in private business; but in the course of Castro's rise to power, he was recontacted by Agency personnel and persuaded to take on the job of running the Agency's propaganda campaign against Castro.*

According to one interviewer:

In the Guatemalan campaign, Phillips had worked with a handful of completely controlled Latin American propaganda writers, and had been able to develop a single credible propaganda line. Now, however, he had to work under Washington orders, to offer radio broadcasting time to all the major and competing Cuban exile groups. Much of the Phillips'

* For Phillips' own story of his employment and his re-employment by the Agency, see his book *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977).

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effort went into overcoming the idea that CIA financed radio programs should become a forum for the varying views of rival exile splinter factions. Phillips was principally in Washington ... [but] there were frequent trips to Miami and New York, and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert broadcasting with Henry Loomis, Director of USIA's Voice of America. 9/

All indications are that Phillips had an excellent staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.*

The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda operation was to be the 50,000 watt radio transmitter located on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called "larger" island being roughly 1 3/4 miles long by 1 1/4 miles wide. US possessions, the Swan Islands are located roughly 100 miles NE of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea. Already located on the island was a Federal Aviation radio beacon, and a Department of Commerce weather station. In April 1960, the cover story which was devised for the

* Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and Psychological Section in WH/4, were William Kent, John Isaminger, Phillip A. Toomey, Earnest I. Harrison, Paul Oberst, and Michael J. Maney. 10/ Illustrative of the desire to placate the various exile factions was the proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating basis to present the position of the particular group. FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming on 1 December 1960, and was of the opinion that such programming would "have desired effect on creating semblance [of] united anti Castro opposition." 10a/

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operation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000 watts and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy was going to purchase scientific signal time from the Gibraltar Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary, which was nominally the operator of a commercial radio station then being established.

The loading of the transmitters, the unloading, the construction of the facilities to house the transmitters, and the installation of the transmitters was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James Burwell, a logisitcs officer who was thoroughly involved in the JMATE operation, reported that the construction activity at Swan Island required the movement of 180,000 pounds of equipment from [10] aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to locating the transmitters and constructing the facilities for housing the transmitters, a crude landing field also was cleared. The total time involved was approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under \$225,000.

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The first test signals from Swan Island were sent on 17 May 1960, and from that time until the close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the station was one of the two or three principal voices aimed at Castro's government. 11/ Shortly after the initiation of the broadcast from Swan, a true tempest in teapot was brewed over the question of whether or not export licences were going to be required for goods moving from the mainland to support operations at Swan Island. Involved in this brouhaha were the Department of Commerce, the US Customs Service, and numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff, Commercial Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of Security. Bill Eisemann, WH/4's Chief of Support, had his hands full! Common sense ultimately prevailed and the question of export licences was dropped. 12/

Even before Swan went into operation, there was some question within the government as to whether the CIA or the United States Information Agency should be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts directed at Cuba. Within a few weeks following the beginning of operations at Swan, this question was resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which

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included representatives from the Agency, Mr. Abbot Washburn, the Director of the United States Information Agency, and various of Mr. Washburn's senior people. The meeting made clear that the Agency was doing medium wave broadcasting directly into Cuba. Although it was not specified at the meeting in Mundt's office, CIA also was supporting station WRUL, which had made a direct application on its own initiative for funding such broadcasts -- even though the Agency was behind such broadcasting and such financing. 14/

The Navy, however, got goosey about the cover story which was being presented. Despite a strong effort on the part of senior Agency representatives to convince Rear Admiral S. B. Frankel -- who was designated as the Chief representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste, then Director of ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement in supporting the cover story.* The hassle with the

* The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefing for Adm. Frankel was that the USN was already so heavily involved in the project that it would do them more harm than good to withdraw. Information on this meeting with the Navy and other information pertaining to the development of the Swan Island facility is contained in the sources listed under Reference 14/.

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Navy was successfully resolved when the Agency found that through its own resources it would be able to provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs, including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty.

The problem of security of the island -- particularly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs to the island -- was never put to any real test. In fact, what might have been the only serious security incident was most successfully resolved by [3

] the Security Officer for the island and the Deputy Chief of Base. The incident took place in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students landed to assert a claim to sovereignty of the Swan Islands by the Republic of Honduras, and it was reported as follows:

A potentially dangerous situation was averted by the tactful handling of the group by Mr. [3] who persuaded them to leave their armament of 13 pistols and three submachine guns aboard their boat and conducted them on a tour of the island. The group leader indicated that he wanted to take a census of the population, and was furnished with pertinent information, with no divulgence of Agency interest in Radio Swan or its personnel. Upon completion of the census, the group was permitted to raise the Honduran flag, was given lunch

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and refreshments, and departed shortly thereafter. The good judgment and discretion of Mr. [3] are felt to be directly responsible for avoidance of what could have been a serious incident involving loss of lives, or injury to Agency and other island personnel.* 15/

The question of the exact nature of the broadcasts from Swan was the subject of much discussion, both prior to the opening of the station and subsequent to its first broadcast. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, for example, called Jake Esterline, Chief, Project JMATE to report on conversation that he (General Cabell) had with "a person of considerable importance who was very familiar with Cuba," concerning the nature of the propaganda which should be aimed at the Cuban population. Cabell stated that according to this important person, if tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the Cuban population for hours on end, the effect would be "to bore the people horribly with Castro, but would

* The island was manned by 24 people, all but nine of whom were CIA personnel. The nine were unwitting technicians of the Philco Corporation.

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also pointedly reveal the inconsistencies of his statements." Following receipt of this call from the Deputy Director, Esterline passed the word on to Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps such broadcasts might be used as filler during the intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broadcasts.* 16/

By early August 1960, however, the official policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at Cuba, was to be "the Revolution Betrayed." This theme was formalized by the Department of State; and at the direction of the Secretary of State, copies of a 105 page document addressed to this theme were presented to members of the National Security Council, to members of the Inter-American Peace Committee, and to US Embassies in the Latin American countries.

* COS Havana forwarded another suggestion for a possible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960 issue of *Confidential* magazine, which apparently carried an article called "An American Mother's Terrifying Story -- Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter." It was COS Havana's suggestion that wide publicity be given to this article in the Spanish language, presumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan. 17/ Available records do not indicate whether this suggestion was adopted.

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Instructions were that the Embassies could furnish copies of the document to the foreign ministers and to other high officials in their respective countries. Additionally, the NATO Council also received a copy of this document; and it was the hope of the Department of State that the document would have some impact on the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere countries, which was to begin 16 August 1960 in San Jose, Costa Rica. According to one interview of WH/4's propaganda chief, Dave Phillips, the theme of the Revolution Betrayed

Hammered across the idea that Castro had double-crossed the Cuban people by abandoning the programs and promises that originally won him support. None of CIA's propaganda, spoken or printed, ever urged the populace to rise up against Castro. This appeal, suicidal before the invasion, would be used when, and if, a Provisional Government obtained a lodgement on the island. 18/

According to Phillips's interviewer:

Friendly third country diplomats in Havana monitored CIA's principal broadcasts and confirmed that the signals were loud and clear. To verify its audience the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts (ball point pens were a favorite) to any listener who would write to the station. Considering the police controls inside Cuba, listeners' letters were an act of defiance to the regime. There was a

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a flood of letters including, during
freak radio propagation periods, re-
quests for ball point pens from New
Zealand.* 19/

Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcasts
was related to the Director of Central Intelligence by
Col. King, Chief, WH Division, who pointed out that WH
had a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who, in
the form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan, made it
clear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud and
clear. 21/

Before the end of the summer of 1960, Swan was
on the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for a
total of 10 hours a day, in addition to which they
also began to utilize programs that had been prepared
by the FRD. One problem which would plague Radio Swan
-- as well as other elements of Project JMARC -- was
the shortage of Spanish language capability. Among

* It appears that perhaps baseball cards also were
going to be offered as an inducement to get listeners
to indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast.
A propaganda note from WH/4 for 9 August 1960, for
example, reported: "M[aney] spoke to [3],
Special Acquisitions. He has contacted a company
making baseball cards who claim 'this most unusual
order ever received.' Will get cards, but curious
what was wrong with bubble gum." 20/

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other evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish language capability immediately available at Radio Swan, were the following: A machine-run of Agency employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient Spanish language to undertake an announcer's job; inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a Venezuelan child by a pro-Castro goon, could not be turned to US advantage; and by mid-November 1960 WH Division was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the Department of Defense for a serviceman with native fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer at Radio Swan.*

* In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan child, the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan. The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been caused by a counter-revolutionary. (Sources for the foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish language capability are listed in reference 22/.)

The lack of Spanish language capability was felt throughout the project, not only in the propaganda effort. As late as January 1961, for example, the training facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters for the services for a two week period of an Air Force sergeant who was fluent in Spanish. The training base wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debriefing an infiltration team. The request was denied, however, because there was a greater need for the man's services as an instructor at the air training base in Guatemala. 22a/ In another instance, a request from COB Miami for promotion of a clerical from GS-4 to GS-5 was based on the fact that "her services as a translator have been of the greatest importance to the Base since her arrival." 22b/

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Despite the handicap imposed by the lack of Spanish language capability at the Station, Radio Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activities supported by the Agency; and with Station WRUL, New York, these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts were the most effective means of providing the general Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition. Additionally radio propaganda -- via both short and medium wave transmitters -- was to play an important role immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro forces on Cuban soil. 23/

Aside from radio broadcasts, other media activities in which WH/4 PP engaged were the newspaper *Avance in Exile* and the magazine *Bohemia Libre*. Both of these were published in Miami by the exile groups, and at one time *Bohemia Libre* was reputedly the most widely circulated Spanish language weekly in the world. Although barred in Cuba, selected items from both publications were broadcast by Swan or WRUL. 23a/

One of the strangest of all activities in which WH/4 PP engaged was a public opinion survey conducted by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime. If WH/4's

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planners expected that the survey would show a strong core of internal opposition to the Castro government, they were to be sadly disappointed. Working with "a competent Cuban research organization" Free's report was based on a series of a thousand interviews with a cross section of the urban population of Cuba "both in Havana and in other cities, towns, and villages throughout the island." Among the findings of the Free survey, the following comments were included in the summary report of mid-August of 1960:

The great majority of Cubans surveyed felt that both they personally and their country were very much better off than during the days of Batista. *The prevailing mood was one of hope and optimism.*

Attesting the apparently genuine enthusiasm of the great majority for the Revolution, the Castro Government and its program were the replies when the sample was asked about the *worst* aspects of life in Cuba today. Despite the fact that this question was designed to illicit unfavorable comments, *a very sizable majority named as the worst aspects of the present situation items which implied sympathy or support for the present regime.* At the top of the list (mentioned by one-third of all respondents) was regret or apprehension over the fact that there is opposition to the Revolution and to the Revolutionary regime; [and] that there are misguided counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries.

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Even in describing the worst aspects of the present situation, only 30% of all respondents mentioned items which could be construed as criticisms, explicit or implicit, of the Castro regime. Only a few such subjects received significant mention, with each being referred to by only a small minority of total respondents: e.g., the danger of or trend toward Communism (7%); criticism of the Revolution's program (7%); economic difficulties (7%); unemployment (6%); confusion and disorganization (5%).

In view of the overwhelming popularity of the Revolutionary program, it is patently clear that *criticisms of Castro's program, as such, will fall very largely on barren, if not counter-productive ground.*

The only positive statements that appeared in the Free report, insofar as the objectives of WH/4 were concerned, were to the effect that successful attack on the Castro Government should be made in terms of the inability of the government to meet the projects it had outlined because of "the unwise and unrealistic means it is employing in the execution of its program"; and "the Revolution and its program are being perverted through the insidious influence of the Communists."*

* The information concerning the Free report, is contained in source reference 24/.

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It is interesting to record the reaction within the Agency to the Free report:

C/JMARC lamented the fact that the Lloyd Free report evidently has gotten into the hands of the Cuban Government and will probably be used with devastating effect at some point during the meeting [the upcoming OAS Conference scheduled for San Jose, Costa Rica]. He told ADDP/A that he felt the Department of State would have to be prepared to sacrifice Mr. Free's report on the proverbial "alter of gold." The point was made strongly to ADDP/A that the Free report, in fact, is not at all valid other than for a limited "sample" of the City of Habana. ADDP/A agreed, but said he did not think State should be made aware of the fact CIA actually paid for the report. He further indicated that he was still endeavoring to find out how the report -- copy of which CIA never received in full -- got out of control.* 25/

The substance of the Free Report appeared in the *New York Times* and also in a Peter Edson column which was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers. In passing this information on to the DDP, Chief, WH/4 suggested that "the survey, in the opinion of WH/4

* Chief, WH/4 apparently misread the significance of the Free report because, as the report points out, the most serious opposition was, in fact, in the Havana area, which included the heaviest sampling of opposition sentiment.

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Prop, will be used in Cuban propaganda" -- something of an understatement!* 26/

* Logic would seem to indicate that if WH/4's principals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey's that WH/4/PP might have been tasked to make a serious study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public to resist outside interference. In an interview with the author of this history, Dave Phillips stated that Enno Hobbing had provided the editorial guidance for WH/4's propaganda efforts; but that to his (Phillips's) knowledge, no study ever was conducted of the Castro propaganda effort. In retrospect, Phillips indicated that this probably was an oversight. 27/

On the subject of surveys of questionable value during the Bay of Pigs Operation, mention should be made of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein and Saks

to initiate a survey of Cuba's present [May 1960] economic position that will also contain an outline of proposals that would sound [sic] as a platform for a successor government to the Castro regime. The cost, which will be borne by JMARC, will be about \$20,000. This is merely the first phase of the projected comprehensive economic program.

Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in the Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and Reports) and the surfeit of government economists familiar with Latin America, WH/4 thought it necessary to negotiate an outside contract for a study such as indicated is truly incomprehensible! That the Klein and Saks contract was not blocked at the DDP or DCI level is equally incomprehensible. The company's "Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Government Platform to Serve the Interests of the People of Cuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of the Hemisphere and the Free World of Which Cuba is a Part" -- which was presented in typescript -- was 15 pages of platitudes about the best of all possible worlds. 28/

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WH/4 PP also became involved in the propaganda activity that was intended to offset the planned visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba in the summer of 1960. In an Eyes Only memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Col. J. C. King informed Allen Dulles that it had been learned that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation from the Government of Cuba to visit that country. Working with Havana Station, a two-pronged program was being developed with the intention of either forcing the cancellation of the trip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban people to Communism. Havana Station was to be responsible for organizing church opposition to the visit, and WH/4 and other elements of WH Division would be responsible for instigating rumors throughout Latin America that an assassination attempt would be made on Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba.

One of the WH/4's contacts suggested that leaflets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upside down, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion, and that these leaflets should be distributed widely through Cuba. 29/ There is no indication that this particular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least

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one instance, the Hammer and Sickle was used to form the 'T' in the word *Traidor* on a sticker that was being prepared for propaganda use. 30/ In anticipation of the possible visit, 10,000 stickers of an anti-Khrushchev, anti-Soviet nature were forwarded from Headquarters to Havana Station. The legend on one of these was "Cuba, Yes; Russia, No; Khrushchev, No;" and a second item showed a prisoner behind bars formed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words *Sin Palabras* -- "Without words."* 31/

Despite these advanced preparations, no opportunity was presented to utilize the propaganda stickers.** Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendance at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, 19-28 September 1960, and even though Castro flew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet, the Khrushchev visit did not materialize at this time.***

* See following two pages for copies.

** More detailed information on propaganda leaflets and the dissemination of such materials by air drop is given in Volume I of this history, *Air Operations*.

*** Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscow at the close of the UN session. On 22 October 1960 in the course of an interview in Moscow with a Cuban journalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visit Cuba and its people as soon as possible. 31a/

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If not particularly successful in projects other than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack of imagination. Among other projects, it was proposed that the Office of Medical Services' psychiatric study of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader; and the Castro image also would have suffered if a disorienting drug could have been placed in Castro's food. These proposals were similar in intent to others aimed at the Castro "image" as revealed in the Senate Select Committee investigation of CIA plots against the Cuban leader.

In light of a rumor that had been picked up to the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting some of their British Sea Fury aircraft with the American flag -- said planes to be used in a provocation action to discredit the United States -- WH/4 investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in order to forestall any such provocations by the Cubans. Unfortunately, however, the Agency art shop pointed out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt to make such fake photos. With the idea in mind of a

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propaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's militia (and apparently at the request of Col. Jack Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM), WH/4/PP gave some thought to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's militia to establish an "elite suicide squad" which would fight on even after the defeat of the other troops. The gentleman who would later become infamous in connection with the Watergate activity, E. Howard Hunt, and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of sending a white painted "flight of truth" airplane on a trip to several of the Latin American countries, bringing -- in a "Billy Graham type operation" -- the message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution. But this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the planning stage. 32/

None of the foregoing proposals however, were in the same league with the propaganda plan that came to be known as "the Dripping Cuban." The WH/4 Propaganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated:

P[hillips] dispatched cable on Special Operation to HAVA. (Cuban jumping ship in Bosphorous). 33/

In fact, the cable that Dave Phillips had originated was addressed not only to Havana, but also to

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[12-3], [12-13], and to the Forward Operations Base in Miami. Remembering that Dave Phillips himself was something of an actor, as well as a newspaperman, it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its entirety. The cable read as follows:

1. FYI: HQS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING OPERATION: SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN BOAT HOMEWARD BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE IN TURKEY. HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT SENT TO RUSSIA FOR IMPRISONMENT. CUBAN SUBJECT WILL CONTACT LOCAL LATIN AMERICAN CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION, THEN RETURN LATIN AMERICA. AFTER BRIEF BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN "ATTEMPT" WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE. FOR THIS REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO "THEY" WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM.

2. FOR HAVA: REQUEST STATION RECRUIT SUBJECT. OBVIOUSLY HE MUST BE SUPERB ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS NEWSMEN. HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE OF RETAINING THOUSANDS OF "DETAILS" ABOUT HIS ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY. HE MUST BE KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN HE IS "ARRESTED." AN ARTICULATE STUDENT TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SWIMMING ABILITY DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL.

3. SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT, STATION STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA, BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED. THUS SUBJECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF SOVIET CONTROL IN CUBA. STATION ALSO AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING, LATER

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RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PERMISSION WEEKEND WITH ALL THE WORKS IN PARIS, ETC.

4. IN RECRUITMENT, IT SHOULD BE STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON SECURITY. HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS.).

5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS SELECTED. HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME. HOPE HE MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH.

6. FOR [12-3, 12-13]: APPRECIATE YOUR CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT COOPERATION [24] SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FORWARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. 34/

A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above went to Chief, WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chief of WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandum read as follows:

The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helms discussed this cable on 24 August [1960] and concluded that since Fidel Castro is definitely identifying himself more and more with the Russians, it is not worth the candle to launch an operation such as that one proposed in subject cable. Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly try to find a body for this operation, providing we play it very carefully and do not

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let the body in on what we definitely have in mind; also, that any further cables which go out on this proposed operation are to be signed off by him.

Examined in retrospect, it would appear that Mr. Helms had good reason to be nervous about the proposal!* 35/

B. Sabotage and other Exercises**

Where WH/4/PP was successful in putting Radio Swan into operation and in supporting Station WRUL in

* This proposal provided another of the very few instances where Mr. Helms' name surfaced in relation to a Bay of Pigs related problem.

** Because so many of the sabotage activities of the Cuban dissidents were uncoordinated, uncontrolled, and did nothing to impede the extension of Castro's control or lessen his support, the author has tried only to illustrate something of the scope of those sabotage operations over which the WH or WH/4 could exercise a degree of control. In responding to the Taylor Committee's request for an assessment of the effectiveness of its sabotage program, the best that WHD could say was:

There are numerous acts of sabotage reported from all provinces of Cuba. These acts included the burning of cane fields, damaging of power and communication lines and sugar mills, burning of schools and commercial buildings and damaging of petroleum and sugar refinery [sic]. It is extremely difficult to verify just what sabotage damage were [sic] the result of our team's [sic] activities; however, they have claimed the burning of cane fields, the firing of commercial stores, [high] tension lines, and the damage to the oil refinery at Santiago de Cuba was the result of a raider operation by one of our
(footnote continued on following page)

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its broadcasts into Cuba, Project JMATE could claim no similarly successful or continuing program of sabotage and disruption. In fact, one of the earliest and most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs against Cuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry -- was a complete and total bust. Being suggested even before President Eisenhower's authorization of the anti-Castro program, attempts to sabotage and interfere with the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineries continued until well into the middle 60's -- with at least one of the sabotage "experts" displaying the same notable lack of success, but excess of foolishness, that characterized his activities during Project

external action groups. In addition, we feel that a great deal of the other sabotage were [sic] the results [sic] of the demolitions we supplied to the various teams and other action groups in Cuba with which we were in contact. Approximately 10-15,000 lbs. of the over 100,000 lbs. of material [sic] placed in the hands of internal assets were demolitions supplies for sabotage action. 35a/

The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by Rip Robertson, but his exciting cable about the action greatly overemphasized the damage; and the plant operations were quickly restored to normal. At the time, however, the DCI reported it to the Special Group (Chester Bowles, Roswell Gilpatrick, and McGeorge Bundy) as a "successful" operation. 35b/ Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E (p. 335).

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JMATE. It is a story worth recording here, because of the extremely close and continuing relationship between one of the major US oil companies operating a refinery in Cuba, [29], and WH Division.

As early as 9 March 1960, the minutes of a Special Group meeting reflect conversations that both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the problems being faced by the major petroleum companies operating in Cuba -- SONJ, Texaco, and Shell -- and particularly the need for "discreet means of inter-company consultation" in order to avoid possible anti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of planned para-military operations against Cuba, it was reported that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division was approached "by [29]". He [Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared that [29] will be willing to cooperate, perhaps even carry the ball on certain selected [sabotage] targets. DD/P gave authority to push this contact immediately."* 36/

* Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among the specific sabotage targets to be considered for attack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960, were petroleum targets. 37/

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By August of 1960, WH/D had approved a program of "subtle sabotage paying off, without resorting to the more risky and sensational type of sabotage." Unfortunately, however, there was a communications gap between the operations people and the intelligence analysts most familiar with the world petroleum industry and a number of demonstrably unworkable -- though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught.*

The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked to as an economic-political target as well as a sabotage target. When the US refineries operating in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet crude oil, WH/4 began to think in terms of disrupting the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis and other independent shipping operators to refuse to carry the Soviet oil. It was predicted that such

* The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledge-ability -- both technically and economically -- on a worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch (later the Fuel's Branch) of the Office of Research and Reports (later the Office of Economic Research). Aside from the constant irritation of having to work half in the dark in response to WH/D or WH/4, ORR/F&P was constantly having to correct errors, to make apologies, or mend fences with the major US petroleum companies as a result of the lack of coordination between DDP and DDI components.

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a plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortage of tanker bottoms in the world market) to transport its own crude to Cuba and to "provide technicians and make modifications in existing refineries to process their crude." This, in turn, was supposed to alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally among Cuba's crude suppliers.* 39/

In addition to petroleum refineries as targets for sabotage, plans were also made to disrupt the Cuban microwave system. Unlike the plans to disrupt the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly involve properties of the international oil companies -- the sabotage program for the microwave networks, as late as February of 1961, specifically stated that attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net with "hands off RCA and Dumont systems, which are to remain intact for later consideration." 40/ Also

* In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the [29] refinery commented to this effect after reviewing the all source intelligence materials available on the plant. He was pleased -- at least in one sense -- to note that [29] training program has apparently been quite successful!

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prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C. King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets by resistance forces not controlled by the Agency were far less efficient than such attacks would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 41/

In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Division's anti-Castro activity also included extensive plans for the formation of goon squads throughout much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This goon squad program also was of considerable interest to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Because of its areawide nature, the activities of the goon squads were run out of WH/D rather than out of WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit for were the following: The disruption in [10

] of about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use of stink bombs set off in the meeting place; in [10

] a counter demonstration against some 200 Castro sympathizers also gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement; and in [10] "A meeting

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of the [29] was broken up by [24]
] , who sprayed the two principal speakers,
prominent [8] leftists with 'Who, Me?'.** 42/

Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose to
mention in the same context with the goon squads were
the [8] of one Latin American
country:

Who can promote action of any of the
[29] .

In another country, an:

Agency member integrated into the
[8] serving as an
Advisor to the President on [8]
] is in a position to recommend
[24] to the President.** 43/

In what may have been a ploy intended principally
to obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations,

* "Who, Me?" was an obnoxious scent.

** In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activ-
ities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's,
it is interesting that the reference to the "Action
Squads" described above also included with reference
to the Dominican Republic an agent:

In contact with a group of dissidents
capable of violent action, including assas-
sination. This group has killed a number
of agents of the *Servicio de Inteligencia
Militar* (SIM), Dominican Secret Police. 45/

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rather than in direct action programs against Cuba, representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter-intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire a vessel which -- for its acquisition, operational maintenance, crew, including incentive bonus would run roughly \$200,000 for a 6-month period -- could also be used in deception operations against Castro. In responding to this suggestion from the Special Projects Group, Col. Jack Hawkins quickly put the quietus on this request, noting that it was doubtful that the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radar or commo gear so that they would react to "the false radar presentation, deceptive communications traffic, noise makers, signals, smoke, explosions, etc." Consequently Hawkins concluded:

In view of the high cost involved, and the other factors mentioned above, I do not concur in the acquisition of this craft for deception purposes as proposed in the reference. 46/

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Part VI

Mr. Nixon's Role

Like so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs story a great deal has been said about the role that Richard M. Nixon played in the operation during the course of his Vice Presidency, but woefully little solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either the *pros* or *cons* on the subject. Because of the continuing repetition of many of these stories, a careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA records of the operation in order to recover those items pertaining to Nixon's participation directly or indirectly -- through his aides, assistants, or correspondence -- in the Bay of Pigs operation.

During the course of his unofficial visit to the United States in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the United States to meet with Mr. Nixon in his official office in the Capitol for an informal discussion. Nixon has stated that the meeting was arranged at the request of the Secretary of State Herter, who suggested

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that the administration might profit if one of its leaders could gain additional inside information about what made Castro tick.

Nixon has said that he had a 3 1/2 hour meeting with Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result of the meeting, he prepared a 4-page secret memorandum and sent copies to President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter and to Allen Dulles.* 1/ In part at least, Mr. Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro was made public as early as November 1964 in an article he wrote for the *Reader's Digest*, and these views were repeated in somewhat more detail in his recent memoirs, *RN*. The thrust of the meeting was that Nixon was emphasizing the need for Castro to establish a democratic form of government as he (Nixon) understood it, with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the

* In his *Reader's Digest* article of November 1964 Nixon indicated that copies of the memorandum went to the three individuals as noted in the text above, however, in his recent Memoirs, *RN*, Nixon states that a copy also went to John Foster Dulles. John Foster Dulles was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959, on which date he was succeeded by Christian Herter. At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro, however, Mr. Herter had been acting in Mr. Dulles' place. Dulles's death occurred 24 May 1959.

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type of government he believed in was that which was expressed most vocally by the people. Nixon's most widely known remark about Castro as a result of that meeting was his statement that: "Castro is incredibly naive about communism, or is under communist discipline." Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with the meeting either, for according to a member of his party when Castro emerged from the meeting he "was angry. He swore and added, 'This man has spent the whole time scolding me'."* 2/

Subsequent to his meeting with Castro in April of 1959, Agency records do not reflect any particular interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban activities until the end of January 1960. On 27 January, and again on 23 February, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, briefed Gen. Robert Cushman, Mr. Nixon's Aide, at the Vice President's Office. Cushman made it clear that the Vice President was

* It was only after making a direct request to Mr. Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained. No copies were found in the files of CIA, State, or the Eisenhower Library. The copy obtained was from Mr. Nixon's personal files. The memorandum was, in fact, classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET. A copy of the memorandum is attached as Appendix F . 2a/

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interested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within and outside of Cuba, including goon squads or other direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro groups in Cuba.

Among the other subjects discussed with General Cushman on 23 February 1960 were propaganda attacks on the Castro government and the possibilities of economic sanctions similar to those which had been suggested by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland, whose views on the need for economic sanctions had not only been discussed with Agency representatives, but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's office.

Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro efforts which were of some interest to the Vice-President were CIA's relations with the Department of State, which obviously was not one of the Vice President's favorite organizations; but Col. King made it quite clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only after policy approval. 3/ After it was pointed out to Gen. Cushman that the Department of State's knowledgeability about Agency operations was on a strict "need-to-know" basis, even for the Ambassador in Cuba,

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Cushman then showed Col. King some derogatory information that the FBI had provided the Vice President about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of the Bureau of American Republic Affairs. Col. King's memorandum provided no details about the nature of this information, but the probability is that both were accused of being too tolerant of Castro and communists. 4/

During one of these meetings in the early part of 1960, Gen. Cushman noted that the Vice President had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to consult with, or acquire the services of, Col. Edward Lansdale, a member of Gen. Erskine's Special Operations Staff in the Department of Defense. Lansdale's activities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, apparently were well known to Nixon. 5/

On 2 March 1960, the Director of Central Intelligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing on "What We are Doing in Cuba." The 7-page briefing paper which had been given to the Director provided information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities, on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda effort which was being supported by Agency financing,

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and went into details concerning attempts to rally anti-Castro support, not only in the other Latin American nations, but in the Near and Far East and in Africa. Details were given on the preparations being made for resistance activities including the acquisition of training bases in third countries, and both Ydigoras Fuentes, President of Guatemala, and President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers of support for this country's anti-Castro activities.

Plans for economic warfare against Castro were also outlined for the Vice President. Delaying deliveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar industry, tightening credit by oil companies to restrict delivery of the essential petroleum products, and possible restriction in sugar quotas were mentioned as under study. One other item which was mentioned in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the fact that the Agency had "a drug, which if placed in Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him." 6/ It should be emphasized that at the date of this briefing (2 March 1960), the United States did not yet have an *official* anti-Castro

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policy -- that would not come until 17 March of 1960. Subsequent to that announced policy, the author has found no other references to drugs or other types of attack which were being considered upon Castro's person, or the persons of any of the other Cuban leaders, as a part of the Agency's official program.*

There is some question as to whether it was the Director of Central Intelligence himself, or whether it was Mr. Bissell, or, perhaps, whether it was Col. King who actually briefed the Vice President on 2 March 1960. A stamp on the copy of the original Memorandum for the Director reads: "Noted by DCI 28 March 1960." This copy was sent to the DCI through the DDP and carries Mr. Bissell's initials. The carbon of the memorandum does not show this stamp and the presumption is that it was the Director who did the briefing. A third version of the memorandum is

* See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the definition of the Agency's *official* policy regarding the anti-Castro program, as contrasted to the *unofficial* program. The author assumes that regardless of reader's biases regarding the former Vice President, that the fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a briefing will not be construed to make him a member of a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the Cuban leaders.

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dated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read:

For the Director's use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will consider the Cuban covert action program paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing.)

This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI did in fact do the briefing. While the briefer may not be positively identified, there is no question however, that the Vice President did receive a detailed briefing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation.*

In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr. Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba, the Vice President was also a participant in the 10 March 1960 meeting of the National Security Council when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a danger, that he wanted contingency plans drawn up, and that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all future National Security Council Meetings. Mr. Nixon attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President

* See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice President on 2 March 1960. (For Appendix G see p. 344).

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gave a formal "go" to the Covert Action Plan of the Agency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group. Mr. Nixon's only reported comments during this meeting concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba, the pulling out of private American firms, and the possibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flow of American dollars into Cuba. 7/

Perhaps one of the reasons why Vice President Nixon has been attributed with playing a major role in the Bay of Pigs activity has to do with the relationship between Nixon's office and Mr. William D. Pawley, former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil and a US businessman with extensive investments in Cuba and interests in various other parts of Latin America. Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Republican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon's cause. Apparently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs -- assuming a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential election -- Pawley was a widely known conservative.

In the spring of 1960, shortly following President Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castro program, Pawley's contacts with the Agency (particularly

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with WHD) and with Nixon's office became increasingly frequent and apparently quite close. On 21 March 1960, four days after formal approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a meeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence which would include the DCI, Col. King, Gen. Cushman, and Walter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United States Steel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as Mr. Pawley. Of the session with Pawley, Chief, WH/4 wrote:

Details and the agenda were not discussed other than to say the principal emphasis would be on reviewing what work could be done throughout the hemisphere and public opinion on the pending operation against Castro. Mr. Pawley was told that the time had arrived for careful coordination of all activities; that permission had been granted for an all-out operation; a government in exile will be formed post haste; that the acceptable non-Batista groups will be put into contact with each other almost immediately; and that Mr. Pawley's contact, Rubio Padilla, will figure prominently in this effort ... It was carefully explained to Mr. Pawley that any action involving exiles now should be most carefully coordinated with Chief, WHD and Chief, Branch 4 to avoid any flaps.* 8/

* Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond CIA until he, Pawley, had the opportunity to give the information directly to Vice President Nixon.

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The meeting mentioned in the foregoing paragraph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on 1 April 1960, and the Agency's representatives briefed, among other things, on the problems being faced by the Cubans in exile who were trying to form a government. There was considerable discussion as to who should be the nominal leaders of this government in exile, with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr. Rubio Padilla and the Agency's representatives suggesting Dr. Antonio Varona. For the benefit of the Vice President's representative, it was stressed that none of the Latin American countries seemed particularly anxious to provide a base of operations for the government in exile. The group was informed by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Col. King that, in addition to US Government financing, arrangements were being made to have private confidential sources help defray the costs of the Cuban government in exile. Col. King pointed out that over and above a bond issue

which will be floated in the name of the government in exile with Mr. Pawley's help, that donations are being made by private citizens and corporations. He indicated that confidential arrangements

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have already been made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to permit individuals or corporate entities making donations to claim these donations as contributions to the US Government for tax purposes. He cautioned that this arrangement was being limited to a very small group. 9/

The question also was raised about the relationship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of American States. Mr. Pawley suggested that rather than lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the US Military Mission in the Latin American countries, especially having them pass the word on about the dangers of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were discussed by the group were the planned propaganda program and "the present pathetic effort on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in Cuba."

This meeting demonstrated that from the very outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy Mr. Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and that certain private American citizens were closely involved in the planning. Within a very short time after the April meeting at Pawley's residence, however,

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senior Agency personnel -- notably C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A -- began to question the Agency's relationship with Mr. William Pawley, particularly as Pawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparently intended to establish a group of Pawley supported Cubans in exile in opposition to the FRD, the Agency's supported exile group. Barnes's concern was that if the US continued to support the extremely conservative element represented by Pawley's group, it would be charged that any anti-Castro action undertaken by the US would be "on the basis of protecting economic royalists."

What Barnes stressed to Mr. Bissell, the DDP, was the need for the US to decide whether or not it wished to be charged with supporting reactionary movements in Latin America, not only in Cuba, but in the rest of the Central American and Caribbean areas as well. Once having made up its own mind, Barnes suggested that CIA's position be worked out with State "and thereafter take it to Mr. Nixon, giving him at that time, a thorough and complete briefing so that there can be no doubt in his mind

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as to where we stand, and what we propose to do."* 10/

When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere Division that he was withdrawing from support of the Agency's anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told Col. King that he intended to make his views regarding the FRD known to Vice President Nixon. In addition, Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley's recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and others, discussed the *pros* and *cons* of cutting off the communications channel between Pawley and the Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was provided by the Agency's communications facility.

Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that the communications channel should be continued because

* Mr. Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Group on 19 May 1960, the DCI categorized the Cubans supported by Pawley as "unreconstructed reactionaries." 10a/

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it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley group. Moreover, the Pawley group had a duplicate channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been restricted by denial of the Agency channel. A restriction was placed on the transmittal of communications which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba; but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable traffic, however, was to be the responsibility of Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.

Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhower administration, the Deputy Director for Plans agreed that the discussion regarding Pawley should be brought to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence and that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bring this matter before both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon. 11/ By the first week of June 1960, however, Jake Esterline apparently had reached the end of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP, he wrote:

It is our firm conviction, based on months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley's views on the Cuban situation are highly

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personal and rigid. These views in our opinion are inimical to the best interest of the United States. Mr. Pawley has refused to budge from his position and has continued to seek official endorsement of his views at the high levels of the government. The flagrant disregard for security reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated 4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to recommend that all contact with the Rubio-Pawley group be immediately and finally severed. If such action is not taken, no guarantee can be made for the security of the JMARC operation. In point of fact, the information in the foregoing message indicates that security already has been damaged severely. 12/

Among other things, the Havana cable which had aroused Chief, WH/4 stated that the following information was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in Cuba:

US Government now backing Rubio group and no other group. Group has entre to Veep. For a time Pawley was having trouble with an Agency or Agencies who wanted [to] back another junta, but after Pawley offered [to] withdraw completely, he was talked out of doing so, and given assurance his group only would be backed, [and this] resulted resignation person backing other group. 13/

Headquarters prepared a priority cable to be sent to both Havana and to the Forward Operations Base, which had also picked up the disinformation being spread by the anti-FRD group. The text of the

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cable read in part as follows:

You have been authoritatively advised that US Government is not (repeat not) backing Rubio group and that it has no intention of ever doing so. It complete fabrication that Pawley was given US Government assurance that only his group would be backed. No resignations of any kind occurred, nor are any foreseen. Mention Veep in such context and on this particular level sheer foolhardiness and can only reflect most adversely on those Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of facts and severest indiscretions. 14/

The cable apparently was never forwarded to either Havana or to Miami, presumably because of opposition from Col. J. C. King who had noted and initialed on his copy of the Memorandum from Jake Esterline recommending that all contact with the Rubio-Pawley group be "immediately and finally severed" the following: "I do not concur with severing of all contacts."* 15/

* As will be noted subsequently, whether it was political expediency or conviction that Pawley could actually do some good, the relationship among Pawley, Chief, WH Division, and Chief, WH/4 continued throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. If anything in fact, the relationship between Pawley and Jake Esterline appears to have become mutually supportive, particularly as the operation drew to its unsuccessful conclusion.

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On 20 June 1960 at the request of General Cushman, Jake Esterline joined him for lunch, the purpose being to provide the General with sufficient information on the state of the anti-Castro program so that he could bring the Vice President up to date from the time of the Miami meeting that had taken place at William Pawley's house.* Among the points covered were the developments related to the organization of the FRD and the fact that Mr. William Pawley's candidate, Señor Rubio, had decided not to join the Frente. According to Esterline's memorandum:

Dr. Rubio's failure to join the Frente, however, has not held up progress in forming the junta, and/or the other important aspects of the operation.

General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarters were to be established in Mexico, and it was on this occasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman to E. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico with the Frente.**

* The meeting of 21 March 1960.

** Insofar as can be determined, this probably was the first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard the name of E. Howard Hunt.

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Chief, WH/4 also touched on the programs that were being beamed out of Swan Island, on the preparation being made for training paramilitary types, base communications, planned paramilitary activities, the choice of a Third Country's staging area, and that the operation was still scheduled to begin during the month of November 1960. Gen. Cushman noted that the Vice President requested this information in order to prepare for an upcoming NSC meeting at which he would be a senior official. The Vice President's aide also asked if there were any particular problems with relation to the operation that Chief, WH/4 wished to have brought to the attention of the Vice President. Esterline reported that the only problems that had occurred concerned political differences among the exiles, but that for the moment all factions seemed to be quiescent. Chief, WH/4 also indicated to Gen. Cushman "that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC would have adequate support at the eleventh hour."* 16/

On 22 June 1960, General Cabell -- Acting DCI at the time -- briefed a special meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban situation. The Vice

* Except for Guatemala and Nicaragua, such support would never be forthcoming.

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President presided and the meeting was attended by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobilization, the Acting Attorney General, a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, among others, Messrs. Bissell, King, Esterline, and McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency.* 17/

A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the FRD and its leadership -- their policies, their background, and the internal difficulties and bickering. The propaganda picture also was discussed, with particular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan Island. Gen. Cabell stated that the paramilitary plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would be divided into 25 20-man teams. The teams would go into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident groups. Cabell emphasized that the implementation of the paramilitary program depended on the existence

* Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence -- that component of the Central Intelligence Agency which, according to some of the "authorities" on the Bay of Pigs, was presumably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's anti-Castro program.

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of viable dissident forces which "have not emerged in strength."

The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create an anti-Castro air force, but his comments about this air force (even at this time) were very much in error. According to General Cabell:

Some trained Cuban fliers are currently available and we hope soon to have access to additional numbers. "Sterile" aircraft for their use have been mothballed by the Department of Defense and earmarked for CIA use. These craft can be made available in a matter of hours. 18/

As reported in an earlier volume of this history, neither the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would be available for missions against Castro's Cuba until late in the fall of 1960.*

In the NSC briefing, Cabell also made some interesting comments about the resistance that might be encountered in an attempt to oust Castro, emphasizing that intelligence reports had indicated that Cuba might organize "a 'foreign legion' comprised of highly trained regular military personnel, drawn from Communist nations, mainly the eastern satellites. Should this eventuality occur it would seriously affect the

* See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, *Air Operations*.

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probable success of any purely clandestine paramilitary operations." Cabell then introduced a suggestion which would be heard right up to the time that the invasion fleet was being boarded -- that "volunteers" be acquired for the anti-Castro forces, such volunteers to be drawn from US Special Forces.* 18a/

As the presiding officer at the special National Security Council meeting, Vice President Nixon raised a number of questions with the Department of State representatives concerning support that the Organization of American States would likely give to this country's anti-Castro efforts; and he also posed a series of questions concerning the economic pressures that the United States might put on Cuba. The questions concerned sugar, oil, and tariffs in particular; and the Vice President urged that "strong, positive action [be taken] to avoid becoming labeled "Uncle Sucker." 19/

* No such volunteers were permitted in the case of the ground forces, but in the last two days of the Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted for combat air operations. See Volume I of this History, *Air Operations*.

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On 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an interesting telephone call from General Cushman, containing two messages from the Vice President. First, Mr. Nixon was interested to know if there were any obstacles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis other agencies in support of JMATE; and if there were, the Vice President indicated that he personally would help to resolve such problems. The second request

was a bit more sticky. Gen. Cushman said that the Vice President has commissioned him to keep Mr. William Pawley happy and, in connection with this, he has also been instructed to keep Mr. Pawley briefed on how things are moving. General Cushman said he realized that this is much against our desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, but the fact remains that he [Pawley] is a "big fat political cat" and, as such, the Vice President cannot completely ignore him. 20/

Esterline allowed that he understood the General's problem and suggested that with a few hours advance warning the Agency would provide the Vice President, or the General, with such briefing materials as necessary for any given meeting with Mr. Pawley -- after first clearing the paper with the appropriate agency officials and within the security regulations that applied to Mr. Pawley. Esterline indicated in his

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memorandum that he immediately informed the Deputy Director for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes, respectively, about the call from General Cushman.*

Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice President's offer to help CIA with difficulties it might have with other agencies to heart. In a memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes, concerning a more effective commercial cover for Radio Swan, it appears, from Barnes's response, that Esterline must have suggested that the services of Vice President Nixon be engaged to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the FCC over the use of commercial advertising to make

* The following interesting comments also appeared in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with General Cushman:

This information [regarding Cushman's telephone call] could not be given to Col. King, as he had just departed on a three-day trip. This memorandum will be available to Col. King, however, upon his return Wednesday, 6 July.

Contrary to the opinions of many who have suggested that Col. J. C. King was read out of the anti-Castro operation, this memorandum would indicate that, in fact, extreme care was being taken to make sure that J. C. King was read into the act.

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Swan appear more legitimate. Barnes, however, took exception and recommended that the US Government should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broadcasts.* 21/

It was also in July 1960 that Vice President Nixon's office, principally through the person of General Cushman, first indicated an interest in the activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. Garcia was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive backing both within the Cuban community in Miami and among dissidents inside Cuba. At one point he claimed that he could raise a force of 2,000 men in the Miami area and 10,000 men inside of Cuba -- if he were given proper financial support for training and equipping these men. Garcia's name first came before the Agency in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a Cuban exile who was an Agency contact. During this

* Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr. Nixon or whether a determination was made concerning the increased use of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in doubt. But Barnes's suggestion of official USG participation in Swan was rejected. A note from Esterline on the official routing slip from Barnes forwarding this memorandum read: "I believe Mr. Bissell reversed this position?" To this query King noted "Yes" on the buck slip.

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initial meeting Garcia claimed that he had large stores of military equipment in Spain, that he had additional promises of assistance from General Franco, and that he had contacts in the White House who had given him the "go ahead" for an invasion of Cuba!

Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI, to General Cabell, and apparently to the Office of Vice President Nixon. In any event, on 9 July 1960 Jake Esterline met with Mr. Marshall Diggs, a Washington lawyer and Garcia's sponsor, where he was told of Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro. In a follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July, Mr. Phillip Toomey, WH/4/Prop met with Garcia, Cameron Pulley, and two reputed underwater demolitions experts. Garcia went into his act about how his force could overthrow the Castro Government, assuming that he could get some financial assistance for training and equipping the troops. Mr. Pulley proceeded to tell Mr. Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a program that was being promoted by former Senator Owen Brewster for the entire Caribbean area -- apparently a program designed to eliminate all the bad guys. Following another meeting on 13 July and after

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listening to Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as Communists -- as well as being unimpressed by his credentials -- on 15 July 1960, Marshall Diggs was informed that the Agency had no interest in supporting Mr. Garcia. On 20 July 1960, Chief, JMATE met with General Cushman to tell him that a full study had been made of the representatives of Señor Garcia; and as a result, the DCI probably would get in touch with Mr. Diggs and/or Senator Brewster and explain to them "the wisdom of their desisting from pushing Garcia as an outstanding Cuban military leader."

The subject dragged on, however; and at one point Mr. Pulley, who with Mr. Diggs and ex-Senator Brewster, was a strong supporter of Mr. Nixon, indicated that the administration's policies with regard to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in the upcoming election. Moreover Pulley also is reported to have indicated that a congressional investigation of the anti-Castro plan was possible. The Director of Central Intelligence was advised on 26 September that because of Garcia's threats to expose everything he had learned about possible Agency involvement in the anti-Castro effort, including the Cuban exile

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organization in the United States, that the time had come for Diggs and Pulley to be asked "to forego their efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga." This recommendation was approved by General C. P. Cabell on 13 October 1960.* 22/

Insofar as the available records show, the contacts between Vice President Nixon's office, and the

* More nonsense from Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga would surface again in the summer of 1961 following Castro's offer to free the Bay of Pigs prisoners in return for US tractors when Garcia bounced up with another proposal for the planned escape of the prisoners -- providing, of course, that he be given a bundle of bucks.

In fact, the hand of Garcia reached from beyond the grave to touch on the BOP operation. On 2 August 1976, almost a year after Garcia's death, the *Washington Star* carried a UPI dispatch saying that Rep. Thomas N. Downing (D., Va.) had affidavits claiming that:

In return for support of the invasion [of Cuba] from Mario G. Kohly, a popular right-wing leader who was exiled from Cuba, then Vice President Nixon agreed in October 1960 to order the CIA to arrest the leftist leaders and turn them over to Kohly for "elimination" after Premier Fidel Castro was thrown out of office.

The affidavits reportedly came from a former CIA contract agent and Mario G. Kohly, Jr., son of the would-be invasion leader. These materials were supposed to have some bearing on House of Representatives's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy; but there is no indication that they were given any credence. 23/

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Central Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia case -- for all practical purposes ended by August 1960.*

The only other significant involvement between the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency, prior to the change of administration on 20 January 1961, concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates for President and Vice President of the United States, prior to the 1960 election. On 23 July 1960, following the Democratic convention, Allen Dulles briefed Sen. John Kennedy, and on 28 July Senator Lyndon Johnson. In his memorandum to President Eisenhower, who had directed that Dulles give these briefings, the DCI reported that in the two hour period for each briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet Union, developments in the Berlin situation, in the

* Whether this reflects the concentration of the Vice President's activities on the upcoming November election, whether the principal contacts came to be maintained between Col. J. C. King and Nixon's office -- with the consequent reference memoranda being included in J. C. King's files, which have disappeared from the sight of God and man -- or whether, in fact, this is an accurate reflection of the limited contacts, the author cannot confirm. His inclination is to believe that the contacts probably were as limited as described above.

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Congo, and in Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on 19 September 1960, and again the briefing touched on relations with the Soviet Union and on the trouble spots in the world, including Cuba. The White House was informed of this briefing prior to the event; and subsequent to the briefing of Kennedy, Mr. Dulles reported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of the White House Staff and also to Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President. 24/

The exact nature of the briefings that Dulles gave to Kennedy on Cuba is of particular historical importance in terms of the election of 1960. In the last of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixon and Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, in the course of condemning the Castro regime and suggesting that the United States take stronger action against Castro, made the statement that:

We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far, these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our Government. 25/

Based on his knowledge and interest in supporting the anti-Castro program that had been authorized by

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President Eisenhower in March 1960, Nixon was put in a Catch-22 situation; for as he said:

President Eisenhower had instructed Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, to brief the Democratic candidate on all operations, including Top Secret operations. I knew that Kennedy had already received two briefings from Dulles. I immediately had a member of my staff call the White House on the security line to ask if these briefings covered Cuba. A member of the White House Staff indicated they had. (Several months after the election, Allen Dulles was to state that his briefing of Kennedy had included Cuba but not the training program for Cuban exiles.) At the time of the debate, however, and after checking with the White House, I had to proceed with the assumption that Kennedy had been briefed on the secret program.

I was faced with the heads-he-wins, tails-I-lose proposition. If in the TV debate I were to reveal the existence of the training program and point out that I had been one of its strongest advocates, I would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's position. But if I did so, the project would be doomed, and also the lives of the brave men, both inside and outside of Cuba, who were receiving training and assistance.

I had only one choice: to protect the security of the program, I had to oppose Kennedy on his position of advocating that the United States openly aid anti-Castro forces inside and outside Cuba. 26/

It is interesting to observe that Nixon became more philosophical about the impact of the final TV

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debate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 election as time passed. In 1964 he would write "Most observers agree that our positions on the Cuban issue could well have been the decisive factor [in the outcome of the election]." But in his recent memoirs he expressed doubt that any single factor in such a close election could really have changed the outcome.* 27/

Following the TV debate, in which Kennedy had raised the issue of assistance for Cuba, Nixon quickly lashed back at Kennedy. The result of the introduction of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the

* In an interesting conversation with Fawn M. Brodie who is writing a Nixon biography, the author of this history, in response to Brodie's concern about the fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public, emphasized that plausible deniability was of real concern at the time of the TV debate. He also emphasized the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by Nixon. The author also suggested to Mrs. Brodie that it seemed equally valid to infer that perhaps Kennedy had been leaked detailed information about the anti-Castro program and that he used this device to put Nixon in a corner during the TV debate. Arthur Schlesinger, of course, claimed that the Kennedy comments "were no more than a rhetorical flourish. Neither Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army in Guatemala." 28/

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election campaign, struck sensitive nerves within the Agency; and on 26 October 1960, General Cabell met with Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, indicating that the discussion and debate about Cuban issues were touching on areas which, in the end, might be damaging to the nation's interest. On 27 October at the Special Group meeting, Mr. Gray reported that he had talked to "certain Nixon people in the White House" in an attempt to enlist their support to bring such discussions to an end. 29/

It was not until 18 November 1960 that President-elect John F. Kennedy was fully briefed by Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, on the extent of the anti-Castro activities being planned by the United States Government. 30/ Mr. Nixon's misconception of the extent of the briefing that Kennedy had received in the pre-election period was not finally clarified however, until 20 March 1962 when Allen Dulles addressed a memorandum to John A. McCone, his successor as Director of Central Intelligence, stating as follows:

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I have read the portions of Mr. Nixon's book with regard to the intelligence briefings which he understood Senator Kennedy had been given by me with respect to Cuba during the campaign. I have also seen the White House statement issued today on this subject.

There has been here, I believe, an honest misunderstanding. This was probably due to the nature of the message Mr. Nixon writes he received as to these briefings. The Cuban situation was, of course, dealt with in the briefings I gave to Senator Kennedy. The last briefing I gave him was over a month before the debate in which the issue arose.

My briefings were intelligence briefings on the world situation. They did not cover our own Government's plans or programs for action -- overt or covert. 31/

As previously noted, however, by 1964, if not earlier, Mr. Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an error in assuming that Kennedy had received a more detailed briefing than in fact he truly had.

By way of concluding this segment on Richard Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity, it should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination was Nixon "the architect of the Bay of Pigs."* 32/

* A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden, an old CIA man, in a TV documentary on the CIA made by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

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It is equally clear that Mr. Nixon, principally through his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., was fully read into the plans that were being developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for the ouster of Fidel Castro. This interest was especially strong in the period from the winter of 1960 through the late summer of 1960. It also should be apparent to the reader that while some of the Vice President's interest -- particularly in his insistence on placating William Pawley, especially in giving undue attention to Pawley's concerns that the Agency-sponsored Cuban-exile organization was being taken over by the pro-Communist groups -- was politically motivated, his basic concern was the fear of the establishment of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. Certainly his constant interest and offers to provide help for the Agency in its relations to other branches of the US Government fall into the latter, rather than the former, category. The unanswerable question, of course, is whether Cuban Communism would play such a large role in international

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affairs in 1979, particularly in the third world countries, if Richard Nixon had been elected President in 1960.*

* Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon would have had the US play was the comment that he reportedly made to William Pawley several weeks before the 1960 election, when Nixon indicated that he favored breaking relations with Cuba -- at that time -- recognizing a Government-in-exile, and then assisting that Government in its efforts to oust Castro. 33/

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Part VII

The Question of Assassinations

In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence Activities, Richard M. Bissell, formerly CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, testified fully and completely to the role that he, Sheffield Edwards, and William Harvey played in negotiations with Robert Maheu and Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro. In addition to the individuals just named, it also appears highly probable that Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (and possibly both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy) was aware that Castro was an assassination target. Unfortunately the Senate Committee Report and the media coverage of the investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency's participation in assassination plots made it appear that the Mafia involvement was a fundamental part of the Agency's response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authorization for CIA to be principally responsible for the ouster of Fidel Castro. In fact, the activities of

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Messrs. Bissell, Edwards, and Harvey, with Maheu and the Mafia remained strictly compartmented and isolated from the officially authorized Project JMARC -- the Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs operation. Bissell himself stated:

I don't remember. I have no recollection that [there was] any specific other plot against Castro during this period when the Bay of Pigs operation was in preparation. I do remember my own feeling that the Mafia plot had a very modest chance for success, and that it was not something to be depended* on in any way. I don't remember others. 1/

Bissell also told the author of this history that:

Shef [Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director, Office of Security] would occasionally let me know what was going on [vis-a-vis the Mafia]. In effect, he and his immediate subordinate were case officers for that activity; and I don't think anybody else [was] involved. I think probably Tracy [Barnes] may have known about it, but I don't think anybody else involved with the Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about it, whatever. My recollection is that it never went to the Special Group, and that is the view of [McGeorge] Bundy.* 2/

* Interestingly enough, at the same time that Col. Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro, CIA's Deputy Director for Support, Col. L. K. White, noted:

Shef Edwards and I met with General Cabell and Jack Earman [on 22 March 1961] to point out to them that we were not
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Jacob D. Esterline, who was Chief, WH/4, the component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically created to run the anti-Castro project, disclaimed either responsibility or knowledgeability about the Mafia connection.* 4/ Richard D. Drain, who became Chief of Operations for WH/4 was more voluble on the subject of the assassination attempts which were reported by the Senate Select Committee. In an interview which touched, among other things on the planned assassination of Castro by the Mafia-types Drain commented:

furnishing the Director the personal protection which we should be furnishing in these critical times, particularly with regard to the dangers inherent in the Cuban situation. General Cabell agreed to talk with the Director about this, and to try to obtain his approval to increase Mr. Tighe's force to six people. 3/

* Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief, WH/4 he refused to grant Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types. It was subsequent to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found out about this, and Esterline told the author of this history that he expressed his strong opposition to the funding of such activities to J. C. King. 5/

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I've been giving you lessons here about [how] a COPS should know a little about everything ... Well, I promise you, until it came out in 1975, this allegation, at least, that Shef Edwards and Mr. Maheu were working with the Mafia to assassinate Castro, concurrent with the Bay of Pigs Operation, that is the first time I ever heard about it. Ever! ... My thought, when I saw this, was Jesus Christ, I must have been a little over-compartmented, because we had spent a considerable amount of nervous energy figuring out how are we going to get a shot at the old son-of-a-bitch concurrent with the landing. If anybody with whom I participated in planning for that ... something that we never had figured out how to do, because so many of our agents went down just prior to the invasion. If anybody that was involved in that ever spoke a word about any other exercise going on to get Castro, I never heard it; and my initial reaction when all this came out, during this last year was ... well ... why did they give me the idiot treatment? Then it occurred to me that maybe there was very good reason for me not to know. You don't need to know ... compartmentation ... even from COPS is not unheard of ...

Well, mind you, I am not saying what I've just said in any kind of pique; and I certainly don't want to leave you -- or this tape recorder -- with the impression that had I known about this, I would have been opposed. I must say, I don't think I would have enjoyed the instrument very much -- whereas we put out an awful lot of bullshit to the Cubans about the restoration of democracy and all that. Those Cubans that were working with us were not, I submit, working for the re-establishment of the Mafia as a controlling factor in Havana. I had a helluva lot rather, in

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contemplating the assassination of Castro, contemplated in the way that we were contemplating it -- that is, can we get a Rip Robertson close to him? Can we get a really hairy Cuban -- I mean a gutsy Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one thing in mind? We surveyed all of our agent material to see who could take a shot at him, but the assassination of that charismatic guy, coincidental with the invasion, would have been a highly desirable thing. Whether the instrument to be picked should have included the Mafia, I think I might have questioned at the time. It was part of my job ... to ask, "Now wait a minute ... What are we doing here? ... If this comes out ... what will we look like?" Not only to ourselves, which is important, but to the Cubans." 6/

In light of Drain's comments about the desirability of having the good guys in the white hats eliminate Castro, rather than the Mafia guys in the black hats, a specific attempt was made to see what the official records revealed about such plans. Although far from satisfactory or complete, there is evidence to indicate that the white-hatted guys would have had no objection -- as reported by Mr. Drain -- if a successful assassination attempt could have been made. Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking

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"direct positive action" against the Castro brothers and Che Guevara, WH/4 records reveal interest, and possibly limited, direct participation, in a number of such activities.*

For the most part, however, the various pieces of evidence that seemed to implicate WH/4 in assassination plots against Castro or other of the Cuban leaders proved to be cold trails. The peripatetic Howard Hunt claimed, even prior to the Senate investigations, that after a visit to Havana in the spring of 1960, he prepared a report recommending among other things that the Agency should:

Assassinate Castro before or coincident with the invasion (a task for Cuban patriots) ... Barnes and Bissell read my report ... and said it would weigh in the final planning ... So far as I have been able to determine no coherent plan was ever developed within CIA to assassinate

* As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Cabell pointed out to Mr. Merchant that such action was highly dangerous both in conception and execution, and, further, he indicated that it was beyond the Agency's capability. 7/ The Senate Select Committee chased its tail at some length over the interpretation of the term "direct positive action," as used by Merchant. Only someone (even a Senator) who consistently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a problem understanding the meaning to be anything other than assassination.

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Castro, but it was the heart's desire of many exile groups.* 8/

In another instance, it appeared possible that an agent named [6] a Cuban exile, might have been in training to make an assassination attempt because it was reported that he

was taken to the [99] firing range where he was checked out in the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi-hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol, single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer; carbine with folding stock; and a 7.65mm British Welrod with silencer. He is to be also checked out this week in the use of a sporting rifle with telescopic lens attachment.

It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration into Havana, [6] had two principal sabotage missions -- one against the Esso refinery and the other aimed at the Havana Electric Company. 9/

In mid-July 1960, there reportedly was an internal Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither WH/4 nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago de Cuba reported:

* Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status of his recommendation he was told that it was "in the hands of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery (Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any such report.

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On 15 July 1960, the Cuban Government uncovered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit to Mina del Frio, an army camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains, between Bayamo and Manzanillo in Oriente Province. Three captains and approximately 100 soldiers had been arrested and more arrests are expected. 10/

In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain, Jake Esterline the Chief of Project JMATE was also very emphatic in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban leaders was a part of the JMATE Program. In response to a question of whether various of the special arms that were being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for use against the Cuban leadership, Esterline responded:

No, I think it [silenced weapons in particular] is for hit and run operations, where they could do their maximum damage and get out without necessarily alerting people ... I know of no -- within JMARC as I knew it -- I know of no attempt, no plans that were made to assassinate. As a matter of fact, the constant battle with Cubans during those years was to tell them that we weren't going to get involved in any assassination, that if there was going to be an overthrow, it was going to be, obviously, a bloody operation; but no Cubans were going to be sent in there, to "make an assassination attempt." It was going to be a ground-roots revolution.* 11/

Some contradictory evidence, however, indicates that WH/4, if not principally responsible, was certainly

* It is known that at least one assassination plot against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men using US rifle-grenades -- was proposed by anti-Castro Cubans to COS Havana, but the COS gave the originator of the plan "no encouragement whatsoever." 11a/

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aware of some sort of planned assassination activity. One of the principals of WH/4 recorded that on 24 February 1961 he:

Asked Ed [Stanulis], Dave P[hillips], [Ed] Hinkle, [Bob] Moore, and Jake [Esterline] why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination. 12/

Although the author of that remark was Chief of Operations for Project JMATE, he was unaware, as reported earlier in this chapter, of the Mafia connection; but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that the invasion might lead to the death of Castro.* In response to a specific question about the AMHINT program, all he could say was:

I said that I was not failing to give some attention to the business of assassination. Now, here on the 24th of February, when I asked Ed, Dave Phillips, Hinkle, Moore, and Jake "why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination," either none of those bastards knew anything about Sheffield Edwards and Maheu in the Mafia ... or some of them did, and didn't see fit to say "Drain, take your AMHINT and stuff it. We've got this thing pretty well

* See pp. 279-281.

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Review

covered." What I would love now [is] to see an outline of AMHINT.* 13/

About the same time that the AMHINT program was mentioned, WH/4 apparently was involved in a disinformation action where reports of an attempt to assassinate Che Guevara were to be directed at Cuba from the CIA controlled radio transmitter on Swan Island. The WH/4 Propaganda Notes for 27 February 1961 mentioned that: " I. phoned following line to Wilkinson for Swan . . . (d) Attempted assassination of Guevara." ¹⁵¹ ~~187~~

In a cryptic entry in his personal notes, Dick Drain indicated that the success of the disinformation ploy would be followed as "CI and D watch Gueverra [sic] assassination attempt." The Counter Intelligence and Division D alert--Division D was responsible for intercepting radio traffic--would have been the most likely way to pick up word of an attempt on Guevara's life. There is no indication that this project was intended to do more than annoy the Cubans, but as suggested, WH/4 would not have objected if the broadcasts had stimulated someone to eliminate Che.

* The author of this history has unsuccessfully tried to track down this particular project. AMHINT was related to the work of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE), an anti-Castro organization inside Cuba. The only evidence that has been found which might have been related to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request of 14 January 1961 for "Silenciadores Rifles de marilla telescopica." (A request for rifles with silencers and telescopic sights.) This might have had to do with a DRE plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather than a plan to kill Castro. When the FOB in Miami heard about the plan against the Soviet official they "immediately sent ... [word] to AMHINT-1 forbidding planned 'atentado' [assassination]." 14/

attempt" then the comment from Chief of Operations appears eminently sensible, for Counter-Intelligence and Division D (which was responsible for intercept traffic) would be the two most likely sources to pick up information should an attempt be made on Guevara's life -- particularly since such an item probably would not be reported overtly in the Cuban press or radio.

One final item which was surfaced during the course of research concerning the possibility that WH/4 had actually included an assassination program as part of its operational planning concerns a carbon copy identified only as "Must Go List." The single sheet of unknown provenance lists and identifies in the following order eleven individuals:

- Che Guevara - Minister of Industries
- Raul Castro Ruz - Chief of Cuban Armed Forces, and wife, Vilma Espin de Castro
- Blas Roca - International Communist leader and Secretary General of Communist Party
- Ramiro Valdez Menendez - Minister of Interior (G-2)
- Carlos Olivares - Deputy Foreign Minister
- Carlos Raphael Rodriguez - Communist leader, editor of newspaper HOY
- Lazaro Pena - Communist leader - labor movement
- Abelardo Colome - Deputy in G-2
- Captain Rogelio Acevedo - Chief of Militia
- Anibal Escalante - Communist leader
- Armendo Hart Davalos - Minister of Education, and wife, Haydee Santamaria de Hart

Pencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a note:

"List forwarded E. L. by C/WH/4 in Nov [1960]."* When

* A copy of the list follows p. 287. The list should read Armando, rather than Armendo, Hart.

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asked if he could identify the "Must Go List" the former Chief of WH/4 stated:

Well, I know all these people ... Some of them I know personally, like Armando Hart ... I entertained Hart in my home a number of times ... the miserable bastard. I have never seen that list in my life, but this is the whole top gang at that time. Now many of them were later eliminated from the power structure by Castro, and by Raul Castro ... They got rid of Olivares, and Roca was pushed aside ... Armando Hart was also half nuts at this point, and he still is. I guess he is still fairly prominent, but he is not really in the power structure. Abelardo Colome -- I don't even know who he is. I wish to help you, but I don't know. 17/

The former Chief of Operations for WH/4, in response to the question of whether the "Must Go List" meant anything to him, replied as follows:

No! Huh! "List forwarded E. L. by Chief WH/4" ... Eddie Lansdale ... E. L. would be Eddie Lansdale. Chief, WH/4 was Jacob D. Esterline. In November, I was there ... No "Big Daddy." Well, whether this "Must Go" is in terms of the assassination, or in terms ... [of] nobody, none of these people must be allowed to have a role in the new government. I guess "Must Go" came to pass eventually in the case of number one on this list, Che Guevara. Raul ... I myself, contemplating the future government, thought it might be interesting to try to keep Raul in, with Fidel out. Capture what magic there was in the name of Castro, but do it with that little homosexual, instead of with Fidel, the real man. I

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don't even know the rest of these guys --
Hart, Escalante, etc. 18/

By way of summarizing, it would appear that CIA's official anti-Castro program as reflected in Project JMATE did not include assassination as an integral part of its operational planning, but would not have been averse to eliminating Castro or other of the Cuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded. Based on records, however, WH/4's principals were in no way privy to, or participants in, the Mafia assassination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs.

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Part VIII

Conclusions

This volume has traced the history of the CIA's official anti-Castro program from its inception in 1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration in January of 1961. It emphasized that in the initial period when Castro's revolution was taking place, the Agency, reflecting the policies of the US Government, was caught betwixt and between -- to move *with* Castro or to move *against* Castro. Shortly following his takeover, it became clear that Castro had little or no intention -- nor apparently concern -- for establishing cordial relations with the "Colossus of the North." Instead, he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies for military, technical, and economic assistance. It became clear that a new philosophy was being introduced into the Caribbean basin and that this philosophy was directly contrary to the interests of the United States Government and to the governments of many of the Latin American nations, whether democratically governed or governed by dictatorships of the right.

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As Castro's threats became more serious, and as increasing pressures were put on legitimate economic interests of the United States in Cuba, pressures within the United States Government led to a decision that Castro must go. With great concern about the impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the United States Government would have on the United Nations and on the Organization of American States, it was decided that a covert plan of action would be adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960. It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary programs which would be implemented in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was to be the principal action agent for the bulk of the program.

Once the official US position was announced, CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy. A separate Task Force within the Western Hemisphere Division was established under the leadership of Jacob D. Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio

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station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City. Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castro publications launched in the area of Miami. Paramilitary programs initially called for the training of cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructors who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and training for the numerous dissident elements that reportedly were ready to move against Castro.

Unfortunately, however, as the summer of 1960 drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro's military strength and training programs were sharply improving and that the initial plan to infiltrate small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was feasible. Consequently, the concept changed to one of a landing in force, the acquisition of a defensible base in Cuba from which a Provisional Government might call for assistance from the United States Government if the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient support to force the overthrow of Castro.

This volume emphasized that following his decision in March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro program, President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the

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question of developments of the anti-Castro program until late in the fall, following the election of 1960 and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that time Mr. Eisenhower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated action to the point where some of CIA's planners hoped that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was already underway -- paramilitary operations might be initiated. Apparently this was feared by Castro, too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs he said:

When our country was in danger of direct aggression and mobilized itself, it waited for the [Kennedy] presidential inauguration thinking that this man [Kennedy] would do something different, because all in all, we didn't understand why a man who assumed the administration of the United States would want to bear the guilt of someone else's mistakes.* 1/

This was not to be, however, for aside from considerable emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only limited support for sabotage activities prior to the

* Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon and General C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell proposing air and naval protection for the invasion and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the beachhead. 2/

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end of Eisenhower's administration. There was considerable concern over the necessary formalities of diplomacy in order that the United States not be involved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS for its anti-Castro program.

Because it has been so widely publicized that ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the principals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation, this volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon played into the proper context. It was the role of an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch, and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's role be construed to have had a major impact on the development of operational planning by the Central Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort.

Similarly, because of the sensationalism which surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, including Fidel Castro and the implications that the Mafia plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay of Pigs Operation, thorough examination of the evidence was undertaken to determine if this allegation was supportable. It was not. The Mafia operation was run

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aside from, apart from, and independent of the formal anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At most, four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and possibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu.

In terms of Project JMATE itself, the few bits of information which indicate the possibility of assassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also fail to demonstrate any responsibility for their initiation on the part of WH/4. If anything, the evidence would indicate that WH/4's position was one of watchful waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara. The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons might be involved in such an attempt cannot be ruled out. 3/

Obviously it would be foolish to contend that those principally responsible for developing CIA's anti-Castro program would have objected to the assassination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Appendix A

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence

from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

UNCLASSIFIED

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

DATE

17 December 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and Building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DD/B

12/11/59

12/11/59

DD/B

2.

DDT

12/11/59

12/11/59

DDT

3.

C/W 14

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

[Handwritten signature]

UNCLASSIFIED

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

11 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (PLIns)

SUBJECT: Cuban Problems.

This memorandum requests approval by the Director of the recommendations contained in paragraph 3.

1. Estimate of the Situation.

a. A dictatorship of the far left is now established. It is not only unfriendly to the United States in oral criticisms, but has taken action against American properties, both industrial and agricultural, which, if permitted to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other Latin American countries.

b. We do and must expect a major increase in the scale and effectiveness of Cuban aid and participation in revolutionary actions against other countries of Latin America now friendly to the United States. In addition to those that have already been targets - Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, recent intelligence indicates a direct interest by Castro in Colombia and Peru. Batancourt's position in Venezuela would be gravely weakened by Castro successes, and it is believed only a question of time before an alliance would be established between the powerful Communist Party of Venezuela and the Castros.

c. Rapid nationalization of the banks, industry and commerce is reportedly contemplated. If this occurs, the small group in control will have at its disposition several hundred million dollars from the sale of the sugar crop early in 1960. Part of these funds may be used to further their revolutionary objectives against other countries of the Caribbean and South America.

d. Castro has lost the support of the upper class and most of the middle class. He probably still has a sufficient following from the masses to maintain control until further inroads can be made in his popular support and the opposition more effectively unified.

e. Propaganda action to reduce his following, while essential, in itself will probably not be enough to dislodge him. His approaching stranglehold on Cuba will be broken only by violent action.

f. It is my personal opinion that if Castro is successful in consolidating his position and remaining in power for two more years,

lasting damage may occur to the United States' already weakened position of leadership in Latin America.

2. U.S. Objective.

The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections six months after assumption of office.

3. Recommended Action:

a. Clandestine radio attacks from Caribbean countries of the liberal group, working closely with us and using Cuban nationals for broadcasting.

b. Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.

c. The encouragement of pro-U.S. opposition groups, excluding Batista and Masferrer supporters, to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba. This would have the following advantages:

(1) It would permit the establishment of a radio station, long wave, which would reach all of the stations in Cuba. Since it would be on Cuban soil, the problems of joint operations with other countries would be eliminated.

(2) A controlled area would be a rallying point for the growing opposition to Castro in the same manner that the 26th of July movement in the hills of Oriente became the rallying point of many who turned against Batista.

(3) It would be a means of testing the strength and fibre of the opposition, and separating the men from the boys.

(4) The reportedly large fragmented elements of the constitutional Cuban Army would have a place to go.

(5) A sizeable guerrilla movement within Cuba would curtail Castro's plans for revolutionary action against other countries.

d. Through consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul

or his companion Che Guevarra, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present Government.

J.C. King
J.C. King

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

cc: CUR:

12 DEC 1959

William M. Russell
Deputy Director (Plans)

The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

[Signature]

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

12 DEC 1959

Appendix B

A Program of Covert Action
Against the Castro Regime

16 Mar 60

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This document is our basic policy
paper. It was approved by the
President at a meeting in the
White House on 17 March 1960.

~~EYES ONLY~~
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~~EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET~~

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the

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2

Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition.

The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard

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intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and divisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the

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opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. \$100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional \$2,000,000.

5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately \$4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not

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reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is \$900,000 with the balance of \$3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

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140 A

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i. e. -they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

- a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.
- b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.

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c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect.

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated.

e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.

A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

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307

~~EYES ONLY~~
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PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i. e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). [6] and [6] have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from [10] and [10]. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S. -controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

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3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has El Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario de la Marina, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.

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~~EYES ONLY~~
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Tab C

FINANCIAL ANNEX

I. <u>Political Action</u>	<u>FY-1960</u>	<u>FY-1961</u>
Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities	150,000	800,000
II. <u>Propaganda</u>		
Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of trans- mitters)	400,000	700,000
Press and Publications	100,000	500,000
III. <u>Paramilitary</u>		
In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training	200,000	1,300,000
IV. <u>Intelligence Collection</u>	50,000	200,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	*900,000	3,500,000

*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

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Appendix C-1

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

- 1) Letter for Allen Dulles
from Arleigh Burke,
17 Mar 60

UNCLASSIFIED

USE ONLY

CONFID

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Ltr from Admiral Burke

FROM:

DD/P

18 March 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/WH Division			<i>gk</i>	1. Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March and the latter handed to me. I do not believe it requires a reply but pass it to you for any value it may have. RMBjr.
2.				
3. C/WH/4			<i>g</i>	
4. [3] Hand Carry			<i>g</i>	
5. <i>Stamps Hand Carry</i>			<i>g</i>	
6. <i>E. J. ...</i>				
7. <i>...</i>				
8. CWH Cuba File				
9.				

0-1436



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

~~TOP SECRET~~

17 March 1960

PERSONAL - ~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Allen:

Enclosed is a memorandum my staff prepared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum, but I know that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,
Arleigh
ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

~~PERSONAL - TOP SECRET~~

Appendix C-2

CNO Correspondence with Department of State
and NSC:

- 2) Letter for Gordon Gray from
Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60

~~TOP SECRET~~ CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

~~TOP SECRET~~

18 March 1960

Dear Gordon:

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum on U.S. action in Cuba which may be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,



ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable
Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Enclosure

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TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Op-62

Op-603D/jwr
16 Mar 1960

Via: Op-105D
Op-603 _____

U. S. Action in Cuba (3)

1. The recommendations contained in the paper on "U.S. Actions in Cuba" were intended originally to provide the broad outline for a carefully laid out program for causing the Castro regime to be replaced by a friendly government. It was intended that State would logically control and coordinate all aspects and provide the guidance as to the specific actions required of the other departments of the government. The paper was not interpreted in this manner by those who received it and the search appears now to be for specific actions which can be used to accomplish the end desired.

2. The following are offered as possible specific actions which can be taken in support of our position on Cuba - You might desire to have OO inject these items into the NSC meeting, 16 March.

a. IACB - Chairman, or the Chief of the U.S. Delegation, attempt to have a delegation other than U.S. introduce a motion for the Board to consider the gap in hemispheric defense resulting from the Cuban situation or for the Board to recommend that the OAS study the influence of Communism in Cuba.

b. Commercial - Oil companies are not being paid by Cuba. State could request the oil companies to point out to the governments who produce the oil the effects on their economies of the loss of the Cuban market.

c. Schools and War Colleges - The Services could include in courses for foreign officers the effect on hemisphere defense of the establishment of a Communist dictatorship in Cuba.

d. Commercial - Do Latin Americans hold stock in the expropriated properties in Cuba? If so, State could request the companies concerned to include in their dividend mailings, information pointing out the effect on the companies' earnings and the stockholders' dividends of expropriation of property without compensation and, for the oil companies, non-payment for oil delivered.

e. State, in conjunction with CIA, publish a weekly or bi-weekly letter documenting the actions of the Castro Government for the previous period. Included would be:

- (1) Violations of human rights.
- (2) Communist trends and actions.
- (3) Dictatorial and undemocratic actions.

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Distribute this to:

- (1) All U.S. diplomatic posts.
- (2) Army, Navy and Air Force for further distribution to units or officers in contact with Latin Americans.

For use as talking points to:

- (1) Discredit the Castro regime.
- (2) Build support for the U.S. position.
- (3) Alert Latin Americans as to the Communist aspects.

f. All Services - Prepare and distribute speech material suitable for inclusion in various types of addresses. Material should cover:

- (1) Communist aspects of present Cuban Government.
- (2) Threat of Communism in Cuba to hemispheric defense.
- (3) The dictatorial aspects of the Cuban regime.
- (4) The Cuban regime's actions against the basic human rights.
- (5) The strategic importance of the Guantanamo Naval Base.
- (6) The logic of the firmness of the treaties by which we hold Guantanamo and the formal commitment of the Castro regime on taking power to honor Cuba's international commitments.

Distribute this material to the Services and to their Leagues and Associations for maximum use in public speeches.

g. IADB - Have General Shaer, as Director of the Staff, IADB, inject into the monthly intelligence briefings at the IADB information on the latest Soviet Bloc actions and the progress of International Communism in Cuba.

h. State, in conjunction with CIA and the Service intelligence agencies, hold special briefings once each month on the general situation in Cuba with special emphasis on the Communist aspects for the following:

- (1) U. S. officials of the OAS and UN.
- (2) U.S. personnel of the Staff of the IADB.
- (3) Official U.S. personnel in Washington having duties involving close contact with Latin Americans.

i. All Services provide special briefings on a one-time basis along the line of h. above for officers and enlisted personnel of units proceeding to Caribbean or South American ports.

j. Navy endeavor to have a good reporter or author prepare a story containing the Navy's views on Guantanamo for publication in a national magazine with wide circulation in Latin America.

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k. Nav - Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral ~~Smith~~ of a complete briefing of State Department activities vis a vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster.

l. State - Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. Nationals going to Latin America on the Communist threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel.

Very respectfully,

J. E. POND, JR.

Appendix C-3

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

- 3) Memorandum for the Special
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,
sub: US Policy toward Cuba



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAR 16 1960

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Cuba

Enclosed is an exchange of letters on the above subject between Admiral Burke and Under Secretary Marchant, both of whom have authorized that I make the correspondence available to you for whatever help it may be in connection with the discussion of this subject at the Council meeting this coming Thursday.

Hayden W. Williams
Deputy Assistant Secretary

2 Encls
A/S

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10 Mar 60

10 Mar 60

Dear Arleigh:

I was much interested in your personal letter of February 26, 1960, on Cuba and the Caribbean situation, in which I noted a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve this result.

As you are doubtless aware from the briefing which Dick Robertson and I gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 8, 1960, most of the courses of action suggested in the memorandum headed "Recommendations for U. S. Actions in Cuba," which you transmitted with your letter, were initiated some time ago and are constantly being intensified. To recapitulate, our own thinking on the Cuban situation as it relates to Communism and our own security interests has been as follows:

a. The maximal objective of International Communism-- in the immediate future--is the consolidation of a radical, anti-American Revolution friendly to the USSR in Cuba and the utilization of Cuba as a base to promote similar revolutionary movements in the Caribbean. The minimal objective of the Communists, if they are unable to achieve the foregoing, is to ask the United States pay as high prices as possible for the elimination of the undesirable features of the Cuban Revolution. In particular, the Communists stand to gain by provoking us into armed intervention, or otherwise taking interventionist actions in violation of our commitments in a manner which could be made to appear as if the United States reacted the same way as the Soviets did in Hungary and other satellites.

b. Unless

Admiral Arleigh Burke,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy.

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D. Unless we were indefinitely to occupy Cuba militarily, the only solution to the Cuban problem is necessarily the emergence of a Cuban leadership willing to and capable of governing the country along lines acceptable to the Cuban people and along lines consistent with basic U. S. policy with respect to Latin America. This will take time. On the one hand, it is doubtful that any Cuban Government which resulted from U. S. armed or other overt intervention could long survive our withdrawal. On the other, despite our own long-standing misgivings concerning Castro, it is an incontrovertible fact that he came into power with overwhelming support not only in Cuba but elsewhere in the hemisphere, including in this country. Although that support has largely evaporated in the United States—and, to a lesser extent, in responsible circles in the other Latin American Republics—Castro and, particularly, his reform program still enjoy very considerable support in his country. Cubans, even those disillusioned with Castro, have yet to find an alternative leadership which they believe would actually carry out the reform measures which public opinion still demands. Opposition elements related with collaboration with the Batista regime are still politically unacceptable and could not establish a stable government. Opposition groups that might be acceptable to Cubans are beginning to organize more effectively but, at best, it will be months before they are ready for vigorous action.

E. The primary objective of U. S. policy should be the coalalescence of the elements of an effective, patriotic movement friendly to the United States within Cuba and among Cuban exiles to counter Cuba's current trend. The first task is to secure, insofar as we are able to do so, a climate in which responsible and friendly Cubans could find it worthwhile to oppose Castro policies which harm the Communists and undermine good U.S.-Cuban relations. On the positive side, we should and are taking actions and making statements which would encourage such elements to organize more effectively and to expect our support and collaboration in their efforts to achieve political and economic progress for Cuba by taking a different road than the present Cuban regime's. At the NSD briefing, we gave an indication of the covert activities underway towards this end, as well as an indication of the extensive contributed effort which has been underway for over a year to identify and expose to public opinion throughout the hemisphere the Communist aspects of the Cuban problem. On the negative side, our policies are guided by the principle that opposition to Castro's policies in Cuba will

increase

Increase fairly rapidly if it is clear to Cubans that Castro himself is responsible for political and economic deterioration of the country. However, the consolidation of the opposition will be slowed down if Castro can succeed by wrapping the flag of patriotism and nationalism about himself in further convincing the Cuban people that the United States has aggressive designs on the Cuban nation as a whole and that the United States rather than Castro's policies is responsible for Cuba's difficulties. We must, therefore, exercise the greatest care that we do not unnecessarily transform the developing dissension of the Cuban people with Castro into a fight between the United States and Cuba, for no self-respecting Cuban could then afford to support us against his own country.

d. While we believe that inter-American action through the OAS and/or some economic action by the United States in defense of its rights may play an important role at the proper time, we must not let these possibilities come to us to lose sight of the critical fact that no solution will be possible until an alternative leadership is ready to move in. If the application of collective or unilateral pressures should bring the Castro Government down before an acceptable leadership is ready to take over, the probabilities are civil war or a take-over by even more Communist elements. Either would bring us closer to armed intervention. Thus, while we are going ahead in the process of influencing the other American Republics to see the Communist and other aspects of the Cuban situation as we do and preparing the ground for possible inter-American consideration of the Cuban problem, we intend to control the timing of any such action insofar as possible to coincide with the development of an alternative leadership. It is also the intention of the Administration to propose to the Congress that the President be given discretionary authority to alter sugar quotas in the national interest and we have developed and are putting into effect an action plan to obtain the release of the United States from certain other economic commitments which impair our ability to take action in the economic field when this could contribute to safeguarding our interest or to the creation of conditions favorable to a leadership opposed to Castro's policies.

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With respect to all these matters, a most important element is time. Time is needed for Cuba to realize that the deterioration of their political and economic life is due to Castro's excesses, including his connections with International Communism. Time is needed for an alternative leadership to emerge and to organize effectively for action. Time is also needed further to ensure Latin American opinion to the dangers of the situation and for Latin American Governments to come around more to the point of view that the Cuban situation is a matter of common concern, not just a U.S.-Soviet quarrel. We are using all available facilities to ~~make~~ this time as short as possible, but our experience in other difficult situations in the Near East and Central America indicate that immediate results are not to be expected. ~~At the same time, we are going to have, we believe, to exercise restraint from taking actions which, while reflecting our own great sense of concern and urgency, would actually retard the process of change which we all desire.~~

I should point out also that, while action in the OAS at the right time may be desirable as a means of encouraging an alternative Cuban leadership, we would probably have to contend with Soviets in the United Nations. It is almost certain that the Cubans will try to anticipate or counter any U. S. approach to the OAS by going directly to the United Nations. Furthermore, actual "enforcement action" by the OAS would probably be brought up before the United Nations under Article 53 of the UN Charter even if we argued that any action taken by the OAS constituted only "recommendations" to governments. This reinforces our view that action in the OAS—which can be taken under the Charter by convening a meeting of Foreign Ministers, as well as under the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Resolution—should primarily be viewed as a means of strengthening Cuban opposition to Castro's policies at the right ~~moment~~ rather than as a means of quarantining Cuba and waiting to see what happens. It would at present be somewhat difficult to bring a case against Cuba under the Caracas Resolution since the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate—which we have asked to be reviewed—does not find the Cuban Government to be Communist-dominated at present. If our own Estimate does not yet substantiate the case, it would be difficult in a short time to persuade less well-informed governments that "the political institutions" of Cuba are under International Communist control or domination.

As you are aware, our basic national policy (NSA 5902/1) views armed intervention as a last resort to be approved by the President when all else fails. We would be most reluctant to make or counter in such recommendation to the President until there had been a reasonable chance for all other solutions to be tested.

Thank you

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Thank you again for sending us a copy of your memorandum. As you know, the NSC is keeping the Cuban problem under constant scrutiny, having discussed it in some detail at its January 14 meeting and again this morning. At the first of the meetings, the Secretary of State reviewed the policy toward Cuba which had been approved by the President, and the consensus of this morning's meeting was that this policy is essentially correct. We anticipate that, at future meetings of the NSC, there will be further discussions concerning Cuba to determine whether there should be a modification of policy toward that country. In view of the fact that today's NSC meeting indicated continued agreement on the validity of the policy discussed in January, it would appear unnecessary to develop new policy documentation at this time, especially as the proposals in your Navy memorandum closely parallel policies which are already underway. Should you, or your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, desire a further briefing on our actions and operational plans to carry out the policy, I should be more than glad to arrange it.

Sincerely,

Livingston T. Farnham
Under Secretary for Political Affairs

//

~~SECRET~~

26 FEB 1953

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SECRET - PERSONAL

Dear Livie:

I am becoming increasingly concerned over deteriorating conditions in the Caribbean. I am especially concerned over the present situation in Cuba, in whose security the Navy is directly interested by reason of this island's strategic location with respect to the sea approaches to the southern United States and the Panama Canal, and because of the location there of the Guantanamo Naval Base. Cuba appears to be in the process of falling under the domination of International Communism. Should this trend continue unchecked and a communist dominated or "front government" become a reality, a direct threat to the security of the United States would be presented. Additionally, a communist controlled state in Cuba would serve as a base of operations for the further spread of communistic influence in the Western Hemisphere having as its aim the isolation of the United States from Latin America.

Because of my concern, I am taking the liberty of sending you the attached paper as indicative of current Navy thinking in this matter, - namely that positive action to reverse the present trend should be initiated to the end that the communist threat is eliminated and a stable, friendly government established in Cuba. Action taken now in the case of Cuba will also facilitate and provide a foundation for any similar actions which may be necessary to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America and to stabilize other areas where unrest is appearing.

I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Jack Irwin.

Sincerely,

ARLICE BURNE

The Honorable Livingston T. Merchant
New State Department Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosure: Paper on U.S. Action in Cuba

Copy to: Mr. J. H. Irwin II, (OSD/ISA) w/enclosure

INTRODUCTION

1. The Castro Movement in Cuba is a vehicle by which international communism appears to be gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. If the present trend continues, it will soon be too late for the United States to stem the Soviet incursion into this hemisphere. This situation, in its many ramifications, presents an immediate threat to the security of the United States and to that of our important neighbors in North and South America. //

PROBLEM

2. What action can be taken to prevent the establishment of a communist state in Cuba and to restore a stable, friendly government?

BACKGROUND

3. The U. S. has never renounced the Monroe Doctrine. This was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Dulles in his address to the Nation on July 12, 1954, on International Communism in Guatemala. In that address, Mr. Dulles stated:

"For several years international communism has been probing here and there for resting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics."

"This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies."

The United States is bound by treaties which commit it to seek settlement of hemispheric disputes by peaceful means, but which also provide for action in the event of aggression either from outside the hemisphere or within. Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, 1947, requires each contracting party to send to the Security Council of the UN complete information "concerning the activities undertaken ... for the purpose of maintaining Inter-American peace and security."

Article 6 of this treaty states:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack ... or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in

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order to agree on ... the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

The Declaration adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela, March 1954, states:

"That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for the meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties."

The 26th of July Movement succeeded in displacing Batista on 1 Jan 1959. Since that time the Castro regime has followed increasingly the classic strategy for establishing a communist state. The communist time table is delineated in American Embassy Havana Dispatch No. 905 dated 29 December 1959. The ruthless elimination of the opposition, assumption of dictatorial powers, suspension of elections, the "Hate America" campaign, the studied breakdown of the economy and confiscation of property, the initiation of relations and trade with the Soviet Union, the forbidding of anti-communist activity and the breakdown and reconstitution of the Armed Services and police are all typical communist maneuvers.

The majority of the Cubans are not yet committed to the acceptance of communism nor are they aware of the trend of the Revolution in this direction. The lower classes, however, continue to give full support to Castro and the Revolution.

It has not yet been proved that Castro himself is a communist. However, some of his principal deputies as well as other leaders are believed to be communists. In any case, individuals susceptible to communist influence are occupying key positions in the government as well as in all important organizations and trade unions. Two developments are noticeable. Communists are being appointed openly and are being elected (in trade unions) to key positions. Hidden communists in the 26th of July Movement are taking positions in seeming opposition to the open communists.

At present the Cuban Armed forces are disorganized and apparently capable only of guerrilla warfare. Intelligence reports indicate that the Soviet Bloc may be supplying technicians to assist in training the new forces and supplying arms to the new government. There is no present indication that the fall of the Castro Government is imminent. If it should fall, however, the government would most probably emerge as a communist government because

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opposition leaders have been eliminated and there appear to be no leaders of stature remaining around whom anti-Castro/anti-Communist peoples could rally. Should Castro fall or be assassinated, mob action which would probably result would jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba. Finally, in the worst extreme, the possibility of direct support for Cuba by the Soviet bloc, even to the extent of an open mutual security agreement, cannot be disregarded.

DISCUSSION

4. Three basic courses of action are open to the U. S.

- A. Multilateral action through the OAS.
- B. Unilateral Overt Action by the U. S.
- C. Covert Unilateral Action by the U.S.

All subsidiary actions, such as economic pressure and moral suasion, which will assist in achieving the objective should also be taken in addition to the above.

A. MULTILATERAL ACTION THROUGH THE OAS.

The machinery exists in the declaration and agreements of the OAS for the U. S. to request convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS with subsequent investigation of the government in Cuba, and, if approval of the member states is obtained, intervention to prevent a Communist take-over.

(1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with our national policy and our treaty commitments under the OAS.

(b) It would strengthen the OAS and would reassure the Free World and the Latin American States of U. S. willingness to live up to commitments.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) Uncertainty of support for OAS action by other Latin American States.

(b) Delay in OAS action could result in a Communist controlled front government being a "fait accompli" in Cuba.

(c) Could result in the entire problem ending in the Security

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Council of the UN where the Soviet Union has a veto.

B. UNILATERAL COERCIVE ACTION BY THE U.S.

The U. S. has the capability to seize Cuba by direct military action, and after a consolidation period, cause the establishment of a friendly, non-communist government.

(1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with the Monroe Doctrine, which is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere, and would solve the problem.

(b) It would serve notice to the world that the U. S. will not tolerate the establishment of a communist or ~~communist~~ "front" regime in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) It would re-emphasize to the world that the U. S. will not hesitate to act when its security is at stake.

(d) It would dispel any illusions by the world at large that the U. S. is unwilling, and unable to act no matter what the provocation. It would also probably stop the "baiting of the U.S." in which some minor powers throughout the world indulge.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) It would violate our OAS commitments to seek settlement by peaceful means.

(b) It would lead to charges of aggression against the U.S., both in the OAS and in the United Nations, with the resulting possibility of UN and OAS action against the U. S.

(c) It would prove that the U.S. is not willing to abide by its treaties if U. S. interests dictate otherwise.

(d) It could isolate the U.S. from the other American States.

(e) It would violate the principle of non-intervention.

C. COVERS UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S.

The U. S. could assist rebel groups covertly to overthrow the present government and re-establish a friendly government. Concurrently, it could take all possible measures to alert all friendly nations and the U.S. people and branches of the U. S. Government to the danger of the threat

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in order to discredit Cuba and bring world opinion to the side of the U.S.

(1) Advantages:

(a) U. S. would not be charged with aggression.

(b) If carried out successfully, Free World and Latin American opinion would be favorable to the U. S.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) There is no certainty of success.

(b) The effort might well come too late.

In considering and comparing the above courses of action, the basic assumption that the United States cannot and must not permit within the Western Hemisphere the establishment of any government dominated by the International Communists is paramount. Therefore, if other courses of action fail, the U. S. must, even in the face of adverse world opinion, take unilateral action to prevent such an occurrence.

Until the situation reaches the stage where direct unilateral action by the U.S. is the only means left, it appears that a combination of those parts of courses of action A and C which have a fair chance of success should be followed in order to utilize the prime advantage given under A, i.e., the cooperation and good will of the other American States.

CONCLUSIONS

5. The following conclusions are reached:

a. The establishment of a communist government, or a "front" government following communist precepts, in Cuba would be a direct threat to the security of the U. S. and would endanger hemispheric security.

b. The U. S. should initiate positive action to eliminate the threat before a communist or "front" government in Cuba is a "fait accompli."

c. Although the revolution still has the support of the masses, the resulting government in Cuba is following the path of international communism. Although they are not yet aware of the trend toward communism, Castro has the personal loyalty of the masses.

d. American holdings are being confiscated. American lives may be endangered if stable, responsible government is not ensured.

e. The Monroe Doctrine is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere.

f. Procedure exists under the Declaration of Caracas to request action by the OAS against a Communist threat to hemispheric security.

g. The U. S. should proceed to document the extent of infiltration of communists into key positions in Cuba and the extent of extra-Western Hemisphere communist support of the present Cuban regime.

h. The U. S. should initiate a campaign to apprise all U. S. agencies, the U. S. public, and the other American States of the threat in order to gain support for any future action that may be taken.

i. The U. S. should actively support the Cuban opposition.

j. The U. S., after having gained the required support, should present its case before the OAS in order that joint action by the members of the OAS may be taken to eliminate the communist threat and establish a friendly, stable government in Cuba.

k. The U. S., as a last resort, should take unilateral military action to eliminate the threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. To accomplish the above, the following plan of action is recommended:

a. Immediately document the communist time table and the communist take-over in Cuba.

b. Use all resources and media to make the U.S. and the other American States aware of the threat. The following should be utilized to accomplish this:

(1) Intelligence briefings of:

(a) U. S. Government officials.

(b) Newspaper representatives and editors.

(c) U.S. businessmen operating abroad and going abroad.

(d) The OAS members and Latin American diplomatic personnel and military attaches.

(e) The Catholic Church (possibly through the Apostolic Delegate).

(f) Church groups operating in Latin America.

(g) Latin American officials visiting the U. S. and U. S. installations.

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(2) orientation of radio broadcasts and news reports, both government and private.

(3) The U. S. Information Service.

(4) All country teams.

c. Covertly support the Cuban opposition. Select and groom trusted Cubans as appropriate to assume responsible posts in a friendly government.

d. Be prepared to use force to safeguard and evacuate U. S. Nationals should the situation deteriorate to the point where they are endangered.

e. When support has been gained, request, in conjunction with other members of the OAS, convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS under the Terms of the Declaration of Caracas to:

(1) Seek OAS action to call on Cuba to place herself under OAS auspices "in order to preserve the revolution for the people and prevent communist take-over," and;

(2) Seek OAS action to intervene by force in the event the above fails, and;

(3) In whatever joint group is formed to accomplish the above, keep U. S. participation to a minimum in order to force the Latin American States to assume their responsibilities to the Hemisphere and to counter accusations of U. S. imperialism.

f. In the event time does not permit completion of the above, or as a last resort, be prepared to take unilateral military action to establish a non-communist government in Cuba.



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~~EYES ONLY~~

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2 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action

SUBJECT : Liaison with United States' Agencies on JMARC Activities

1. This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action.

2. The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States' Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made on a regular basis, such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of State, and to offices which, we must contact quite frequently to solicit their support, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of the Executive Branch including:

- a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon's military assistant.
- b. NSC 5412 Representatives.
- c. Certain United States' Senators and Representatives, particularly Senator George Smathers of Florida.

4. In the early stages of JMARC we had almost daily contact with Rear Admiral S. B. Renkin, USN, who was the action officer on the movement of two radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island.

5. Through Raymond Millard [Mallard?], the Agency is in close touch with CINCLANT at Norfolk. Robert Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, has briefed selected senior officers on JMARC 4. Mr. Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for Cuba.

J. D. ESTERLINE
Chief, WH/4

Attachment:

Chart mentioned in paragraph 2.

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~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

COPY

OFFICE

NATURE OF DISCUSSION

CIA REPRESENTATIVE

FREQUENCY

STATE DEPARTMENT

Office Inter-American Affairs (ARA)
(Mr. Rubottom)

Policy

Col. J. C. King

Weekly

Cuba Working Group (State, USIA)
(Chaired by Ambassador Mallory)

Overt Programs

[3]

Daily

Consular & Security Affairs
(Mr. John Haynes)

Passports for Aliens

Mr. Pennington (OS)

As required

Office of Intelligence & Research
(Ambassador J. Lampton Berry)

"Talent" Matters

E. A. Stanulis

As required

Inter-departmental Defector Committee

Cuban "Defectors"

[3]

As required

Latin America Task Force
(Chaired by John Hill (ARA))

Program Coordination

Paul E. Oberst

Weekly

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Office of Special Operations
(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)

Defense Support

E. A. Stanulis
Robert Young (CC)

As required

Office of Special Operations
(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)

Briefing

J. D. Esterline

Weekly

Collateral Support Section,
Office of Naval Intelligence
(Cdr. Frank Day, USN)

Cover

Robert Young (CC)

As Required

Operations Branch, Collection
Division, ACSI (Army)
(Col. Stewart McKinney)

Cover

Robert Young (CC)

As required

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EYES ONLY

Continued

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

OFFICE

NATURE OF DISCUSSION

CIA REPRESENTATIVE

FREQUENCY

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Director, Voice of America
(Henry Loomis)

Coordination

David A. Phillips

Weekly

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Office of the Director
(Mr. Hennessey)

U. S. Entry of Cubans

Mr. Pennington (OS) As required

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Appendix E

Attack on Petroleum Refinery at

Santiago de Cuba

13-14 March 1961

209
14 MAR 61

BELL

ZRHH

BELL 15

DO/P, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, OC 6, BELL 1/C

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

WATERS

MAR 14 0920Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 3307

IM BELL KOLA WAVE CITE 8181 000

ZIP TAGBAR COMMO

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BARBARA AT 140638Z NR4 140600Z

BT

10. RE YOUR MSG NUMBER 49. CADICK SENDS

TEALUP DEBARKED 130045R MARCH SNEAKED PAST SEVERAL

BOATS TO CAYO RATON ISLAND COVERED WITH BRUSH AND TREES.

FIELD FIRE TO REFINERY WITHOUT DISTURBING OCCUPANTS TWO

BOATS MOVED TO MAINLAND NEAR REFINERY ENCOUNTERED STORM

GET BACKED OUT IN WATER TO 250 YARDS FROM REFINERY FOR CLEAN

SHOTS FIRED 7 TYPE 57 MILLIMETER SHELLS WITH FIVE HITS IN

REFINERY AND ONE TOWER STARTING ON FIRE. FIRED 200 ROUNDS

60 CALIBRE HITTING CRACKING PLANT AND CAUSING BRIGHT EXPLOSION

LARGEST TOWER. TOWER CHIMNEY BLEW ON DEPARTURE. VIEW TOWER

OBSCURED BY SMOKE TEALUP HUGGING BEACH ON WAY OUT BUT REFINERY

WAS DARKENED AND TOWER LIGHTS DISAPPEARED. SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS

HEARD FREQUENTLY. TEALUP ENDED ENGAGEMENT. CONSULTED BELL AND

WAS ADVISED ALL ABOVE. SMOKE COMPLETELY OBLSCURED FOLLOWING EXPLOSIONS

WAS OBSERVED. SCORPIONZ REGRASS. NAME TEALUP. TEALUP

WAS HIT ON FIRING AND WAS DROPPED INTO WATER. MOTORS ON

~~SECRET~~

AT QUIT BUT RESTARTED IN FEW MINUTES. AT HARBOR ENTRANCE AT
AST 750 CALIBRES AND 120 MILLIMETER ENGAGED US PLUS PLENTY SMALL

AND ONE STRONG SEARCHLIGHT. LEFT SEARCHLIGHT POINTING
DOWN INTO WATER AND SILENCED 20 MILLIMETER BUT 50'S FOLLOWED
ACUP OUT TO SEA WHERE BARBARA J MADE FINE PICK UP RIGHT ON
ATION. BE COMPLETED AT 130400R.

[Team screwed up?
See Para 1]

2. AT NO TIME DID TEACUP FIRE AT ANY EXCEPT THOSE OBVIOUSLY
AIMING ABOUT PREVENTING TEACUP'S DEPARTURE.

3. TEACUP COOLEST SEEN BY CAD: ON TO DATE. SUGGEST FOUR OF
THEY ARE LEADER MATERIAL AND HQS COULD USE THEM IN PRE-INVASION
PLANNING MINUS ONE IF FOUR TEAMS ORGANIZED AROUND THEM.

END OF MESSAGE

Appendix F

Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum
on Meeting with Fidel Castro,
19 April 1959

RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

July 27, 1979

Dear Dr. Pfeiffer,

I am enclosing a copy of the summary of my conversation with Fidel Castro in 1959, as you requested in your letter of July 19th.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA Historian
Washington, D.C. 20505

enclosure, 4 pages.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 19, 1959

Summary of conversation between The Vice President and Fidel Castro:

When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed somewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he had not done as well on "Meet the Press" as he had hoped. He was particularly concerned about whether he might have irritated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard to him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversation that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult programs a public official could go on and that he had done extremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that he had the courage to go on in English rather than to speak through a translator.

The subjects we discussed were no different from those on which he had made public statements on several other occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of interest, particularly in view of the comments I made with regard to the positions he took.

I suggested at the outset that while I understood some reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to have elections it would nevertheless be much better from his viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it would be as long as four years before elections would be held. I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having elections at the earliest possible date and that four years would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections were scheduled. He went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holding elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did not want elections because the elections in the past had produced bad government."

He used the same argument that he was simply reflecting the will of the people in justifying the executions of war criminals and his overruling the acquittal of Batista's aviators. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people

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-2-

whatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion."

It was this almost slavish subservience to prevailing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be. That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to give the people what they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make them want what they ought to have. I pointed out that it might be very possible that the people of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections and representative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes. Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictatorship against which he and his followers had fought so gallantly. I used the same argument with regard to freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial court, judge and jury, and on other issues which came up during the course of the conversation. In every instance he justified his departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of the people. I, in my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we believe in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majority should never have the power to destroy.

I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him but he did listen and appeared to be somewhat receptive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms of how this place in history would be affected by the courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow the mob, but that the right

-3-

thing in the long-run would be better for the people and, of course, better for him as well. As I have already indicated he was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communists overplayed their hand and "my people put them in their place." He implied that this would be the situation in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Communism, both internally and from an international standpoint, he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had sounded to me when I visited Indonesia in 1953. In our discussions of Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get into the positions of power and influence. On this score I feel I made very little impression, if any.

Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he did this he would have a workload which would be so great that he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people needed for the great issues. I put as much emphasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.

It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion his primary concern was with developing programs for economic progress. He said over and over that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had freedom along with it. I of course tried to emphasize that here again as a leader of his people, he should try to develop support for policies which could assure economic progress with freedom rather than without it.

-4-

He indicated that it was very foolish for the United States to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country. He said "anybody knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out. The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution. It would be far better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could disagree with!

We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could get the investment capital it needed for economic progress. He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he wanted was not private capital but government capital. He gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that were licensed and/or owned and operated by the government would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best hope as far as the United States was concerned was not in getting more government capital but in attracting private capital. I explained that government capital was limited because of the many demands upon it and the budget problems we presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which would attract it. I pointed out that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable length, tried to explain why he had said and done some of the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up to this time. Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression.

He explained his agrarian reform program in considerable detail justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the goods produced within the country and that it would make no sense to produce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands of consumers was increased.

-5-

He rather bitterly assailed the United States press for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution after he came to power. I, of course, tried to explain that speaking from some personal experience, it was necessary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with regard to ~~criticism~~ criticism might eventually lead him to take some rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press in the future.

He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was a very disturbing attitude on the part of the American press and the American people generally. His argument went along this line: "yours is a great country -- the richest, the greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, therefore, should be proud and confident and happy. But everywhere I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communism, afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice will be reduced -- afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they have previously. You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -- you should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship."

In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welcomed the industrialization and development of Latin America, that one of our best customers was Canada, for example, which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions improved in any country this was not only good for that country but good for us as well. I also tried to put our attitude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Communism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set up dictatorships. I also emphasized, however, that we realized that being against Communism was not enough -- that it was even more important that we make it by our actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we convince people every place that we want to help them achieve economic progress in a climate of freedom.

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-6-

Several other subjects were discussed but none that I think are worth noting at this point. Significantly enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with regard to economic assistance. His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a Communist and that his policies had the support of the great majority of the Cuban people.

My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere. He is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline -- my guess is the former, and as I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries.

But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred, we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.

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Appendix G

Memorandum for DCI

[for Briefing Vice President Nixon],

29 Feb 60

~~SECRET~~

28 Mar 60

29 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans) *Rudy*

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intelligence

Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being taken or planned against Cuba are:

a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishment Communist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation cannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control Cuba.

b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of a pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the overthrow of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.

c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.

d. [29] reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.

29 February 1960

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VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

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8 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will consider the Cuba covert action program paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing.)

2. Intelligence

Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being taken or planned against Cuba are:

a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishment Communist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation cannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control Cuba.

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d. [29] reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.

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[File: JHP 22 Jan 74

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Volume III

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* Unless otherwise specified all sources are SECRET. Copies or notes of all sources cited are filed under HS/CSG 2632.

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